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A: Preface  
 
A.1 Preface to Portfolio of Work 
The overall theme of this doctoral portfolio is the importance of meaning and humanity. How 
as human beings our pursuit and desirability of achievements, conformity and knowledge can 
often cause us to lose sight of the bigger picture. This is no less true in relation to traumatic 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes as it is to eǆpeƌieŶĐes geŶeƌallǇ. As theƌapists ǁe aƌe iŶǀited iŶto people͛s liǀes iŶ 
a variety of ways and asked to assist them in making sense of things that happen, by virtue of 
our positioŶiŶg as ͚eǆpeƌts͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, agaiŶst a ďaĐkdƌop of ŵediĐalisatioŶ, Ŷatuƌalisŵ, 
enterprise capitalism and bureaucracy, we can become quickly caught up in attending to 
problems and solutions, small parts of a whole, essentially disregarding experiencing and the 
importance of meaningful relationships. Fontana and Rosenheck (2005) identify the need to 
understand the role of loss of meaning in the pursuit of treatment by those experiencing 
trauma. We all, help-seeker and helper alike, can lose sight of this in responding to the 
symptomatology. Further, van der Kolk (2009) reflects on how despite advances in knowledge 
about treatment and aetiology, as well as societal advances in terms of technology, we still 
appear to have missed knowledge and advancement in relation to understanding of the 
importance of context. He reflects that economic and social concerns appear to be 
concentrated upon the discovery of biological components of psychological distress rather 
than upon the prevention and amelioration of the long-term impact of adverse experiences, 
often occurring in childhood (van der Kolk, Crozier & Hopper, 2001).  
 
The pieces of work within this portfolio seek to underline the importance of retaining 
compassion and humanity within a system which, as a whole, seeks to deny the very essence 
of being human: A system that instead attempts to attribute formal logic and simplistic 
understandings to complex problems, tangential with a medical model of psychological health. 
In our desire to do this we can lose sight of the dialectical relationships between all things, the 
importance of the whole, and hence the ability to understand and provide meaning to things 
which would otherwise be inexplicable. Strawbridge and Wolfe (2010) state that attempting to 
use a single meta-narrative to understand and explain complexity is not only improbable but 
also impossible. Therefore, we must look beyond this and integrate effectively; human science 
must be approached with openness and inquisitiveness, such that dogmatism may be resisted.   
 
All too often those with the most extensive experiences of trauma are viewed pathologically, 
and are further abused by a system founded on individualism. Individuals who are essentially 
denied what Haigh (2004) identifies as a fundamental human right to secure attachment 
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relationships, and further denied the opportunity for this in adulthood within the mental 
health sǇsteŵ, laďelled ǁith oŶe of ŵaŶǇ possiďle ͚disoƌdeƌs͛, aŶd ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ iŶ Ŷeed of 
͚Đuƌe͛ at the eǆpeŶse of ĐoŵpassioŶ aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg. Fuƌtheƌ, these aƌe Ƌuite ofteŶ the 
same individuals for whom traditional cures elude and are hence considered treatment 
resistant, challenging, difficult, manipulative, malingering or untreatable; rather than viewing 
the system as challenging, difficult, manipulative and in opposition to the needs of the 
individual who has experienced trauma. 
  
The work that I have selected and will summarise below, draws together different aspects of 
considering traumatic experiences in relation to the reasons that people seek out the 
assistance of mental health services. I bring together professional practice examples of 
working with traumatic experiences in primary and secondary care settings, with empirical 
research examining the discourse of individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder 
that have experienced extensive childhood trauma, and critical review of literature examining 
where we are in understanding the needs of those experiencing complex trauma. As a 
counselling psychologist I hope that I have evidenced the humanistic values of the profession, 
beyond technological competence and psychological theory. A discipline that requires of its 
practitioners the ability to bring critical reflection to bear on all the knowledge that we take for 
granted and to involve ourselves in debates of our time to which we can bring an alternative 
perspective (Orlans, 2009). My choice of theme for this portfolio comes from compassion. 
Compassion for the individuals whom I have been brought into contact with and who have 
been unable to internalise compassion for themselves, as described by Lee (2005); and 
compassion for the many professionals whom become caught in the medicalisation of 
psychological problems, and struggle to disentangle themselves. I hope that in the future as a 
society we may be able to view individuals not in terms of manipulative behaviours but as 
individuals expressing needs and desperate for understanding.   
 
A.1.1 Empirical Research 
Strawbridge and Wolfe (2003) highlight the emphasis within counselling psychology upon 
suďjeĐtiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ŵeaŶiŶg, Ƌualitatiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐes, foĐus upoŶ iŶdiǀidual ͚tƌuth͛ as 
opposed to oďjeĐtiǀe ͚tƌuths͛, the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of alloǁiŶg pƌaĐtiĐe to iŶfoƌŵ ƌesearch and 
knowledge generation, and not simply research informing practice. Lane and Corrie (2006) 
identify that counselling psychology originally combined science and reflection in a way 
uncommon to other applied psychology traditions. The qualitative research that I undertook 
sought to combine science and reflection in this way.  
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When I first became aware of the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder I was already 
working with individuals who may later go on to be diagnosed as such. They were individuals 
first and foremost, and it seemed incredulous to me that as professionals we could disregard 
their experience so flippantly. I believed it to be a matter of increasing understanding and 
compassion. As a result I decided to explore the diagnostic label by qualitative research.  The 
aims of the research, from a social constructionist and critical realist stance, were to identify 
how individuals with a diagnosis of BPD constructed: their experience of the problems labelled 
as ͚BPD͛; theiƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the diagnosis; positioned themselves and considered 
themselves positioned by the diagnosis of BPD.  By using Critical Discourse Analysis I identified 
three dominant discourses and discuss the implications of these with regard to current 
ideology and improving treatment experiences of individuals diagnosed with BPD. As Courtois 
(2004) identifies there are significant similarities between the clinical profile of individuals 
having experienced complex trauma and the symptoms profile of BPD. Further there are 
opinions within the field that reconceptualising BPD as a complex trauma reaction would 
reduce stigma, encourage greater empathy and result in more positive attitudes by clinicians 
to those individuals.  
 
A.1.2 Professional Practice 
The two cases that I have chosen to present in this portfolio had both experienced childhood 
trauma. The experiences were different and they manifested in adulthood in different ways. 
While the individuals were seen in very different settings and required different therapeutic 
approaches, the importance of the therapeutic relationship was significant. Further I chose 
these cases because I saw them at the beginning and end of my doctoral training respectively, 
and they consequently provided different challenges. I believe they reflect my ability to 
demonstrate my competence as a practitioner working with trauma in different settings and 
with different therapeutic approaches, requiring skills as a scientist and capacity for reflection 
on the process and my self as part of that process.  
 
Strawbridge and Wolfe (2010) further identify that within the counselling psychology 
profession importance is placed on the therapeutic relationship, an awareness beyond 
manuals of psychological theory, ethics and socio-political understanding, as well as ongoing 
inquiry and reflection as paramount to the philosophical values of the discipline and integrity 
of the pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs. BeǇoŶd this O͛BƌieŶ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ideŶtifies that iŶtegƌatioŶ ǁithiŶ theƌapǇ 
requires reflection, theoretical knowledge and understanding, and continual awareness of the 
reasons for using particular strategies within the framework of therapy. This involves ensuring 
ǁoƌk is ďoth iŶfoƌŵed ďǇ, aŶd iŶfoƌŵiŶg of, ƌeseaƌĐh. This ƌelies upoŶ aŶ aďilitǇ ͚to ďe͛ ǁith a 
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client regardless of therapeutic tradition. Within work with complex trauma the uniqueness of 
the pƌeseŶtatioŶs aŶd the ĐuƌƌeŶt state of kŶoǁledge ǁithiŶ the field ƌelǇ upoŶ oŶe͛s aďilitǇ as 
a practitioner to integrate effectively.  
 
A.1.3 Critical Review of Literature  
Since commencing work as a trainee counselling psychologist with a particular interest in 
traumatic experience, I was aware of a lack of consensus with regard to best practice. That is, 
when trauma was actually identified and acknowledged as an underlying problem, which 
certainly in my experience within secondary care services was often resisted, there was a 
teŶdeŶĐǇ to aǀoid eǆploƌiŶg ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd huŵaŶitǇ aŶd siŵplǇ ͚tƌeat͛ the pƌoďleŵ. As a diƌeĐt 
consequence I wanted to examine how far the field had progressed with regard to establishing 
best practice recommendations for working with adult survivors of childhood abuse 
experiencing complex traumatic reactions. Within this literature review I also identify the gaps 
and methodological difficulties, as well as identifying the significance of counselling 
psǇĐhologǇ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the field.  
 
Ford and Courtois (2009) identify a whole person approach as important to the treatment of 
complex trauma. This is accomplished within counselling psychology through a therapeutic 
outlook founded on well-being and not pathology. Collaboration is seen as essential to the 
pƌoĐess, ĐlieŶts aƌe Ŷot ǀieǁed as ďeiŶg ƌeƋuiƌed to ͚ĐoŵplǇ͛ aŶd ͚suďŵit͛ to tƌeatŵeŶt as 
expected within a medical model view. Strawbridge and Wolfe (2010) define this as the 
diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚doing something to ĐlieŶts͛ ;p.ϭϬͿ aŶd ͚being with theŵ͛ ;p.ϭϭͿ ;italiĐs iŶ 
original). As such counselling psychology offers not a different method but a different 
philosophy and attitude to therapeutic work. Hence, the reason for considering complex 
trauma in adult survivors of childhood abuse through the lens of counselling psychology. 
Herman (2009) identifies that while it is too early to identify which treatment approaches 
might be most helpful for which individuals and when, there are some emerging constants 
which can be identified and I consider these within this review. 
 
A.1.4  Reflections 
In 1995 I made a life-changing decision, one which led directly to me writing this preface 
today. Having spent many years training to be a musical theatre performer I decided to hang 
up my dancing shoes and train to be a psychologist. Now suddenly I find myself nearing the 
point at which one might measure the attainment of that goal, and reflecting on what it means 
to be a psychologist?  Upon embarking on this professional training journey I had an 
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approximate idea of what that meant, however, the way I see myself now as a professional is 
captured in this quote by Goldstein (2010):  
 
[Counselling psychologist is]an ethical position, which demands something of its 
practitioners well beyond competence. We must profess – in the original religious 
sense – these values in all that we do and we must put these values before the public, 
before they realise they have been mistreated by (health) technologies and then ask us 
why we did not do more to help (p. 680) 
 
The DOH (2007) implicitly promotes CBT as the treatment of choice for psychological 
problems, despite acknowledgement that a range of approaches are important (DOH, 2004). 
However, an alternative to the medical model foundations of CBT is the human science model, 
as suggested by Strawbridge and Wolfe (2010), emphasising humanistic values and positioning 
the individual as having choice and personal responsibility outside of internal and external 
causes, enabling self-awareness and reflection. Furthermore there is a view of the individual as 
a whole and ever developing self. My foundations are in psychodynamic theory, although I 
believe in applying the appropriate technological expertise for both the individual and the 
context in which they exist, for some this means CBT. However, ultimately the ability to 
determine this relies upon an ability to be with the client and apply evidence-based theory 
beyond evidence-based technology, where the goal is attendance to individual needs rather 
than economical ones.  
 
During the course of my doctorate I have had some amazing opportunities which have 
reminded me of the reasons I went into psychology in the very beginning, I mention but a few 
here. In November 2009 I attended the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies 
(ISTSS) Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. I sat in a ballroom amongst 1000 other professionals 
for the keynote address and was struck by the warmth and connection between that vast 
group of diverse individuals from all across the globe, one might suggest a highly positive and 
alternative perspective on the definition of globalisation. I experienced an overwhelming sense 
of belonging despite being a lone traveller. Since then I have been afforded the opportunity to 
implement Lisa Najavits (2002) Seeking Safety programme as part of an innovative and 
forward-thinking redevelopment of our local drug treatment system. This is an incredibly 
exciting venture which I hope will enable me bring a new perspective to the treatment and 
understanding of traumatic experiences locally. Also this year I set up a new service within a 
local remand prison to provide a pilot structured day care programme, while this is small scale 
it has afforded me the opportunity to return to my roots and employ a service model 
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incorporating the therapeutic community principles for effective team working, as identified 
by Haigh (1999), and the possibilities of implementing a variation on a therapeutic community 
model within a prison, as discussed by Cullen (1997).  
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B: Empirical Research 
The enigma of borderline personality disorder: a critical discourse analysis of interviews with 
iŶdiǀiduals diagŶosed ǁith the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛  
B.1 Chapter 1: Abstract 
The purpose of this empirical research was to conduct a qualitative study of the discourse of 
individuals diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) as identified in DSM IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). This is a diagnosis surrounded by controversy 
and debate with regard to its validity and reliability as a construct, its identification as a 
personality disorder, its nosological terminology, and its treatability. From a social 
constructionist and critical realist stance the aims of the research were to identify how 
language was used to construct positions, experiences and roles for those with a diagnosis of 
BPD; how these social constructions of reality may have been influenced by the ideology of the 
mental health community; and consequently, how the ideology and social constructions 
impact upon the individuals. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 7 females and 1 male 
diagnosed with BPD who were not currently involved in psychotherapeutic treatment. Their 
iŶteƌǀieǁ tƌaŶsĐƌipts ǁeƌe theŶ eǆaŵiŶed usiŶg FaiƌĐlough͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ŵodel of CƌitiĐal DisĐouƌse 
Analysis. This led to the identification of three dominant discourses: Blame, Stigma and 
Recovery which were dialectically related and together further constructed the disorder as an 
enigma. The ideology of the mental health community and Western culture and society more 
generally were found to be apparent within the discourses, demonstrated by dialectical 
dilemmas, or ideological struggles as defined by Fairclough (2001a). The ways in which this 
ideologǇ aĐts to ŵaiŶtaiŶ the positioŶiŶg of iŶdiǀiduals as ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛ aŶd iŵpaĐts upoŶ theiƌ 
prognosis are discussed. I further discuss the use of social constructionist approaches to 
therapy and alternative conceptualisations as a way of navigating a path of change for 
individuals with a BPD diagnosis. The limitations of qualitative research are raised including 
consideration of how this research addresses the issues of quality, transferability and 
usefulness of findings.  
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B.2 Chapter 2: Introduction  
 
B.2.1  Introduction to Chapter 
Within this chapter I begin by identifying my reasons for conducting this research and my 
epistemological and ontological positions in relation to this. The literature review that follows 
provides an overview of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD
1
) from a range of perspectives. 
This includes the current theoretical representations and the associated treatment models 
ideŶtified as ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ foƌ BPD. I also identify its historical and cultural origins and 
construction within the psychiatry diagnostic system. Within this I present the dilemmas of the 
diagnosis of BPD and identify how this drives my choice of Critical Discourse Analysis as 
methodology for the research. I then conclude the section by discussing the transferability, 
impact and importance for counselling psychology of studying BPD discourses. 
 
B.2.2  Research Rationale  
After my first degree, I was fortunate to begin my career in Psychology in a Therapeutic 
Community
2
 for Older Adolescents. Within the therapeutic community, individuals had the 
opportunity to establish a secure base, learn to effectively manage their emotions, address 
underlying issues, learn life skills and return to their previous lives with a sense of self that had 
been constructed in an environment of care and safety. This experience provides the 
foundation for my research. 
 
As my career progressed, I entered a world of categorisation and classification of people and 
problems through the criminal justice and mental health systems. I began to hear individuals 
desĐƌiďed iŶ pejoƌatiǀe ǁaǇs aŶd lotteƌies takiŶg plaĐe ǁith ƌegaƌd to ǁho ǁas goiŶg to ͚take͛ 
the Ŷeǆt ͚PD3͛. I leaƌŶed that BPD ǁas the diagŶostiĐ laďel that ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ used to 
describe many individuals from the Therapeutic Community. This label also described the 
individuals with whom I had established good therapeutic relationships within the criminal 
justice and mental health systems. These, it appeared, were the individuals with whom few 
staff wished to work, preferring to use pejorative labels to distance themselves and to suggest 
                                                          
1,3
 Throughout all the chapters in this research I use abbreviations for Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD) and Personality Disorder (PD); this is to ease the flow of the chapters. However, these 
abbreviations themselves represent social constructions; where possible I tried to avoid the 
objectification of the constructs in my language. I identify this point to highlight my awareness of the 
difficulty of using abbreviations; this is not intended to imply the existence of the constructs.  
2
 Refer to B.2.5 for an overview of the treatment approach of Therapeutic Communities.  
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that they ǁeƌe ͚uŶtƌeataďle͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ atteŵptiŶg to gaiŶ aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of theiƌ uŶiƋue 
ways of responding and interacting. This was something that left me feeling discontented and 
uneasy; however, only through conducting this research have I really come to understand why.  
 
It seemed to me that the distinct difference in treatment approach between the Therapeutic 
Community, mental health and criminal justice systems was the way individuals were 
constructed and positioned. Diagnostic labels were not commonly used in the therapeutic 
community, whereas in other parts of the mental health and criminal justice systems, 
individuals were predominantly referred to in this way. In fact without a label the door to 
mental health and support services was closed; worse still with the label of PD the doors were 
firmly closed. The problems were located within the individuals; all responsibility was removed 
fƌoŵ soĐietǇ. I ǁoŶdeƌed if this ǁas ǁhǇ ͚tƌeatŵeŶt did Ŷot ǁoƌk͛; if the ideŶtitǇ that had ďeeŶ 
constructed for these individuals resulted in them responding as they were expected to, in 
͚soĐiallǇ uŶaĐĐeptaďle͛ ǁaǇs. The ǀeƌǇ laďels that ǁeƌe alleged to assist were perhaps 
preventing alternative ways of being in the world  
 
Beginning my career in a therapeutic community, my social and cultural context, grounded my 
view that labelling was unnecessary and counterproductive; adding to an iŶdiǀidual͛s 
confusion about their being in the world. This led the way for identifying my social 
constructionist epistemology - geŶeƌal ǀieǁs aŶd ďeliefs aďout ͚kŶoǁledge͛ - and critical realist 
ontology - ͚ďeiŶg͛ oƌ ǁhat it eǆists. 
  
B.2.3  Epistemological and Ontological Positioning of the Research 
At its simplest Burr (2003) identifies that the concepts of knowledge, reality and truth are 
created by humans through language with language arising out of sociocultural, historical and 
political contexts. Essentially the words that we use to represent or construct our knowledge, 
reality and truth are determined by our experiences; using language as a familiar way to 
communicate with other members of our social groups, further identifying a social and cultural 
context with common beliefs, values and ideals. This way of viewing knowledge, reality and 
truth is identified within social constructionism. Thus, Burr identifies this as concerned with 
the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh psǇĐhologǇ aŶd otheƌ disĐipliŶes ĐoŶstƌuĐt ͚kŶoǁledge͛ thƌough laŶguage 
according to historical, social and cultural contexts. Further, this construction of knowledge 
leads to the mistaken assumption that what we describe through our language actually exists 
i.e. is a ͚faĐt͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ just oŶe ǁaǇ of ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg oƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg soŵethiŶg. This ǁaǇ of 
representing is affected by the purpose of the representation and the underlying ideologies of 
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the construction; where ideology is a system of shared beliefs, values and assumptions with 
common goals.  
 
Critical realism refers to how we understand what exists in the world beyond the constructions 
of our knowledge of it.  Norrie (2010) explains that a natural and social world exists in which, 
irrespective of how we understand it, things occur as a result of their natural entity and the 
effect upon them by other things; the existence or non-existence of things will continue being 
ǁhetheƌ ǁe Đƌeate oƌ use laŶguage to desĐƌiďe theŵ oƌ Ŷot. This ƌepƌeseŶts ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ďut hoǁ 
ǁe uŶdeƌstaŶd this ͚ƌealitǇ͛ is depeŶdaŶt upoŶ ouƌ peƌĐeptioŶs aŶd seŶsatioŶs ǁhiĐh aƌe 
deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ ouƌ histoƌiĐal, Đultuƌal, politiĐal aŶd soĐial ĐoŶteǆt ;HƌuďǇ, ϮϬϬϭͿ. The ͚ĐƌitiĐal͛ 
aspeĐt of ƌealisŵ is ĐhalleŶgiŶg the ĐoŶĐept of ͚tƌuth͛ aďout ͚ƌealitǇ͛. Fƌoŵ this positioŶ ǁe ĐaŶ 
Ŷeǀeƌ kŶoǁ the ͚tƌue͛ Ŷatuƌal eŶtitǇ of the thiŶg oƌ the effects upon it; we can only come to 
understand it in a way which enables us to make sense of it given our construction of 
knowledge at the time. However, as Willig (1999) points out the constructions that are available 
to us depend upon the natural entity of the thing, thus there are limits brought about by the 
thing we are trying to describe. Consequently, critical realism requires us to challenge the idea 
of oŶe ͚tƌuth͛, oƌ a higheƌ oƌdeƌ of ͚tƌuths͛, aŶd the puƌsuit of this, positiŶg that all ͚tƌuths͛ can 
oŶlǇ eǀeƌ ďe theoƌies aďout ǁhat does aŶd does Ŷot eǆist. Theƌefoƌe,  ǁheŶ this ͚tƌuth͛ aďout 
͚ƌealitǇ͛, Đƌeated ďǇ ͚kŶoǁledge͛, is shaped ďǇ ideologies pƌoŵotiŶg the positioŶ of the ŵost 
powerful groups or individuals, we need to challenge this positioning and identify how this 
ǀeƌsioŶ of ͚tƌuth͛ aŶd ͚ƌealitǇ͛ iŵpaĐts upoŶ the eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg of the less poǁeƌful. 
 
During conversation we can be positioned by dominant others, as well as position ourselves 
according to our construction of authority, dependence and powerfulness within the context 
of the situation (Locke, 2004). The Mental Health System is a discourse community
4
 in which 
there is potential for this to occur, due to the ideologies upon which the system is built. The 
social constructionist perspective can begin to identify the ways individuals, who find 
themselves categorised and classified by psychiatric diagnoses and the mental health 
community, are positioned by those diagnoses, the professionals and themselves; how this 
impacts on treatment and affects their being in the world.  
 
B.2.3.1  Research Aim 
In summary the intent of this social constructionist approach is to provide information or 
͚kŶoǁledge͛ ǁhiĐh Đould lead to the alteƌatioŶ of sǇsteŵs ǁhiĐh Đƌeate oƌ ŵaiŶtaiŶ soĐial 
inequity (Fairclough, 2001a). My aim within this research is to identify and understand how 
                                                          
4
 “ee B.ϯ.ϯ Foƌ aŶ eǆplaŶatioŶ of ͚disĐouƌse ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ 
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language is used to construct positions, experiences and roles for those with a diagnosis of 
BPD; how these social constructions of reality impact upon the individuals; what this presents 
with regard to the mental health community; and to identify the origins of the constructions 
through social analysis. The way an individual constructs their being in relation to self and 
others affects the way they behave and dictates their interactions with others (Bajaj & 
Crawford, 2010). Discourse analysis, defined in B.3.4, aims to identify how language/text 
comes to be constructed and the enabling/disabling factors involved (Cheek, 2004). Text is 
placed within and understood through the socio-political, cultural and historical context. As 
such this is particularly relevant in the field of BPD due to the ongoing controversy around the 
diagŶosis, iŶĐludiŶg the ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ that ƌesult iŶ the diagŶosis ďeiŶg ŵade. IŶ B.ϯ.ϲ I ideŶtifǇ 
the specific questions used to guide my analysis.  
 
B.2.4  The dilemma of the diagnosis of BPD  
There exists a great deal of debate about the utility and appropriateness of diagnosis generally, 
and PD diagnosis in particular, with BPD having undergone more research than most of the 
other PDs͛ (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health [NCCMH], 2009). Hodges (2003) 
highlights the extent of interest in BPD as being apparent from the abundance of articles, 
books, and presentations on the subject; she also notes that this, more often than not, has a 
negative perspective. The controversy occurs within a variety of domains: the validity of BPD 
as a diagnosis; choice of nosological term; the position within the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as a PD; the treatability; and the aetiology. Based on the 
current construction of BPD, taken from DSM IV-TR (APA, 2000), the latest prevalence data for 
EŶglaŶd suggests that BPD ͚affeĐts͛ 0.5% of the general population, comparatively psychotic 
disorders in the same survey were identified as affecting 0.4% (McManus et al., 2009). 
Prevalence rates do vary however, with mental health samples being markedly higher. As such, 
Kernberg (2009) suggests that BPD presents a significant public health concern characterised 
by lack of recognition, treatment, funding and extensive stigma emanating from within the 
mental health community.  
 
As implied by Table B.2-ϭ, BPD is ĐoŶsideƌed to iŵpaĐt upoŶ all aspeĐts of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s life 
although there are some exceptions where individuals are considered to function at a high 
level. It is often co-morbid with affective disorders and often confused with bipolar disorder 
(NCCMH, 2009). NCCMH (2009) investigating the treatment and management of BPD 
commissioned by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), identified a 
ǀaƌiaďle Đouƌse of BPD; ǁhile ŵost ǁill deŵoŶstƌate ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ ďǇ late adolesĐeŶĐe, it is 
possible that they will not be seen in services until much later. Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen 
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and Silk, (2003) suggest that 68.6% of the people in their sample had improved over a period 
of six years, to the extent that they met the criteria for remission.  
 
Table B.2-1 Current diagnostic criteria for BPD from DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000, p.710). 
Based on the criteria identified in the previous version of DSM III, Stone (1990) identified 93 
ways in which an individual could meet the criteria for the diagnosis. More recently, Hoffman 
(2007) identified over 200 possible presentations of the disorder; the addition of criterion 9 in 
DSM-IV is thought to have caused this increase. Thus the diagnosis of BPD is applied to a 
markedly heterogeneous group of individuals, which impacts upon outcomes both 
academically and clinically. Generally, medical diagnosis can only be applied reliably to 
homogenous groups because of its essentialist approach. The BPD diagnosis tends to be given 
without use of standardised instruments or structured interviews (British Psychological Society 
[BPS], 2006). Partly because no single psychometric test or assessment schedule has been 
Borderline Personality Disorder  
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and 
marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as 
indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
 
(1) frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. 
Note: Do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5. 
(2) a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating 
between extremes of idealization and devaluation 
(3) identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self image or sense of self 
(4) impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, 
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating).  
Note: Do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5. 
(5) recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior 
(6) affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic dysphoria, 
irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days) 
(7) chronic feelings of emptiness 
(8) inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights) 
(9) transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms 
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found to be more efficacious for making the diagnosis (NCCMH, 2009), this is perhaps not 
surprising given its heterogeneity. In their investigations, NCCMH (2009) identified that most 
clinicians will make a diagnosis based upon a description by a client of their interactions with 
others and through behavioural observation. 
 
B.2.4.1  Validity 
Despite a wealth of research there remains little consistency pertaining to the validity or 
reliability of BPD as a construct (Becker, 2000). While research demonstrates overlap in BPD 
with Axis I affective disorders, this is determined to be evidence of the complex nature of BPD 
rather than a differential diagnosis. For example, one study of nearly 500 patients identified 
56% of those meeting diagnostic criteria for BPD also met PTSD criteria (Zanarini et al., 1998). 
However, this was viewed as co-morbidity rather than lack of construct validity in either 
diagŶosis. IŶ faĐt, BeĐkeƌ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ desĐƌiďes BPD as: ͞“hoƌthaŶd for a difficult, angry female 
ĐlieŶt ĐeƌtaiŶ to giǀe the theƌapist ĐouŶteƌtƌaŶsfeƌeŶtial headaĐhes͟ ;p.ϰϮϯͿ. IŶ suppoƌt of this 
suggestion Adler, Drake and Teague (1990) found that men with identical problems as women 
with a BPD diagnosis were most likely to be labelled with Anti-social Personality Disorder 
rather than BPD.  
 
Further, Becker (1997) states that poor treatment response by, and negative therapist 
responses to, the individual are used as evidence for the existence of BPD. In his role as 
teacher of medical residents Paris (2008) suggests that it is too easy to make a BPD diagnosis 
based on one or two details without reference to the explicit guidelines and criteria identified 
within DSM. Instead he argues that the problems with BPD lay in the lack of specificity of the 
diagnosis, it lacks validity according to the criteria laid out by Robins and Samuel (1970, as 
cited in Paris, 2008). Thus long-term Paris suggests that what we have come to know as BPD, 
may in effect turn out to be a cluster of symptoms without common origins, development or 
effects. In an attempt to apply the diagnosis to a more homogeneous group, Paris applies 
stringent criteria with regard to the domains of the disorder.  
 
Tyrer (2010) highlights that  
…[PD] is a highlǇ uŶpopular dichotomous diagnosis. According to current diagnostic 
practice people either have this nasty condition that no-one in their right mind could 
derive any satisfaction in having or you are squeaky clean with no personality 
distuƌďaŶĐe at all…;p.ϯϯͿ.  
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He fuƌtheƌs Paƌis͛ aƌguŵeŶt ǁith ƌegaƌd to speĐifiĐitǇ, ideŶtifǇiŶg that histoƌiĐallǇ too ŵuĐh 
emphasis has been placed upon the creation of diagnostic categories that lack specificity and 
are created through a combination of dominant belief systems and expert opinion, rather than 
evidence. His suggestion is that where there is a lack of valid and reliable empirical evidence 
foƌ a ͚sǇŶdƌoŵe͛ it should ďe ideŶtified thƌough the use of a diŵeŶsioŶal ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
categorical system; this is something which is being considered for the next version of DSM.  
 
Approaching the diagnosis with regards to its sociocultural context, Millon (1996) argues that 
while PD can be assessed, it cannot be diagnosed. His argument rests on several assumptions 
underlying a systems model of peƌsoŶalitǇ. He positioŶs that the teƌŵs ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aŶd 
͚aďŶoƌŵal͛ aƌe ǀalue-ladeŶ, aŶd uŶsĐieŶtifiĐ, aŶd that the use of ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ siŵilaƌlǇ fits ǁith 
this value-laden and unscientific model when identified in conjunction with personality. While 
nomothetic approaches enable us to gain an understanding of some of the constructs of 
personality they do not identify how different people can be and how every personality will be 
Đƌeated ďǇ a diffeƌeŶt ͚foƌŵula͛. That is, a uŶiƋue seƋueŶĐe of histoƌiĐal, Đultuƌal, familial and 
social factors along with biological and genetic factors which create an individual blueprint 
Ŷeǀeƌ agaiŶ ƌepeated. Theƌefoƌe, ǁe aƌe uŶaďle to tƌulǇ deteƌŵiŶe ǁhat is ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ peƌsoŶalitǇ 
aŶd, ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛ peƌsoŶalitǇ. ‘atheƌ, personality must exist on a continuum, 
irreducible to distinct categories. Essentially, the diagnosis of PD ignores the idiographic 
perspective of personality, emphasising only the nomothetic perspective (Millon, 1996). 
Uniqueness is lost at the cost of reductionism, as within-group similarities are overemphasised 
without consideration of variables extraneous to the diagnosis.  
 
B.2.4.2  Pejorative Labelling 
Lewis and Appleby (1988) found attitudes towards individuals with PD diagnoses to be 
judgemental, rejeĐtiŶg aŶd pejoƌatiǀe. A suƌǀeǇ of ϭϰ seƌǀiĐe useƌs͛ ǀieǁs deteƌŵiŶed that the 
label PD can leave individuals feeling stigmatised by society and professionals (Department of 
Health [DOH], 2003). Stigma related to BPD appears to be connected to connotations of 
attention-seekiŶg ;Nehls, ϭϵϵϴͿ. MaŶǇ seƌǀiĐe useƌs ideŶtifǇ haǀiŶg ďeeŶ Đalled ͞tiŵe-wasters, 
difficult, manipulative, bed-wasters or attention-seekiŶg͟ ;DOH, ϮϬϬϯ, p.ϮϬͿ. Blackburn (1988) 
suggests PD diagnoses are simply a way of disguising moral judgements by mental health 
professionals, demonstrating a lack of empathic understanding for this group of individuals 
(Nehls, 1998). In addition, Lewis and Appleby (1988) found upon surveying psychiatrists, that 
240 of those surveyed believed those with a PD diagnosis were less deserving of mental health 
services than individuals with non-personality disorder diagnoses.  
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Dr Rex Haigh (2006), in his forward to a collection of writings about living with BPD, identifies 
his position in relation to the stigma of the diagnosis:  
Personality disorder is a ghastly term for a very common disposition: the very 
juǆtapositioŶ of ǁoƌds ƌeǀeals its authoƌitaƌiaŶ suďteǆt. It suggests that ͚these people͛ 
are not like us; their characters are flawed and there is probably very little that can be 
doŶe aďout ͚it͛. This is ĐleaƌlǇ ŶoŶseŶse: ϭ iŶ ϮϬ people ĐaŶŶot ďe ǁƌitteŶ off as faultǇ 
human beings, suffer great distress and anguish, and yet be undeserving of suitable 
ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes… ;p.ϵͿ.  
Stobbe (2006) agrees that the stigma surrounding BPD is driven by mental health professional 
attitudes, unlike the societal stigma surrounding other mental health problems. Allen (2004) 
highlights the extent of the problem, how mental health professionals use the label of BPD 
without formally recording it, or providing the information to the client, identifying a lack of 
transparency surrounding BPD as a diagnosis. That mental health professionals tend not to 
share it with clients preferring to talk about it through the use of different terminology, acts to 
maintain the stigma. Allen raises the important question as to whether we, as mental health 
professionals, should be applying diagnostic labels to people that we are not willing to share 
with them, calling into question the underlying paternalism of the system ;BaltƌušaitǇtė, ϮϬϭϬͿ. 
There are lobbying groups who campaign for a change of name, however, Hodges (2003) is not 
alone in highlighting that changing the name of BPD would not prevent its use as a pejorative 
label. Paris (2008) identifies that until we actually know more about the construct itself 
changing the name would be irrelevant and pointless.  
 
Attempts have been made to suggest that a more correct diagnosis would be complex Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Herman, 1992); this being suggestive of less negative 
connotations for the individual being labelled (Becker, 2000). However, trauma is not, on its 
own, sufficient to cause the problems underlying the current diagnosis of BPD. In fact only 25% 
of those experiencing trauma are thought to go on to develop BPD (Werner & Smith, 1992). 
However, for those who have a childhood trauma history, a BPD diagnosis may act as further 
abuse (Shaw and Proctor, 2005). Hodges (2003) compares BPD and PTSD as diagnostic 
categories, identifying BPD as holding pejorative associations, unspecific criteria and 
suggestive of character flaws, while PTSD is identified as an effect of circumstances. However, 
Becker (2000) suggests that both BPD and PTSD are the most indiscriminately used diagnoses 
to be applied to individuals without the use of valid instruments.  
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In addition to stigma, Horn, Johnstone and Brooke (2007) found that the label BPD brought a 
feeling of others power, both negative and positive, something also identified by Ramon, 
Castillo and Morant (2001). Further considering the research the DOH (2003) identified service 
useƌs ďelieǀiŶg theŵselǀes to ďe uŶtƌeataďle. This issue of ͚tƌeataďilitǇ͛, foƌ a loŶg tiŵe, ǁas 
part of the unofficial diagnostic criterion for PD (Alwin et al., 2006), individuals not responding 
to ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ŵethods of tƌeatŵeŶt ďeiŶg laďelled ͚uŶtƌeataďle͛. WheŶ Ǉou eǆaŵiŶe the 
diagŶostiĐ Đƌiteƌia the laŶguage aĐtuallǇ iŶfeƌs this, thƌough its use of the teƌŵs ͚peƌǀasiǀe͛ aŶd 
͚peƌsisteŶt͛.   
 
According to ƌeĐeŶt ƌeseaƌĐh ďǇ HoƌŶ et al. ;ϮϬϬϳͿ, BPD ƌesults iŶ ͞iŶteƌŶalised ǀieǁs of the 
self, where the individual can come to behave and think in disempowered and devalued ways 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith the laďel͟ ;p.ϮϱϳͿ. Earlier Miller (1994) had conducted interviews with 10 
inpatients with a diagnosis of BPD to identify how they experienced the world in relation to 
their social context, treatment and the disorder itself. She found the similarity between 
accounts to be striking with key themes of estrangement, inadequacy and impairment; they 
desĐƌiďed ͞stƌuggliŶg thƌough life͟ ;p.ϭϮϭϲͿ.  
 
B.2.4.3  Social Order and Psychiatric Classification 
Pilgrim and Rogers (2005) identify that the effect of the psychiatric classification system is to 
create a series of checklists foƌ ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ ǁhiĐh ƌeŵoǀes the ĐoŶteǆtual eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the 
individual from understanding. As a consequence Lucy Johnstone (2010) states that we need 
to determine whether BPD would be better conceptualised as an understandable response to 
the problems of living and the conflicts experienced as a result of socially imposed gender 
roles. She suggests that BPD has, in fact, replaced early female diagnoses of hysteria. In 
summing up current thinking on BPD, Gunderson (2009) highlights that it remains highly 
stigmatised. He highlights a need to further understand the neurobiology and a need to 
explore the questions about its conceptualisation as a PD. He believes that its validity has 
begun to be established; however, he also acknowledges the importance of positioning the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s histoƌiĐal aŶd Đultuƌal ĐoŶteǆts iŶ oƌdeƌ to eŶhaŶĐe ŵeaŶiŶg, uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd 
acceptability.   
 
Tyrer (2009) in a discussion article posited that BPD should be removed as a PD diagnosis and 
be redefined and reclassified. Mulder (2ϬϬϵͿ ĐoŶĐuƌs that TǇƌeƌ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs Ŷeed to ďe 
addressed with similar conclusions being reached by NCCMH (2009). Tyrer identifies that BPD 
is the only PD that is not trait-ďased ďut ͚sǇŵptoŵ͛ ďased aŶd as suĐh ĐaŶŶot ďe defiŶed iŶ 
terms of personality. He highlights that as it stands it involves arbitrary differentiation between 
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normal personality and abnormal personality. Paris, Silk, Gunderson, Links and Zanarini (2009) 
agƌee that the diagŶosis is haŵpeƌed ďǇ aŶ eǆteŶsiǀe Ŷuŵďeƌ of poteŶtial ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ Đalling 
into question the validity of the current diagnostic criteria, however it does not mean it should 
be reclassified as a mood disorder or abolished altogether. They believe it should be retained 
such that it provides a treatment guide, as is the intention with all psychiatric diagnoses.  
 
One of the main criticisms and controversies regarding the BPD diagnosis generally is the 
concern that this is a diagnosis of behaviours which are considered socially undesirable, or a 
diagnosis to justify the reason for non-response to mental health treatment (Bajaj & Crawford, 
2010). There is increasing pressure from the political arena for social order which can be 
rephrased as socially appropriate behaviour, and there is continued pressure for this to be 
policed by mental health services (Allen, 2004). However, Becker (2000) discusses this in 
relation to women, to whom the diagnosis is most frequently applied, in particular stating that 
͞MediĐalisatioŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutes to the soĐial ĐoŶtƌol of ǁoŵeŶ thƌough eǆpaŶsioŶ of ŵadness, 
aŶd leads us iŶ puƌsuit of Đuƌes foƌ the ͚disease͛͟ ;BeĐkeƌ, ϮϬϬϬ, p.ϰϯϬͿ. IŶ heƌ disĐussioŶ 
regarding what feminist psychologists can offer to psychiatric diagnosis, Johnstone (2010) 
identifies the contradictions and conflicts experienced by women in relation to modern gender 
roles, positioning mental distress as an understandable response. However, she highlights that 
the pathologising of these social role problems has prevented us from considering alternative 
conceptualisations. Similarly, Allen (2004) highlights the cultural and social pressures upon 
ǁoŵeŶ to pƌoǀide selfless ŶuƌtuƌiŶg; ǁheŶ theǇ eǆpeĐt this iŶ ƌetuƌŶ this is seeŶ as ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛. 
There is, potentially, an additional stigma for men who are diagnosed with BPD, due to it being 
seen as a ͚feŵale disoƌdeƌ͛ aŶd the iŶfeƌeŶĐe of feŵiŶiŶe attƌiďutioŶs of eǆĐessiǀe 
emotionality, lack of consistency, and reliance upon relationships. Gaines (1992) highlights this 
as ideŶtifǇiŶg the ͚GeƌŵaŶiĐ͛ WesteƌŶ ǀalues uŶdeƌlǇiŶg PD ǁithiŶ D“M that opposes 
emotional expressiveness and interdependence and promotes independence and emotional 
repression.  
 
Szasz (1960), in his article The Myth of Mental Illness, suggested that our construction of 
͚ŵeŶtal illŶess͛, iŶ geŶeƌal, is iŶĐoƌƌeĐt aŶd aĐts to pathologise the problems of everyday life. 
He suggested that ͚diagŶosis͛ is ŵeƌelǇ a ŵoƌal judgeŵeŶt ďǇ a psǇĐhiatƌist oŶ the ǁaǇ that aŶ 
iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶfoƌŵs to soĐietǇ͛s Ŷoƌŵs aŶd soĐial pƌaĐtiĐes. “zasz ideŶtifies that ǁe ŵust 
ĐoŶsideƌ ǁho the diagŶoseƌ is ͚ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ͛ aŶd, ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, hoǁ theǇ aƌe positioŶed aŶd 
then subsequently construct their assessment. As well as the ways in which their personal 
ideologies influence their assessments, he suggests that it would not be realistic to think that 
they are not influenced by their own experience of the world. He maintains that, erroneously, 
30 
 
psychiatry responds to problems which are socially and culturally constructed, with medicine. 
The diagnosis results from establishing deviance from psychosocial, ethical or legal norms. 
Thus the psǇĐhiatƌist as diagŶoseƌ is ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ ǁhat theǇ ĐoŶsideƌ to ďe ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ďased iŶ 
their own value system or ideology. Further, Szasz identifies that we fail to acknowledge that 
human interactions are constructed of complex processes. He comments that diagnosis 
depersonalises the individual, removing meaning. Importantly Szasz identifies that for most 
people life is a struggle but as a result of human values, not an internal biological abnormality 
that can be corrected. In accordance with this Hodges (2003) suggests that reliance upon the 
biomedical model of classification of psychological difficulties symbolises our need to label that 
which we do not understand as a way to create understanding.  
 
Concordantly with Szasz, Johnstone (2010) considers the criteria identified by DSM as 
ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg iŵpliĐit assuŵptioŶs of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛, thus iŶfeƌƌiŶg thoughts, feeliŶgs aŶd ďehaǀiouƌs 
ǁhiĐh aƌe soĐiallǇ ͚appƌopƌiate͛. “he also highlights that the Đƌiteƌia ŵake eǆpliĐit ƌefeƌeŶĐe to 
cultural norms but, nonetheless, are stated as medical symptoms. The importance of 
considering the social and cultural influences of those who determined the criteria are raised 
within her article. When a man or woman deviates from the socially and culturally expected 
Ŷoƌŵs of thoughts, feeliŶgs aŶd ďehaǀiouƌs theǇ aƌe thus at ƌisk of ďeiŶg Đlassified as ͚ill͛. 
Further if a woman rejects her expected social role she is putting herself at risk of being 
pathologised. Gaines (1992) further damns diagnosis by suggesting that it supports the values 
and attributes required for the maintenance and progress of a capitalist economy.  
 
Equally, we must be minded that while psychiatry is vested with the power for making such 
diagnoses the institution itself exists within a social environment and as such is created and 
maintained by society. Davies and Bhugra (2004) identify that evident within western society 
and the lay model of psychopathology, is the tendency to refer to behaviour that we are 
uŶaďle to fathoŵ as ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛, ǁith use of language that is derisive enabling separation to be 
created between self and others. Throughout history policy-makers have not only shaped but 
ďeeŶ shaped ďǇ the deŵaŶds of soĐietǇ to ͚ĐoŶtƌol͛ ďehaǀiouƌ that eǆists outside the pƌeǀailiŶg 
social and cultural norms. Thereby, this responsibility currently rests with psychiatry.  
 
Psychiatry is a modernist idea, drawing on essentialist, and reductionist ideologies (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2006) and is currently dominated by a biomedical model of ͚disease͛, or biology. 
MediĐiŶe is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of ͚sǇŶdƌoŵes͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe hǇpothetiĐallǇ 
ĐoŶstƌuĐted fƌoŵ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ aŶd iŶtuitioŶ ;BeďďiŶgtoŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ. The idea, as desĐƌiďed ďǇ 
Tyrer (2010), being to reduce a pattern of symptoms to a single diagnostic category 
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(reductionist) which can be investigated and treated, while simultaneously identifying the 
cause, the intrinsic qualities of the problem, the symptomatology, the prognosis, and the likely 
outcome; these are implicitly deemed to be independent of context and universal for 
individuals with a particular diagnosis (essentialist). By applying a medical model alone the 
social aspect is excluded. Bebbington (2010) states that psychiatry is a social endeavour; thus 
where psychiatry falls down is in the exclusion of social aspects of diagnosis through the 
dogmatism of biological interpretations, despite the obvious social construction of the 
diagnoses themselves. Bolton (2010) in his discussion of the Social, biological and personal 
constructions of mental illness similarly suggests that the problems lie in the desire to reduce 
psychiatry to naturalism, to find a matter of fact, to separate the social and psychological 
aspeĐts of a peƌsoŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs to that ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified as 
evolutionary. However, in describing dysfunction, psychiatry is unable to do so without 
including social and psychological factors and, as such, both enacts and is influenced by social 
and moral norms of the current culture. In essence psychiatry becomes dominant in the 
policing of social order.  
 
In defence of the psychiatric system of diagnosis, Tyrer (2010) identifies the importance of 
ĐlassifiĐatioŶ of ͚sǇŶdƌoŵes͛ foƌ the effiĐieŶt opeƌatioŶ of psǇĐhiatƌiĐ seƌǀiĐes. He states that 
without such classifications we would lack the ability to communiĐate aďout ͚patieŶts͛ ǁith 
efficiency. Every individual would require lengthy discussions identifying all the presenting 
diffiĐulties, possiďle attƌiďutoƌs, ƌaŶge of poteŶtial ͚tƌeatŵeŶt͛ optioŶs aŶd theƌe ǁould ďe Ŷo 
shorthand for this. Indirectly he identifies the increased economic costs of such an approach. 
However, he identifies that the system is hampered by the difficulty in obtaining diagnostic 
ǀaliditǇ due to the laĐk of eǆteƌŶal ŵeasuƌes of the pƌeseŶĐe of ͚sǇŶdƌoŵes͛. JohŶstoŶe ;ϮϬϬϳͿ 
argues that given the heterogeneity of human experience diagnoses can never categorise 
people accurately or provide meaning to individuals about their experiences and the impacts 
of them. Further, Masterson (1990) holds that the diagnostic classification system reduces 
psǇĐhologiĐal pƌoďleŵs to ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛, the supeƌfiĐial aspeĐts of a pƌoďleŵ aŶd, theƌefoƌe, 
presents only an external view of the individual. This approach fails to take into account the 
internal experience of the individual and provides a subject position for the individual of being 
͚aďŶoƌŵal͛.  
 
Powers (2002) advocates that diagnosis prevents voices of oppression from being heard and 
that this is justified through scientific, and medical discourses, despite PD being the most 
vulnerable to social, cultural and political changes due to its lack of similarity to other 
diagnoses (Kroll, 1988). Further, Horn et al. (2007) reinforce the suggestion that PD is actually a 
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ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of pƌofessioŶal disĐouƌse. “iŵilaƌlǇ, Cheek ;ϮϬϬϰͿ states that: ͞at aŶǇ tiŵe iŶ 
histoƌǇ, ĐeƌtaiŶ disĐouƌses ǁill opeƌate iŶ suĐh a ǁaǇ as to ŵaƌgiŶalize oƌ eǀeŶ eǆĐlude otheƌs͟ 
(p.1143). Throughout the history of medicine, the underlying feature of discourse has been 
one of unrivalled concrete truth, essentialism, unquestioning of the societal control 
underlying, in particular, individuals who do not conform to societal norms (Cheek, 2004). This 
may in part be maintained, at least, through the lack of requirement of professionals using the 
biomedical model to be self-critical, to challenge assumptions and judgements, or to reflect 
upon the efficacy of their practice (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; McLaren, 2011). In fact, McLaren 
(2011) highlights that such critique is implicitly discouraged amongst traditional psychiatry. 
 
Demonstrating the idea of unrivalled concrete truth and essentialism further, the British 
Journal of Psychiatry recently published a special article written by 37 members and fellows of 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists, calling for a renewed focus upon the biomedical model of 
tƌeatŵeŶt foƌ ŵeŶtal health pƌoďleŵs ;CƌaddoĐk et al., ϮϬϬϴͿ. TheǇ highlighted a ͞ĐƌeepiŶg 
deǀaluatioŶ of ŵediĐiŶe͟ ;p.ϲͿ as ͞daŵagiŶg to ďoth the staŶdiŶg aŶd the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of 
psychiatry in the minds of the public, fellow professionals and the medical students who will 
ďe ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ the speĐialtǇ͛s futuƌe͟ ;p.ϲͿ. These stateŵeŶts highlight the disĐipliŶaƌǇ 
imperialism, the belief that one discipline is most superior and positions their views as the 
correct ones, within the field of mental health, which reflects the struggle for power and 
supremacy. They suggest that the move away from biological medicine to psychosocial 
ŵethods of tƌeatŵeŶt is politiĐal ďut has ďeeŶ ͚alloǁed͛ ďǇ psǇĐhiatƌists. The aƌtiĐle pƌeseŶts 
ŵediĐiŶe as holdiŶg the oŶlǇ ͚tƌuth͛ ǁith ƌegaƌd to the ͚tƌeatŵeŶt͛ of seǀeƌe ŵeŶtal health 
problems. They suggest that focusing on the provision of psychosocial interventions 
disadǀaŶtages ͚patieŶts͛, aŶd ĐoŶtƌiďutes to stigŵa thƌough the deŶial of effeĐtiǀe ŵediĐal 
interventions. TheǇ also positioŶ theŵselǀes as ͚the ŵost appƌopƌiatelǇ skilled aŶd 
eǆpeƌieŶĐed pƌofessioŶal oŶ the teaŵ͛ ;p.ϳͿ.  
 
Woolfe (1996) identifies the Western biomedical model of viewing psychological problems as 
͚diseases͛ aŶd loĐatiŶg theŵ ǁithiŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual eŶables the application of pharmaceutical 
͚tƌeatŵeŶt͛ to ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ ;FletĐheƌ, ϮϬϭϬͿ. This is dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ eĐoŶoŵiĐs, ǁhiĐh eŶaďle 
outcomes to be measured and the costs to be quantifiable. NCCMH (2009) identify that the 
economic costs of PDs in general are high, and that in terms of healthcare costs, BPD places a 
higher demand upon acute and mental health services which results in higher approximated 
costs than other diagnoses such as depression. Healthcare services are dominated by the drive 
to reduce costs and deliǀeƌ ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ tƌeatŵeŶts iŶ the shoƌtest tiŵe-frames. This not only 
disadvantages treatments which have been developed to address the underlying problems of 
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the iŶdiǀidual ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ of distƌess ;FletĐheƌ, ϮϬϭϬͿ, it also ĐhaŶges the focus 
of the seƌǀiĐes, seeiŶg iŶdiǀiduals diagŶoses as ŶeediŶg to ďe ͚Đuƌed͛ ǁith the ŵiŶiŵuŵ 
amount of money and in the shortest time frame; an inherent effect of Capitalism. Allen (2004) 
highlights further the problems of mental health services, identifying the constant change that 
has been imposed over many years, and the strain that has been placed on resources, resulting 
in a lack of consistency and fragmentation of the services that are available, as well as 
demoralised staff groups. I will consider further the reasons for the dominance of the 
biomedical model following reviewing the historical and cultural origins of BPD within B.2.6.1.  
 
My position with regard to the diagnosis of BPD in this research is that it is legitimised through 
medically constƌuĐted disĐouƌse; the diagŶosis of ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ ĐƌeatiŶg soĐial ĐogŶitioŶ ǁhiĐh is 
Ŷegatiǀe, iŵplǇiŶg a Ŷeed foƌ a ͚Đuƌe͛. This theŶ Đƌeates stigŵa ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ ďe appaƌeŶt iŶ the 
attitudes of staff and society as a whole (DOH, 2003). For example, Forsyth (2007) identified 
that staff were less likely to employ helping behaviours to those labelled with BPD. Further 
research suggests that generally staff are often patronising and demeaning in their manner 
towards those diagnosed with PD (DOH, 2003).  
 
B.2.5  Aetiology, theory and treatment of BPD 
Gunderson (2009) identifies how the recent decade has seen a focus on discovering the 
aetiologǇ of psǇĐhiatƌiĐ ͚disoƌdeƌs͛ geŶeƌallǇ, a ƌeaǁakeŶiŶg of ƌeduĐtioŶisŵ aŶd esseŶtialisŵ 
at the heart of psychiatry. He suggests the research findings indicate a degree of heritability to 
BPD, as well as the possibility of recovery. Gunderson claims that BPD has been established 
during the decade 2000-ϮϬϬϵ as a ͚ďƌaiŶ disease͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ outliŶiŶg the aetiologǇ of BPD 
Joel Paris (2008) identifies that there are a number of risk factors for its development; with no 
single cause of BPD, it is a complex problem and as such requires consideration of social, 
psychological and biological factors. Equally, there is no combination of factors that can 
accurately predict the development of the diagnosis although it may be possible to identify an 
increased risk. Thereby, theoretical models which encompass a nature/nurture interaction 
appear to demonstrate the most likely course of the diagnosis.  
 
In the UK, theoretical insights into the development of borderline psychopathology have been 
ĐoŶtƌiďuted ďǇ WiŶŶiĐott iŶ the ϭϵϱϬ͛s, BoǁlďǇ iŶ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s aŶd ϭϵϴϬ͛s aŶd, latteƌlǇ, FoŶagǇ 
ĐoŵŵeŶĐiŶg iŶ the ϭϵϵϬ͛s ;as Đited iŶ GuŶdeƌsoŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. TheǇ all consider early attachment 
relationships to be influential in the aetiology of BPD. Livesley (2003) identifies the basic 
assumptions underlying all theories of personality disorder to be: the result of unfavourable 
experiences during personality development causing a psychosocial disorder; and that 
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personality is flexible, influenced by therapeutic intervention. However, he identifies that 
generally these assumptions are simplistic and fail to take into consideration the influence of 
biological and genetic factors.  
 
Lis, Greenfield, Henry, Guile and Dougherty (2007) reviewed the neuroimaging and genetics 
research into BPD. Their findings suggest that when an individual, with a BPD diagnosis, 
experiences emotionally traumatising events, such as the prospect of abandonment, there is 
an alteration in brain activity and this alteration is potentially associated with anatomical 
changes within the brain. They highlight the conflicting evidence that appears and suggest that 
this may be a result of the relative youth of the technology or the behavioural characteristics 
of the client groups, potentially preventing a high degree of accuracy in results. They propose 
that differences maybe explained by different experiences of childhood trauma, for example 
chronic versus acute. More recently, Berdahl (2010) has identified a testable hypothesis for a 
neural network simulation of the reactions in BPD behaviours.  
 
Linehan (1993) identified a biosocial theory of BPD, bringing together the experimental work of 
biological psychiatry, psychology and sociology to produce an understanding of the problems 
experienced. The theory states that an individual is biologically predisposed with an emotional 
vulnerability which, within an invalidating social environment, causes an inability to self-
regulate with regards to emotions, relationships, attention and basic needs. The individual 
then internalises the invalidating social environment and continues to repeat patterns of 
invalidation, viewing life simplistically. This results in unachievable goals, and standards, and 
extremes of emotions and experiences causing problems in major life domains, with the 
individual experiencing an overwhelming sense of uncontrollability. The theory draws on 
cognitive-behavioural, biological, social learning and Zen theories in tandem with dialectical 
theory to provide a principle-driven approach to treatment and understanding of the problem.  
 
Therapy involves a balance between acceptance, validation, compassion and challenge on the 
part of therapists and clients. As a whole these aspects are modelled by a team of therapists 
such that a client may internalise them, while also creating a tension which enables them to 
resolve dialectical dilemmas or contradictions. Swales, Heard and Williams (2000) highlight 
that the use of the diagnostic term BPD, in dialectical behavioural therapy (DBT), is purely a 
means of referring to a collection of behaviours. Once these behaviours are no longer present, 
the diagnostic term is redundant. Thereby, they emphasise that the treatment approach does 
not have a belief in the diagnosis, as such, but believes it to be assistive if used appropriately. 
Moƌe ƌeĐeŶtlǇ, Cƌoǁell, BeauĐhaiŶe aŶd LiŶehaŶ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ pƌoposed aŶ elaďoƌatioŶ of LiŶehaŶ͛s 
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(1993) original model, incorporating further biological factors including the role of genetics, 
neurotransmitters, the endocrine system, and the autonomic nervous system. They also 
include new evidence with regard to the role of family psychopathology, attachment 
relationships, environmental factors, and sociocultural influences. They propose a number of 
hypotheses that require testing and identify that continued work is necessary to fully 
understand social and cultural influences.  
 
Dialectical theory is the world-view, philosophical basis, and the approach strategy of DBT. 
Swales and Heard (2009) outline the three principles of dialectics with regard to the concept of 
reality and human behaviours: interrelatedness and wholeness; polarity or opposition; and 
continuous change. Interrelatedness and wholeness, refers to the assumption that we live in a 
system and that we exist only in relation to that system. Therefore, to attempt to examine a 
part of that system without reference to the whole system will, in effect, provide an inaccurate 
view of reality. Polarity, or opposition, refers to the assumption that reality is dynamic and 
contains a continuous sequence of opposing forces, or contradictions. Upon synthesis of these 
forces or contradictions there is a new contradiction of force apparent within the new 
synthesis, such that nothing is reducible to a single part. Hence a dialectical view of BPD holds 
that within any dysfunction there must be function, understanding this can transform a 
theƌapist͛s ǀieǁ of the ĐlieŶt ǁith a BPD diagŶosis. This leads directly to the final principle that 
interrelatedness and polarity result in evolution, or constant change. Linehan (1993) highlights 
that the dialectical theory of change fits with both psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural 
perspectives, however, there is an implied tension of bringing about change which is at odds 
with client-ĐeŶtƌed theƌapǇ ǁhiĐh ƌelies oŶ aŶ ͚uŶfoldiŶg͛ of aŶ iŶdiǀiduals poteŶtial aŶd does 
not require tension for this to occur.  
 
Moorey, Davidson, Evans and Feigenbaum (2006) define psychodynamic models of Personality 
Disorder as conceptualising the problems experienced as being a result of disturbances of the 
individual self with regard to continuity, coherence, agency and affectivity. The development 
of self occurs early in life as a result of attachments to care-givers. The effectivity of the self 
being dependant upon key processes such as mentalisation and memory, such that the self can 
also be experienced in relation to others. Mentalisation refers to the ability to manage the 
experience of mental states of the self and others including recognising, tolerating and 
responding to them as required (Moorey et al., 2006). This is further dependant upon the 
ability for self-reflection to moderate affect, impulses, interpersonal interactions and the 
ageŶĐǇ of self. FoŶagǇ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ideŶtifies that ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of the ǁaǇ the ŵiŶd ǁoƌks is leaƌŶed 
through secure attachment where an infant has the opportunity to explore the workings of the 
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attachment figures mind and thus learn about their own. Mentalisation-based treatment 
(MBT) has been established as an effective intervention for BPD (Gibson, 2006) and involves 
developing skills in mentalising. 
 
Other models which have been explored with regard to treatment have had variable 
outcomes. Transference Focused therapy (TFT) is a manualised and structured form of 
psychodynamic therapy. Schema Focused Therapy (SFT)is based in cognitive theories of 
personal disorders that suggest biological predisposition is influenced by the environment, and 
togetheƌ deteƌŵiŶe the iŶdiǀidual͛s sĐheŵa͛s oƌ sĐƌipts foƌ diffeƌeŶt eǀeŶts that oĐĐuƌ ǁithiŶ 
their lives influenced by the social and cultural setting (Moorey et al., 2006). Also explored has 
been Cognitive Analytical Therapy (CAT) which involves a combination of psychodynamic and 
cognitive theories (NCCMH, 2009).  
 
Another model of treatment which has been applied as an alternative to traditional psychiatry 
is the Therapeutic Community; a residential or day programme in which the social 
environment or community is considered the main therapeutic tool (Haigh, 2002a). Day-to-day 
running of the community is shared between its members including staff (Dolan, 1997). The 
therapeutic community operates according to a democratic style of interaction, reality 
confrontation and accountability for actions, with tolerance of mistakes. In principle not only 
the therapeutic groups but the interactions outside of them are considered to re-enact the 
social and cultural world in a safe environment. Medication is not used. The idea is to alter 
interpersonal interaction by enabling it to be displayed in the community and challenged, 
consequently adapting psychosocial functioning (Dolan, 1997). This is a longer term facility of 
1-2 years, generally using psychodynamic principles (NCCMH, 2009). In this approach the 
therapists, or staff, are Ŷot positioŶed as ͚all-kŶoǁiŶg eǆpeƌts͛ ďut as seŶioƌ ŵeŵďeƌs of the 
community acting as collaborators, facilitators or participant observers.  
 
NCCMH (2009) identify that there are relatively few studies on the effectiveness of treatment 
which are comparable due to methodological problems, including the level of heterogeneity 
ǁithiŶ the diagŶosis of BPD ŵeaŶiŶg that ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ aƌe diffiĐult to taƌget speĐifiĐallǇ. Fƌoŵ 
the limited evidence DBT and MBT have demonstrated the most promising outcomes and 
NCCMH conclude that short interventions of less than three months are not found to be 
effective. They also highlight that the evidence on cost effectiveness is limited. They identify 
Therapeutic Communities to be more expensive than general psychiatric care but to provide 
more benefits, with cost effectiveness being difficult to measure. A review by Zanarini (2009) 
found that DBT, MBT, SFT and TFT all reduce the severity of the problems experienced by 
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individuals with BPD. However, she highlights the need to develop less intensive and costly 
forms of treatment. Interestingly, NCCMH (2009) identify that while there is evidence to 
suggest that pharmacological treatments may assist in the alleviation of co-morbid problems, 
such as depression or anxiety, no drug has been found to beneficial. 
 
Despite the wealth of research relating to the prevalence and treatment of BPD, the lack of 
availability of effective treatments, due to resourcing issues, appears to have led to further 
suppoƌt foƌ the laďel of ͚uŶtƌeataďle͛ ;Nehls, 1998) amongst this group of individuals. Manning 
(2001) highlights the delays that invariably occur between what is learnt through scientific 
investigation and what is occurring in clinical practice; and how classifications inevitably 
develop at either end of the spectrum of experience, impeding progress in the development of 
effective treatments.  
 
B.2.6  Historical and Cultural Origins of BPD 
Borderline as a construction first came into psychiatric language during a time when psychiatry 
was dominated by the psychoanalytic paradigm and the classification system simply reflected 
aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐoŵpatiďilitǇ ǁith aŶalǇtiĐal appƌoaĐhes ;GuŶdeƌsoŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ. MaŶŶiŶg ;ϮϬϬϭͿ 
ideŶtifies hoǁ the teƌŵ ͚ŵoƌal iŶsaŶitǇ͛ ǁas used iŶ the EŶglish speakiŶg ǁoƌld uŶtil the early 
ϭϵϬϬ͛s to desĐƌiďe ǁhat ǁould peƌhaps Ŷoǁ ďe Đlassified as PD. The ďoƌdeƌliŶe diagŶosis is 
generally traced to the work of Adolph Stern in 1938, a psychoanalyst, who noticed that some 
of his patients disregarded the usual therapy boundaries and did not fit into either the 
psǇĐhosis oƌ Ŷeuƌosis ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of ͚patieŶts͛, aŶd thus desĐƌiďed these iŶdiǀiduals as 
͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe͛ ;MaŶŶiŶg, ϮϬϬϭͿ.  
 
Later Kernberg (1967) and Grinker, Werble and Drye (1968) furthered the concept with 
classifications of ͚BoƌdeƌliŶe PeƌsoŶalitǇ OƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚The BoƌdeƌliŶe “ǇŶdƌoŵe͛ 
respectively. In 1968, the second version of DSM appeared within an even heavier influence 
fƌoŵ psǇĐhoaŶalǇsis thaŶ the fiƌst ǀeƌsioŶ of ϭϵϱϮ, ǁith ͚hǇsteƌia͛ ƌeplaĐiŶg ͚ĐoŶǀeƌsioŶ 
reactioŶ͛ aŶd ͚dissoĐiatiǀe ƌeaĐtioŶ͛. It ǁas iŶ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s that BPD ďeĐaŵe oďjeĐtified aŶd ǁas 
the label ascribed to those clients whom professionals found most difficult. The inability of 
psǇĐhoaŶalǇsis to ͚tƌeat͛ this gƌoup of ĐlieŶts ǁas loĐated ǁithiŶ the clients themselves 
(Gunderson, 2009).  
 
Following the work of Gunderson and his colleagues between 1969 and 1979 (as cited in 
Gunderson, 2008) the criteria of the BPD diagnosis, first appeared in DSM III in 1980. Tyrer 
(2009) states that the introduction of PD as a separate axis within DSM occurred as a 
38 
 
bargaining tool to enable DSM III to be introduced. As such the inconsistencies with it remain. 
With DSM III came a reigniting of the positivist paradigm of the 19
th
 century for psychiatry 
(Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005). What followed was an explosion of interest in BPD, evident in the 
academic and clinical publications, and much debate about its cause and prognosis. The 
publications went from being psychoanalytically oriented to focusing on other theories and 
models of the disoƌdeƌ ;GuŶdeƌsoŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. DuƌiŶg the ϭϵϴϬ͛s aŶd ϭϵϵϬ͛s psǇĐhiatƌǇ͛s foĐus 
shifted to become more concerned with the establishment of its place as a medical specialism, 
turning its attention to neurological and biological origins of psychiatric ͚diseases͛ as opposed 
to social ones (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005). Around this time research suggested childhood 
histories of abuse were important for the development of BPD, and concern was also raised 
with regard to the number of women diagnosed (Gunderson, 2009). Consequently, Vaillant 
(1992) suggested with a journal title that The beginning of wisdom is never calling a patient 
borderline. Theƌe ǁas also a ŵoǀe toǁaƌds ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ as iŶĐuƌaďle, ƌeƋuiƌiŶg 
the adjustment of therapeutic goals. As a result Oldham suggests that individuals with the 
͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ of BPD ďeĐaŵe kŶoǁŶ ǁithiŶ ĐliŶiĐal ĐoŶteǆts as ͞dƌeaded paƌiahs͟ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p.ϱϬϵͿ. 
IŶ the ϭϵϵϬ͛s, GuŶdeƌsoŶ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ideŶtified that ƋuestioŶs ǁeƌe ƌaised aďout the peƌsisteŶĐe of 
the diagnosis folloǁiŶg alleǀiatioŶ of ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛. This ƋuestioŶ ƌeŵaiŶs uŶƌesolǀed paƌtlǇ due 
to the dubious validity of the diagnosis to begin with. It was also during this decade that it 
became apparent that childhood experience of abuse was not sufficient to identify aetiology. 
Pƌogƌess ǁas also ŵade iŶ tƌeatŵeŶt appƌoaĐhes ǁith LiŶehaŶ͛s deǀelopŵeŶt of DBT aƌƌiǀiŶg 
in 1993.  
 
B.2.6.1  The dominance of the biomedical model within psychiatry 
A full exploration of the historical development of psychiatry diagnosis and the associated 
political, social and historical events influencing this is beyond the scope of this review. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the development of the BPD construct since the 
early 20
th
 Century occurred against a back drop of political and social change, as well as 
paradigmatic shifts within psychiatry and psychology. These included the impact of war, a call 
for more scientific rigour within diagnostics, a rise of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
demands of insurance companies, and psǇĐhiatƌǇ͛s desiƌe to estaďlish its disĐipliŶaƌǇ 
imperialism within the mental health field. These changes are important for understanding the 
potential reasons for the dominance of biomedical model identified within B.2.4.3 and B.2.5, 
and in contextualising the assumptions underlying traditional psychiatric discourse.  
While mainstream or traditional psychiatry in the UK today continues to rely upon a 
biomedical model this does not mean that all psychiatrists are proponents of the model. 
Within medicine there are different models and theories of psychopathology, as there are in 
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psychology. That is, because an individual is a psychiatry professional does not automatically 
identify their theoretical orientation or beliefs about the development of mental health 
problems or indeed the solutions underlying them, outlined in B.2.5. However, psychiatry has 
become synonymous with the biomedical model, and is referred to generally in abbreviated 
form as the medical model. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) defines medicine as 
;italiĐs iŶ the oƌigiŶalͿ: ͚the sĐieŶĐe oƌ pƌaĐtiĐe of the diagŶosis aŶd tƌeatŵeŶt of illŶess aŶd 
injury and the preservation of health; spec. the science or practice of restoring and preserving 
health by drugs and the regulation of diet, habits, etc., rather than by surgical methods͛ 
(p.1740). This definition does not suggest that biology is the only model within which medicine 
operates.   
Nonetheless, the biomedical model dominates within psychiatry as in medicine more widely, 
with all psychiatrists erroneously but equally positioned by users of services and others, 
including other psychiatrists, with this model. Smail (1996) identifies that despite widespread 
and enduring criticism from both within and outside the profession, little has occurred to 
thwart the continued dominance of the biomedical model of psychopathology within western 
society. In order to understand this dominance and the reliance upon the location of an 
internal physical cause of mental health problems, we must consider the impact of such a 
paradigm upon society and the structures within it. The reasons for the continued dominance 
of this model may be attributed to a number of influencing factors: historical influences from 
the asylum era, the positivist scientific paradigm, social order, the legal system, and political 
and economical interests.  
PƌopoŶeŶts of ƌefoƌŵ of the ͚luŶatiĐ͛ asǇluŵ iŶ the ϭϴϬϬ͛s put foƌth the opiŶioŶ that puďliĐ 
asylums should provide a homely and family atmosphere (Crossley, 2006). This had been found 
by The York Retreat, founded by William Tuke in 1796, to be most effective. However, as a 
result of economics this did not happen and the immense size of the population of the public 
asylums prevented this from being a reality. Crossley (2006) and McLaren (2011) identify that 
the poor were overrepresented within the asylums, and economics of the time meant that 
those who were unable to work became a financial burden to their families. Consequently, it 
was argued that the treatment of insanity required medical intervention, and thereby, became 
the remit of physicians who were medically trained (Crossley, 2006). Despite unease about this 
amongst the profession, due to the lack of success in applying medicine to those with such 
problems, the biomedical model became entrenched in the absence of an adequate and 
simple alternative, and thus the assumption of physical causality remained operationally 
unquestioned. In 1943, the Minister of Health, declared that mental health should be treated 
the same as physical health thereby bringing it under the auspices of the newly formed 
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National Health Service when it came into being in 1948. The mechanistic view of the body 
underlying this decision was permitted many centuries previously through religion, in 
particular Christianity, that allowed bodies to be dissected as a result of the mind-body 
dualism that prevailed at the time (Engel, 1977).  
“hoƌteƌ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ outliŶes that iŶ the ϭϵϰϬ͛s aŶd ϭϵϱϬ͛s theƌe ǁeƌe distiŶĐt diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ the 
rates of psychiatric diagnosing in the US as compared to the UK. This presented a dilemma 
which suggested the process was unscientific and therefore lacked rigour and validity. It was 
not until 1952 that DSM came into being as a classification system standardising the names of 
disorders and diseases, which previously were unnamed. At this time the influence from 
psychoanalysis remained heavy, with half the committee developing the system being 
identified as psychoanalysts. Therefore the classification system was heavily influenced by 
analytic ideas. In 1959, Erwin Stengel published a critique of the diagnostic practice and this 
ǁas iŶflueŶtial iŶ the ϭϵϲϬ͛s toǁaƌds ŵediĐalisatioŶ aŶd sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵethods, aŶd a foĐus upoŶ 
locating accurate diagnoses that would identify cause and course of disorders, moving from 
clinical evidence to empirical research (Gunderson, 2008). This was essential in order for 
psǇĐhiatƌǇ to estaďlish its pƌeseŶĐe iŶ a positiǀistiĐ, teĐhŶologiĐal soĐietǇ. DuƌiŶg the ϭϵϳϬ͛s, 
there was a tendency to psychologise or socialise distress, rather than medicalise it, 
thƌeateŶiŶg psǇĐhiatƌǇ͛s positioŶ to deal ǁith ŵeŶtal health issues (Shorter, 1997). 
Furthermore, as other psychiatric treatments had been unable to produce consistent 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ ͚patieŶts͛, the pƌofessioŶ ƌeturned to reliance upon biological models for 
explaining causation. This despite lack of physical evidence and previous methods of medical 
treatment within asylums, including pouring buckets of icy water over an individuals head, 
making cuts in the skin, whipping, applying red hot pokers and drilling holes in the scalp 
(Johnstone, 2000), proving unsuccessful.  
The biomedical model in contemporary psychiatry enabled social control to continue to be 
enacted through the dƌug ƌeǀolutioŶ of the ϭϵϱϬ͛s aŶd ϲϬ͛s that pƌeĐeded the Đlosure of 
asǇluŵs aŶd ďƌought aďout ͚Đaƌe iŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ ;Busfield, ϮϬϬϬͿ. It eŶaďled ͚patieŶts͛ to ďe 
treated as passive objects by experts with medicines and medical technologies. This was due to 
the assumptions underlying the biomedical model, as identified by Busfield (1989): that a 
malfunction has occurred within the physicality of the individual, that this malfunction is a 
reducible and determinable entity, which can be specifically located, identified and treated, 
particularly with chemical interventions. Further, due to the accepted dominance of drug 
therapy within western psychiatry, non-adherence to medicine regimes are located as patient 
non-compliance, as such the individual is seen as not complying with the authority of the 
expert (the Medical Doctor). In many cases this is defined as part of the mental health problem 
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enabling many to have medication enforced by mental health law. Biological explanations 
immediately remove the problem of mental ill-health from the social environment and 
necessitate aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s depeŶdeŶĐe upoŶ psǇĐhiatƌiĐ tƌeatŵeŶt. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ďeĐause it 
removes the need to understand or determine cause outside of physicality, replacing it with a 
need to know what medicine to prescribe to ameliorate the symptoms or control ͚the 
pƌoďleŵ͛, it ƌeŵoǀes ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ fƌoŵ poliĐǇ ŵakeƌs, soĐietǇ aŶd politiĐs foƌ addƌessiŶg 
social problems (Ingleby, 1981; Navarro, 1976).  
The model protects social institutions and both maintains and enables the attainment of 
capitalist goals (Gaines, 1992). Actuarial systems of insurance companies require the 
application of logical diagnostics that enable decisions to be made about financing for 
psychological problems. Simple systems of physical causality are welcomed by such systems 
for this purpose. Pharmaceutical companies have responded to the proposition of physical 
causality by providing simple solutions, by way of drug therapy. Both insurance and 
pharmaceutical industries are driven by capitalism, profit-making and cost cutting. Without 
biological explanations: drug therapies would be called into question and this lucrative 
industry would experience a decline in trade, as the assumption, both explicit and implicit, of a 
biological cause leading to a chemical intervention would be redundant; and insurance 
companies would be forced to rely less on actuarial systems of decision-making, thereby 
increasing complexity and subjectivity of these systems and consequently costs. The impact 
upon the economy of the losses experienced by these industries, while uncalculated, has the 
potential to be immense.   
Furthermore, the legal system relies upon psychiatry to define mental illness; to identify 
behaviour that is the result of a medical condition and, therefore, removes responsibility from 
the individual and places them under the control of the legal or medical systems (Davies & 
Bhugra, 2004). In addition, when psychiatry is unable to define such conditions, the legal 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk ƌeǀeƌts to the laǇ ŵodel of psǇĐhopathologǇ, ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the ͚ŵaŶ-must-be-mad͛ 
test (Hoggett, 1990), further evidence of individualism. In legal terms biological causes offer 
improved credence, certainty of outcome and are considered less contestable than other 
potentially more complex explanations.  
The biological model of psychiatry negates the need to challenge prevailing ideologies and 
bring about social change to address environmental and socioeconomic factors contributing or 
directly causing mental ill-health (McLaren, 2011). In short where there are no alternative 
methods of ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ tƌeatŵeŶt, the ďioŵediĐal ŵodel offeƌs poliĐǇ-makers means of social 
control that is quick to administer and the costs of drugs are subsumed within health budgets.  
42 
 
In summary, the biomedical model enables hegemony to prevail: Medication regimes treating 
symptoms enable individuals to return to the workplace, as opposed to being supported by a 
welfare system while they address underlying issues causing the symptoms through longer 
term psychotherapeutic treatments. Social control of individuals behaving outside of social 
norms is possible. The ideology upon which policy-makers base their decisions remains 
unchallenged on account of the problems being internally located, even in the absence of 
evidence of physicality.  
 
B.2.7  Transferability, Impact and Importance 
Borderline Personality Disorder only exists because the mental health community, say it does. 
We have chosen to gather together a group of personal attributes, behaviours, and 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd ideŶtifǇ theŵ as ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛. We theŶ suggest theǇ aƌe peƌŵaŶeŶt aŶd 
uŶĐhaŶgiŶg, thƌough ĐhoiĐe of the teƌŵ ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ aŶd the ĐƌeatioŶ of a ĐategoƌǇ laďel 
suggestive of a fundamental dysfunction. In another culture, another language, another 
society or another era this same list of attributes, behaviours, and experiences may be 
recognised differently, or not at all. They may be, perhaps, considered a mood disorder, or 
disorder of social functioning which is not, necessarily, permanent and unchanging. However, 
these three words with their historical and potentially outdated sociocultural origins continue 
to be applied to individuals whose sense of self and identity is already uncertain, at best. 
 
As such the medical model of illness and disease dominates the field of mental health, along 
with social structures such as the welfare benefits system. Without a diagnosis an application 
for benefits is unlikely to succeed and, in many cases, a claim cannot be made. Additionally, a 
diagnosis of PD carries with it a greater stigma than other psychiatric diagnoses. A number of 
academics, researchers and clinicians (Johnstone, 2010; May, 2007; Moncrieff, 2007) have 
proposed a move away from diagnosis in the treatment of mental health problems. Hodges 
(2003) supports a move towards shifting focus from the individual and consequential blaming 
that occurs, to societal power and influence upon the individual. My research will provide an 
investigation into this area, by examining the construction of self through the diagnosis of BPD. 
The research outcomes will provide information on the influence of medical diagnosis on the 
ways that individuals construct their experience and identity, and its consequence for the way 
that they experience the world and their behaviour within it (Becker, 2000). I will use CDA to 
explore client experience of the diagnosis of BPD, and how their internalisation of this is 
constructed through language. This is an attempt, to bridge the gap of BPD research both in 
relation to the client experience and to Discourse Analysis as there appears to have been little 
attempt to examine clients use of language within BPD research.  
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Nehls (1999) identifies that without understanding the meaning of living with BPD we cannot 
begin to improve practice, training or treatment. Counselling psychology uses process as the 
primary means for understanding and affecting therapeutic change. It is concerned with the 
individual, their development of self and their interactions with others (BPS, 2007) and it is 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ǁellďeiŶg ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚illŶess͛ ;OƌlaŶs, ϮϬϬϵͿ. This ĐaŶ ďe ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀe if ǁe 
understand the discourse presented in this relationship and how those with interpersonal 
difficulties construct their experience, position themselves and are positioned, as it provides 
most efficient access to the effect of sociocultural variables on experience. Whether the 
diagnosis remains as a credible DSM classification or not, gaining increased understanding of 
what is constructed in discourse as a result of social, cultural, historical and economical 
iŶflueŶĐes, ĐaŶ oŶlǇ adǀaŶĐe the field toǁaƌds ǁhat is ƌeƋuiƌed foƌ ͚effeĐtiǀe tƌeatŵeŶt͛ aŶd 
the appropriateness of the construct. The humanistic values underpinning counselling 
psychology provide the opportunity to bring new perspectives to the field of BPD research and 
to pƌoǀide ĐƌitiĐal ƌefleĐtioŶ oŶ ͚ǁhǇ tƌeatŵeŶts do Ŷot ǁoƌk͛.  
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B.3 Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
B.3.1   Introduction to chapter and reflexivity 
This chapter describes the research methodology. It identifies how the research was carried 
out, the reasons for my choice of analysis and the procedure. I also consider the issue of 
quality with this type of research. Throughout the chapter I interlace reflexivity in keeping with 
the qualitative approach, considering the impact of my personal context, identified in B.2.2, 
upon the research process. It would not be credible to rely upon an approach that is based in 
critical social theory without acknowledging and positioning myself within that in relation to 
my world view and theory of knowledge, truth and reality. For example my positioning with 
regard to my research aims is based on my construction of reality as a result of my access to 
different discourse communities, which has developed as a result of my personal and 
professional cultural history; this includes employment within the NHS, Criminal Justice, 
National and Local Charities, Private Organisations, as well as my educational, social and 
familial background. In addition, as this is empirical research and with an academic goal to 
further the knowledge of the field and present recommendations for the future of the BPD 
diagnosis; my language is constructed for the academic discourse community, situating it as a 
power discourse.  
 
B.3.2   Rationale for qualitative approach 
My preliminary literature search led me to determine that the vast majority of BPD research 
has been about prevalence and treatment. There has been little focus on experience of 
providers and even less of clients, as demonstrated by Nehls (1994). Aviram, Brodsky and 
Stanley (2006) suggest that this has meant the investigation of stigma around BPD has been 
limited, as compared to other mental health problems such as Schizophrenia and Depression, 
and, therefore, little known of its effects on treatment course. In addition there is only limited 
research on the impact of the diagnosis itself upon iŶdiǀidual͛s constructions of reality. 
Ultimately, this means that service users have had little opportunity to participate in the 
debate on BPD, their experience remains largely undiscovered (May, 2007).  
 
My epistemological and ontological position, as identified in B.2.3, and my research aim led me 
to qualitative research. This was something I was unfamiliar with. I was confident with 
quantitative research; I knew the methods, designs, analyses and most importantly the 
language. The decision to use qualitative research was going to be a new experience and 
involve learning a new language. However, it was something that I believed fitted with my 
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research aim, as stated in B.2.3.1. Discovering how individuals constructed their reality 
following a diagnosis of BPD; the way they constructed their experience of being diagnosed 
and any treatment received, as well as the way their construction of the diagnosis, this would 
be virtually impossible through quantitative methodology, as it would be in opposition to my 
epistemological position.  
 
However, I was aware that by selecting to undertake qualitative research I was moving away 
from the Gold Standard Randomised Control Trial (RCT), influential within the medical model. 
Nonetheless, as a Scientist-PƌaĐtitioŶeƌ I ĐoŶsideƌed that this ͚gold staŶdaƌd͛ due to ƌeliaďilitǇ 
and validity, had not yet provided answers, solutions or ways of understanding for every 
individual. Therefore, perhaps there was another way to understand individual experience in 
order to develop or adapt effective treatments for those whom the treatment protocols, 
developed through RCTs͛, did not reach. For example, Horn et al. (2007) found that individuals 
tended to internalise unhelpful views of themselves that were presented by others in response 
to diagnostic labelling. They suggest that individual formulations would be an important 
alternative and would include individuals in the process thus reducing dehumanisation which 
occurs as a result of diagnostic labelling. Alwin et al. (2006) support this individual formulation 
approach in relation to all personality disorder diagnoses, and Johnstone (2005; 2010) 
proposes this approach as an alternative to psychiatric diagnoses more generally. These are 
examples of how qualitative research can be used to propose alternative treatment options. As 
a counselling psychologist and a researcher I have the opportunity to bring about change using 
alternative or additional methods to those situated within the positivist paradigms of medicine 
and psychiatry. However, I also recognise the importance of maintaining rigour within research 
and later in this chapter (see B.3.7) I address this in relation to quality.  
 
B.3.3   Discourse and why it is important 
There are many different definitions of discourse dependent, principally, on the research 
tradition being employed (Mills, 2001). The study of discourse has been influenced by social 
constructionism, pragmatism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, linguistics, critical 
psychology, deconstructionism, and phenomenology, as identified by Rapley (2007). Bloor and 
Bloor (2007) provide a broad definition of discourse stating that it pertains to all human 
communication and interactions involving language, whether spoken, written or visual 
representation. They identify that it will likely encompass contextual information, historical 
information and shared knowledge between communicators. Furthermore, discourse takes 
place within a socially recognised context (domain) within which social practices and genres 
are familiar. Language enables meaning to be created by way of discourse and, therefore, 
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constructs reality, rather than language being the tool for referring to objects. Within this 
research I use the term discourse to define the particular meaning created by language when it 
is used in a particular way, which is formed by historical, social and cultural influences and 
occurs within a particular group of people, a discourse community. This discourse community 
is held together by shared social practices, genres and social events. The language used will be 
characterised by similar vocabulary, grammatical expressions and implies shared beliefs, ideas 
and experiences. The term discursive construction is defined as the way in which something is 
presented through the use of a particular discourse, or way of communicating.   
  
Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith (1995) further reinforce that 
language and society have been neglected in the treatment of mental distress, with focus 
ďeiŶg, pƌiŵaƌilǇ, oŶ the iŶdiǀidual͛s diagŶosis thƌoughout the ŵeŶtal health sǇsteŵ. TheǇ state 
that understanding language is an essential ingredient for the effective examination of this 
system. They call attention to the fact that who makes it through the gate-keeping system into 
mental health services also appears to be language dependant; the right language sets in 
motion the wheels to aĐĐess the ŵeŶtal health sǇsteŵ. TheǇ pƌopose that ͚faĐts͛ aďout aŶ 
iŶdiǀidual͛s ŵeŶtal health aƌe Ŷot ƌeallǇ faĐts ďut ƌhetoƌiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs Đƌeated fƌoŵ 
ĐoŶteǆtual aŶsǁeƌs to paƌtiĐulaƌ ƋuestioŶs. As suĐh, these ͚faĐts͛ Đould ĐhaŶge aĐĐoƌdiŶg to an 
individuals context.  
  
In 1971, Michel Foucault first described the emergence of the discourse pertaining to the 
ŵediĐal ĐategoƌǇ of ͚ŵadŶess͛. Lateƌ, Paƌkeƌ et al. ;ϭϵϵϱͿ fuƌtheƌ ĐoŶteŶded that the diagŶosis 
of madness was a method of exerting control resulting from a human desire to be socially 
aĐĐeptaďle oƌ ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛. TheǇ highlight that this is aŶ adǀaŶtageous positioŶ ǁithiŶ a 
democracy. By locating the problems within individuals we do not have to acknowledge the 
problems and traumas that individuals have been subjected to in their lives. They suggest that 
when mental health professionals place individuals into clinical categories with the problem 
being located within them, societal responsibility is removed. Meanwhile, a position of 
normality is secured for those who carry out the categorisation, with this categorisation paying 
little atteŶtioŶ to ĐoŶteŶt of distƌess oŶlǇ to foƌŵ. While the laŶguage of ͚ŵadŶess͛ has 
changed over history, and will continue to change, because language is tied up in clinical 
institutions it continues to hold power. Psychiatric institutions are powerful as a result of 
powerful historical regimes, and, therefore, power exists irrespective of the individual 
attitudes of those in powerful positions. It is only by uncovering discourses and exposing this 
power that the system can be enabled to take action accordingly. 
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Further, Parker et al. (1995) also argue that culture is important in understanding and 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg the laŶguage of ͚ŵadŶess͛. If ǁe do Ŷot haǀe the laŶguage (words) to 
categorise then we cannot categorise, with language being influenced by culture. Categorising 
aŶd ideŶtifǇiŶg ͚ŵadŶess͛ is, theƌefoƌe, depeŶdaŶt upoŶ laŶguage. Cultuƌal ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of 
͚ŵadŶess͛ aƌe appaƌeŶt thƌoughout the ŵedia aŶd theǇ highlight that popular culture can 
influence professional culture.  
 
B.3.4   Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis (DA) draws on the disciplines of anthropology, philosophy, sociology and 
linguistics (Cameron, 2001); Carla Willig (2001; 2008) describes how language became a focus 
foƌ ŵaŶǇ of these disĐipliŶes duƌiŶg the ϭϵϱϬ͛s. The theoƌists ďegaŶ to eǆploƌe soĐial ƌealitǇ as 
ďeiŶg ĐoŶstƌuĐted ďǇ laŶguage iŶ oƌdeƌ to adǀaŶĐe soĐial oďjeĐtiǀes. IŶ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s, duƌiŶg this 
͚tuƌŶ to laŶguage͛ aŵoŶgst the diffeƌent disciplines, social psychologists started to challenge 
cognitivism. This challenge was based on the premise that a number of assumptions of 
cognitivism were spurious. The belief was growing that psychological concepts were the result 
of discourse: they were constructed by talk rather than accessed by talk; social and 
interpersonal goals were pursued through discursive resources, and they were used in 
different contexts to achieve different outcomes; this belief was considered to be the basis of 
concepts rather than being a result of enduring cognitive structures which individuals had.   
 
From a social constructionist position, Rapley (2007) reports that DA involves asking questions 
about everything we take for granted in social life, because our understanding of concepts 
suĐh as ͚ŵadŶess͛ is a pƌoduĐt of huŵaŶ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, histoƌǇ, soĐietǇ aŶd Đultuƌe. This offeƌs aŶ 
opportunity for research to be directed towards how things are produced by social processes 
aŶd iŶ ǁhat ǁaǇs ouƌ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of the ǁoƌld has historical and cultural specificity. The thesis 
purports that language is constructive, when you communicate you produce a world. DA 
involves focusing on what version of the world is being created by expressing something in a 
particular way; what identity or meaning is produced. This involves considering what is made 
available to the listener or reader, and what is excluded from them by expressing it in this 
particular way; which identity, membership category or subject position is constructed, what 
impact this has and how it connects to context and culture are all examined. The language is 
treated as opaque, never considered to be neutral (Rapley, 2007).  
 
B.3.4.1   The different traditions of discourse analysis within psychology 
Willig (2001) identifies two main research traditions within psychology which have been borne 
out of discourse analysis: Discursive Psychology and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. These 
48 
 
deǀeloped iŶ the ϭϵϴϬ͛s folloǁiŶg psǇĐhologǇ͛s ͚tuƌŶ to laŶguage͛. While the tǁo tƌaditioŶs 
share a common concern they seek to answer different research questions and are based on 
different philosophies.  
 
Discursive Psychology (DP) was brought into British Social Psychology by the publication of 
Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour by Potter and Wetherell 
(1987), although the name was coined later. It was identified as a psychology due to its 
exploration of psychological concepts including identity and attributions (Willig, 2001). This 
version of DA drew its underpinnings from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, 
asking questions about what and how language is used to construct social interactions (Willig, 
2001; 2008). It is based on the idea that people do not have prejudices, memories or identity, 
instead it is something that they do; they are constructed through discourse (Willig, 2008).   
 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) was introduced after a number of psychologists, who 
were influenced by the work of Michel Foucault and other post-structuralists, sought to 
investigate the link between language and subjectivity, and how this link may influence 
research in psychology (Willig, 2008). FDA focuses on what discourses are available within a 
culture to construct objects and subject positions, the constructions create social reality and 
social order which effect experience, how people think and feel and what they do (Willig, 
2008). FDA explores historical changes in discourse over time and how social processes of 
power relations are legitimised and embedded within institutional practices. In contrast to DP, 
FDA considers discourse to construct subjects, make meaning available and position speakers; 
DP considers discourse to be a tool that speakers use. FDA asks questions about experience 
resulting from the objects and subjects constructed by discourse, and what implications this 
has for ways of being (Willig, 2001).   
 
B.3.4.2   Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
CDA takes a ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist positioŶ; a ͚teǆt͛, ǁhiĐh ŵaǇďe ǁƌitteŶ, spokeŶ oƌ ǀisual 
demonstrates the social and cultural effects on the way individuals, construct their experience, 
others and their actions (Crowe, 2005). CDA asserts that hegemony is constructed through 
language. Hegemony occurs via the accepted wisdom of the most dominant group, so that this 
way of thinking is considered to be common sense and fated. This is what Fairclough (1992) 
teƌŵs ͚ŶatuƌalisatioŶ͛. LaŶguage is Ŷot ͚tƌaŶspaƌeŶt oƌ ǀalue fƌee͛ ;Cheek, ϮϬϬϰ, p.ϭϭϰϰͿ, 
people construct particular texts, consciously or unconsciously, with particular audiences for a 
desired result (Locke 2004). The CDA framework enables us to examine these discursive 
constructions for dominance (van Dijk, 1993). The definition of dominance is: social inequality 
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brought about by hierarchical structures and powerful groups (van Dijk, 1993). Consequently, 
CDA has focused particularly on topics involving political issues.  
 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to CaŵeƌoŶ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ CDA is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the ͚hiddeŶ ageŶda of disĐouƌse͛. “he 
states that the analytic purpose is to identify how the language used functions as a social 
practice that constructs the objects, rather than simply describing them, with the choice of the 
language being ideologically significant. CDA looks for these hidden ideological positions 
contained within discourse, they are not always consciously known by social group members 
(Bloor & Bloor, 2007).  
 
CDA draws its framework and methodology from structural linguistics and critical theory 
(Cameron, 2001), in particular the neo-marxism of the Frankfurt School, Foucaultian 
archaeology, post-structuralist deconstruction and post modernism (Locke, 2004). Critical 
theory involves taking a critical view of traditional ideas about reality, subjectivity and 
knowledge, viewing concepts as constructed and not natural (Cameron, 2001). In identifying 
some of the underlying commonalities among critical theorists, Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) 
highlight that within any society some social groups will be more privileged than others for a 
wide variety of reasons, oppression occurs where the social status of the less privileged groups 
is accepted as inevitable or necessary. One of the main aims of CDA, as identified by Bloor and 
Bloor (2007), is to examine how oppression and discrimination are supported by discourse, 
and how language maintains inequality. They also highlight that the most dominant group are 
best served if the acted upon group accept their positioning as ideologically required. Certain 
social classification systems thereby impose identities on people which may be unwelcome if 
the underlying ideology was known. An example of this would be the attention drawn by 
feminist psychologists to the oppression of women identified in the application of particular 
diagnostic categories, and hence the association of particular difficulties with women (Shaw & 
Proctor, 2005). The analysis requires that a text must be considered both in terms of what it 
does and does not include; what are the alternative constructions that could have been chosen 
(Locke 2004). The analyst considers what the alternatives would suggest for the representation 
and understanding of the world, and what social actions would be brought about. This goes 
further than simply reading ideologies from a particular stance onto a text (Locke, 2004).  
 
When considered alongside DP aŶd FDA, CDA iŶĐoƌpoƌates FouĐault͛s ǁoƌk ďut iŶǀolǀes a 
more ground-level approach to language providing more concrete examples of how texts 
demonstrate social inequities and concentrate on the mechanics of discourse. For example 
identifying grammatical choices and use of vocabulary in contrast to what alternatives could 
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haǀe ďeeŶ used; the ĐhoiĐe of pƌoŶouŶs to ĐoŶstƌuĐt aŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe suĐh as ͚I͛, ͚ǁe͛, ͚Ǉou͛ oƌ 
͚theǇ͛ ǁill pƌoǀide aŶ iŶdiĐatioŶ of hoǁ the iŶdiǀidual ǁishes to positioŶ theŵselǀes iŶ ƌelation 
to what they are discussing. If this is perhaps an attribute which is considered undesirable as a 
ƌesult of ideologies ƌelatiŶg to ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ theǇ ŵaǇ Đhoose to use ͚theǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚I͛. If a 
particular position or collective identity is undesirable on account of social inequity individuals 
ŵaǇ ǁish to distaŶĐe theŵselǀes fƌoŵ the ĐolleĐtiǀe thƌough the use of ͚theǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚ǁe͛. 
While this is similar to DP the framework is different, it is drawn mainly from linguistics but 
incorporates cultural theory, rather than ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. This 
provides a more complex model of discourse practices and their impact on participants (Mills, 
2001).  As a result of the overlapping of ideology and language, careful systematic analysis of 
the language of the text is thought to uncover some of the workings, thereby, exposing the 
ways in which people are oppressed (Mills, 2001). It moves from description of the linguistic 
properties of the text, to consider critically what has been constructed through the language 
choices and their significance culturally, socially and politically in a continual process. This is a 
ƌeiŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of FouĐault͛s ideas, applǇiŶg theŵ suĐh that the aŶalǇsis is ďoth ƌepliĐaďle aŶd 
verifiable, as dictated by the discipline of Linguistics (Mills, 2001).  
 
In summary, CDA focuses on how reality is constructed through discourse and why it is 
constructed in this way; this is achieved by paying attention to both content and form in order 
to identify ideological significance and patterns of choices made by communicators. The focus 
is on what language is selected as well as what is not (Cameron, 2001).  
 
B.3.4.3   FaiƌĐlough͛s ŵodel of CƌitiĐal DisĐouƌse AŶalǇsis 
I have selected FaiƌĐlough͛s ;ϮϬϬϭa; ϮϬϬϯ; ϮϬϬϵͿ ŵodel of CDA because his epistemological and 
ontological positioning is most similar to my own. His approach draws on the work of Foucault 
(FDA); Gramsci (Hegemony) and Habermas (need for transformation through increased 
understanding). His approach is based on the foundation that language constructs social 
identities, social relationships and knowledge and belief systems. In addition he proposes 
particular focus on the analysis of the dialectical relationships within social practices 
(Fairclough, 2001b). Dialectics is a classical philosophical base which has also been used in the 
development of effective treatment for women with the collection of symptoms associated 
with BPD, credited to Marsha Linehan (1993), as described in B.2.5 
 
According to Blackburn (2008) dialectical theory operates on several levels, as a world view it 
places the truth as the whole picture. It is the process, whether natural, historical, or 
intellectual involving constant change, transformation and development. According to the 
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philosopher Hegel (as cited in Blackburn, 2008) this occurs via thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
A view is in place which then generates a directly opposite view which then generates a 
compromise between the two. This compromise then forms the basis of the new thesis. 
FaiƌĐlough͛s CDA also eŵploǇs dialeĐtiĐal logiĐ, as desĐƌiďed ďǇ Chouliaƌaki aŶd FaiƌĐlough 
;ϭϵϵϵͿ, ǁheƌeďǇ ͚tƌuth͛ is ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe soŵeǁheƌe iŶ ďetǁeeŶ thesis aŶd aŶtithesis. The 
idea is that power issues can be identified where one view is stronger or expressed by 
individuals in authority and this prevents the compromise (or truth) from being identified. The 
thesis and antithesis is known as a dialectical pair, and the phrase is used to express the idea 
that there is a tension between conflicting ideas. 
 
This methodology is an attempt to bring to the field of BPD research, both in relation to the 
client experience, and in relation to discourse analysis, an alternative thesis. Within research 
on BPD there has been little attempt to examine clients use of language. This information is 
particularly important to counselling psychology because of its implications for treatment, and 
the internalisation of views of self. Counselling psychology is concerned with individuals and 
the way that they function in the world, and how that is constructed. Counselling psychology 
professionals focus on the development of self and growth beyond symptom correction (BPS, 
ϮϬϬϳͿ. This is paƌtiĐulaƌ peƌtiŶeŶt foƌ the iŶdiǀiduals ǁith ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ aŶd iŶteƌaĐtioŶal 
difficulties. Research concerning the way that individuals construct themselves in language will 
inform the therapeutic process and assist professionals in this field to understand this 
construction more clearly enabling them to be more effective in therapeutic endeavours. I now 
move to identify my research design before finishing this chapter with the analytic procedure.  
 
B.3.5   Research design 
In the following Section I will begin by describing the sampling strategy and participant 
recruitment procedures, including the problems that occurred; following this I will move on to 
identify the procedure that I undertook once participants had been recruited; the next part of 
this section is devoted to the ethical considerations of this research. I have provided cross 
referencing where processes and considerations overlapped. The final part of this section 
details the transcription that was used.  
 
B.3.5.1   Sampling and participants 
The sample was self-selecting to enable individuals to make a clear personal choice about 
participation, without influence from others. However, I was aware that this could make 
recruitment difficult. Also it could mean that individuals who were nervous about meeting new 
people, or wanted to forget about their diagnosis would be unlikely to participate.  
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The criteria I used for participation were: adults over 18 years of age, for ethical reasons and 
because a diagnosis of BPD in adolescents is ill-advised (APA, 2000); male or female; from any 
sociocultural background, although they needed to be English speaking, due to the additional 
difficulties in using translators when conducting qualitative research based on language; they 
also needed to have been formally diagnosed with BPD by a psychiatrist based in the UK, this 
was to rule out any variables relating to non-UK diagnosing practices. I decided not to limit the 
time frame for diagnosis, therefore, no matter when the individual was diagnosed they could 
be considered if they met all other criteria. All were formally diagnosed post-1994, when DSM-
IV was published and an additional criterion added. After further consideration and reflection 
with my supervisor and colleagues I added a further exclusion criterion that participants were 
not to be receiving therapy or counselling at the time of the interview. This was to ensure that 
the therapeutic process was not affected by participation in the research.  
 
In addition, I identified that individuals should not be suffering from any untreated Axis I 
disorders in addition to the problems experienced as part of BPD. In order to identify this, prior 
to interview the potential participant was asked directly about any problems which were not, 
either directly related to their diagnosis of BPD or currently stable. It was explained to the 
participant that the reason for this was to ensure that the interview process was as safe as 
possible for them. The problems they were asked about included: substance-related disorders, 
psychosis or schizophrenia, depression or bipolar, anxiety disorders such as PTSD, OCD or 
generalised anxiety or panic, dissociative disorders, or eating disorders. Several of the 
participants did have secondary diagnoses, and I discussed this with them and established that 
this was something that was suitably stable to manage safely within the research interview. 
Stability was assessed by enquiring about severity, level of distress and protective factors. The 
interview questions specifically directed participants to consider their BPD diagnosis, and 
individuals with a secondary diagnosis tended to stipulate which diagnosis they were referring 
to.  
 
Initially, I decided to offer the opportunity to participate in the research to individuals living 
within London and the South-East meeting the inclusion and exclusion criteria identified 
above. The reason for selecting this area was related to my initial preference for location to 
conduct the research interviews. Conducting the interviews within the University Clinic Room 
would mean that individuals would need to be able to travel with relative ease to the location 
(see section B.3.5.3 for consideration of interview location).  
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My initial targeting for displaying adverts (Appendix 1) included community centres, libraries, 
non-NHS support groups, charities and I also approached several of the main BPD internet 
support organisations in the UK.  The adverts that I used were designed to encourage people 
to consider participating in the research as a way of having a voice and for this to be the first 
thiŶg that dƌeǁ people͛s atteŶtioŶ to the adǀeƌt. ‘eseaƌĐh suggests that people remember 
most clearly the first piece of information that they access or is available to them (Woods, 
2006). I wanted individuals to have the opportunity to get something out of the research and 
ultimately this was the way that I considered people would be most likely to do this. However, 
I received only 3 responses from this strategy and they did not become participants by choice. I 
have no way of knowing why they chose to decline to participate other than my own 
assumptions. In addition several internet organisations declined to advertise the research 
stating that they had a policy preventing them from doing this. I understood that there may be 
many reasons for these policies, however, it was frustrating. I believed that there must be 
individuals who wanted to have the opportunity to voice their experience.  
 
I considered possible reasons for lack of responses: stigma attached to the diagnosis 
preventing people from wanting to talk about it; not meeting the research criteria; willingness 
of service providers to promote research for their own reasons or policies; and the lack of ease 
of taking down the details of the research from the research poster when displayed within a 
public place. After discussing this with my research supervisor I contacted various criminal 
justice agencies and asked them to display my advert and also found a self-help support group 
who agreed to circulate it. This second strategy led to involvement of one participant. 
However, I knew that if I was going to gain enough participants to make the research credible 
then I was going to have to widen my sampling strategy.  
 
I thought about the most discrete ways that I could perhaps reach people. I considered 
approaching a mental health trust or organisation and decided that this would not meet my 
research aims. If I went to a trust, time restraints would limit me to one trust and, therefore, a 
particular discourse, potentially unique to that trust involving power dynamics unique to that 
trust also. I was also concerned about ethical considerations, I did not want to negatively 
impact upon the treatment that individuals may be receiving.  
 
I considered how I might come to be involved in research and how I had done in the past, my 
attention turned to the worldwide web. As organisations were reluctant to advertise my 
research I decided that I would set up my own website. This would enable individuals to 
consider the research in the privacy of their own homes without being seen reading an advert 
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relating to BPD. It would also enable them to contact me with ease, through a link on the 
website. Fortuitously, I was able to secure the domain name 
www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.co.uk (see Appendix 1 for webpage content); I decided 
that I would have three pages on the site which covered the same information as my adverts 
and also hosted a photograph; I thought this ŵight ďe a ǁaǇ to giǀe the ƌeseaƌĐh a ͚faĐe͛. I 
theŶ plaĐed a ͚google ad͛ so that ǁheŶeǀeƌ aŶǇďodǇ eŶteƌed the seaƌĐh teƌŵs ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe 
peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛, ͚ďpd͛, ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛, ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe͛, oƌ ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ theǇ 
would be presented with a link to my website (see Appendix 9 for costs). The search terms that 
I selected ensured that my advert targeted those individuals who were actively looking for 
information on BPD. This was the strategy that proved successful. Over the course of 6 weeks I 
had 437 visits to the website, my ad was shown over 10,000 times, and I was contacted by 30 
people, of these I went on to interview 7, a further participant contacted me as a result of a 
friend seeing the link. While the advert was available to a large number of people, I only 
received communications from 30, this may indicate something about either the diagnosis 
itself or the identities of the individuals with the diagnosis; conversely, this could simply 
indicate a general reluctance to participant in research. Of the 30, 4 were in treatment and 3 
were not diagnosed by a Psychiatrist in the UK; 10 I received no further communications from 
and 6 presented ethical concerns and as such these 23 were excluded from the research and 
signposted as appropriate (B.3.5.3).  
 
It is diffiĐult to deteƌŵiŶe ǁith Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh, hoǁ ŵaŶǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts pƌoǀides the ͚ƌight͛ 
number or a good sample size. I had anticipated that I would like to interview between 8-15 
participants. However, because of the methodology I knew that it was also important to 
ensure that the data that was produced was manageable. The difficulties that I had with 
recruitment meant that I was able to obtain appropriate interview texts from 8 participants. I 
was aware that if any of these individuals changed their mind about the research I would be 
risking losing credibility of my research. However, the individuals who were interviewed were 
very engaged with the process and keen to share as much of their experiences as they could. 
 
Upon reflection I would definitely use the website strategy again, but beginning this earlier 
would yield more potential participants. It is a strategy which gives people the opportunity to 
participate easily and make contact without the undue stress of remembering, noting down or 
taking contact details from an advert placed within a public domain. I would use this in 
combination with some of the other sampling strategies to ensure that individuals without 
access to the internet had the opportunity to take part also.  
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B.3.5.2   Procedure 
All respondents, except one, contacted me by email initially. This seems to be a non-
threatening and indirect way of requesting more information before feeling like you have to 
make a commitment. I responded to all contact within a short space of time, to preserve the 
moment. Each individual was sent a participation information sheet and a copy of the 
informed consent form; they were all thanked for their interest. I identified the need to 
consider the enclosed information before making a decision and asking me any clarification 
questions before they agreed to participate. Some respondents got as far as arranging an 
interview and then changed their minds and discontinued contact. I followed these up with an 
informal email stating that if they did want to participate to simply get back in touch with me 
and we could arrange it. However, if not I wished them all the best on their journeys and 
thanked them again for their interest. A couple of my participants did come back following this 
email and I was able to interview them.  
 
After the responders received further information about the interview I asked them to contact 
me again to let me know if they wanted to participate in the research. At this point I also 
answered any further questions that they had. Only 3 participants requested more information 
and this was with regard to reassurance about confidentiality (see also section B.3.5.3 for 
ethical considerations) and also clarification about what questions they might be asked. At this 
point I decided that I would inform all my future participants that the interview would be 
about their experience of the diagnosis and would not ask questions about their life history 
leading up to the diagnosis. On reflection I could have expected that this might be a concern 
and it may have been another reason why I had low numbers of respondents, because of the 
sensitive and/or traumatic nature of past life experiences. However, I made it clear upon initial 
contact that they would be able to decide what and how much they wanted to share.  
 
I advised those individuals who indicated their wish to proceed with the research that the 
interview would take approximately 1 hour, that I would audio record the interview and that I 
would later transcribe this into text, and I also asked them to check and sign the informed 
consent form (see section B.3.5.3). I explained that following the interview there would be an 
opportunity for debriefing (see section B.3.5.3) where they could talk about the experience of 
the interview process and ask any further questions that they may have. I used a standard 
checklist of questions to ensure that all points had been covered and important information 
obtained (Appendix 7).  
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The interviews took place using a guide sheet of semi-structured interview questions 
(Appendix 4). This was a minimum set of questions which I identified as useful questions for 
encouraging the participant to start talking (Willig, 2001); while keeping the interview away 
from sensitive topics and also giving individuals the opportunity to share their experiences. The 
order of the questions was based on a natural progression from setting the scene to talking 
about perceptions, to talking about treatment, and making any final comments, this is an 
approach highlighted by Willig (2001) as a useful way of conducting interviews and establishing 
rapport. Testimony to the planned order of the questions was that these did indeed follow a 
natural progression in the interview, and often the story would unfold in this way without me 
needing to ask many questions. However, Potter and Wetherell (1987) do suggest that with 
interviews for the purpose of discourse analysis it is useful to ask follow-up questions or 
further questions in different ways about topics, this was my interview approach.  
 
This was my first experience of conducting semi-structured interviews for a major piece of 
research. As this was also my first Discourse Analysis I was not entirely sure what information 
would be the most useful, so I considered that actually hearing the story would demonstrate 
the way in which individuals constructed themselves and would make sense to the client. I 
kept my interjections minimal throughout the interviews as I did not want to shape their 
answers or stories with my perceptions. After the interviews I made some written notes 
relating to the process of the interview and to identify any non-verbal semiotics pertinent to 
the process. As I undertook the first few interviews I incorporated a few more questions which 
had come out of these interviews, including: Do you think it is possible to recover from BPD? Is 
there anything that could have been done differently? How do you feel about others knowing 
about your diagnosis?  
 
I reminded participants before they left that they could contact me or my research supervisor 
after the interview for further clarification or to ask any questions they had not thought of. I 
wanted to ensure that each individual had a good experience of participating in research but 
also that I did not replicate any negative experiences that they may have experienced 
previously. I attempted to convey this through rapport building with all the individuals who 
contacted me and genuine interest in their stories.    
 
B.3.5.3   Ethical Considerations 
I was aware from the outset that this research could raise anxieties about ethics. Primarily 
because of the nature of the symptoms that lead to a diagnosis of BPD. There was no way of 
knowing who would respond to my adverts and in what psychological state of mind they 
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would be in. However, with careful consideration I received ethical approval from City 
University (Appendix 8). In many ways the preparation I undertook was planned to manage 
worst case scenarios. It was not until I began to receive contact from potential participants, 
that the importance of being a practitioner and a researcher became apparent. The skills that I 
use as a practitioner in risk assessment came into play immediately and this skill I had initially 
underestimated in planning my ethics. However, it proved to be effective, as no participants 
who were actually interviewed required further therapeutic support, or became emotionally 
unstable within the interview, and all reflected on it being a positive experience. I think this is 
testimony to the importance of using counselling skills within the whole research process with 
human participants.  
 
Due to the nature of this diagnosis and the purpose of the research, there was a possibility 
that participants would raise questions with regard to their diagnosis. The resource pack 
(Appendix 5) that I prepared enabled me to utilise appropriate signposting when I was unable 
to answer their questions. I was also able to follow up with 2 participants after the interviews 
with information about services specific to their geographical locations. I was very clear with 
all my respondents that the purpose of the research was not to question their diagnosis rather 
to determine how it affected the way they talked about and understood themselves. 
 
As response to my website grew it became clear that some individuals were contacting me 
because they were reaching out in distress or because they wanted information about the 
diagnosis rather than wanting to participate in the research. In these three instances, I 
provided information and signposting to crisis services and support agencies. On reflection my 
professional and ethical responsibilities as a practitioner took priority over my needs as a 
researcher, even though I was aware that this could have ultimately impacted upon the 
research.  
 
There were 13 participants who on the basis of my inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
excluded from participating in the research. I was also aware in my contact with them that the 
research was something that may not be beneficial. I was able to consider their well-being and 
determine their reasons for becoming involved in the research, whether related to their desire 
for support or their wish to use the research as a vehicle to express their anger. I think without 
my knowledge and experience as a practitioner I may have dismissed the meaning in their text 
(emails) as rich material for the research. It was my concern to put their well-being at the 
forefront of my considerations.   
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I received several emails which were incredibly personal and contained disclosures about 
traumatic childhood experiences. Upon receiving these emails, I contacted the individual with 
suggestions of signposting for organisations who may be able to hear their story in a more 
supportive way than a research interview. I took care to ensure that I offered the same 
sentiment about their contact as with other respondents, but was clear that perhaps this was 
not the best forum for them. This was a considered risk because I knew that in many ways this 
could be seen as rejection and I wanted to limit this as much as possible. My perception was 
that for most people it provided the opportunity to write down their story and deliver it to 
somebody who appeared to care and then be able to walk away from it. I used my skills; my 
knowledge and experience in this particular area enabling me to manage this process 
sensitively and effectively, again highlighting the advantage of being scientist-practitioner. My 
natural instinct was not excitement at the prospect of a participant, but concern to ensure that 
in reaching out for support these individuals were indeed pointed in the direction of 
individuals or organisations who could provide that support.  
 
As this research involved human participants (BPS, 2008) they were asked to sign an informed 
consent form to agree that they: were participating voluntarily; understood what the research 
involved; were aware of the possible risks, although these were not outside of the normal risk 
of harm that they may be exposed to while going about their everyday activities; had a right to 
withdraw at anytime; agreed to the recording of their research interview; understood 
confidentiality and that their information would be protected under the data protection act 
and through anonymity; and that I had answered any questions they had about the research 
satisfactorily. Participants were given copies of the consent form, this detailed contact 
information for my research supervisor and myself (Appendix 3 for Informed consent form). 
Prior to signing the informed consent form participants were provided with a Participant 
Information sheet detailing the research (Appendix 2). They were given the opportunity to see 
this information prior to the research interview, so that they could discuss their involvement 
with an advisor and could choose not to be involved without feeling under duress.  
 
Within any context when you ask somebody to reveal personal aspects about their lives and 
their lived experience, confidentiality is imperative not only ethically, but also to enable the 
individual to feel safe to share real experience. Informed consent forms that I asked people to 
sign addressed this, but I also repeated this verbally at the beginning of the interviews and at 
the end, explaining that all identifying details would be removed and no information regarding 
geographical locations or treatment services would be included. This was particularly 
important in two cases where participants were mental health professionals. I spent time 
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providing assurance on this matter. As a result I decided that within the research I would not 
mention any demographic information other than gender and occupation. This meant that all 
participants would be subject to the same high level of confidentiality. The concerns about 
confidentiality were firmly attached to the stigma and altered perceptions that people 
believed they may encounter if work colleagues, employers or clients were to know about the 
diagnosis. This provided important contextual information for the analysis.  
 
When individuals decided that they wanted to participate I arranged a semi-structured 
interview. First I had to agree a location for the interview. A number of issues had to be 
considered, including the participants and my safety, particularly given the potential for affect 
dysregulation of the participants, for example inability to control impulses, anger, self-harm, or 
other extreme emotions. The location needed to offer confidentiality and be a safe 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt. IŶ ŵost iŶstaŶĐes this ŵeaŶt Ŷot ĐoŶduĐtiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁ iŶ the paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s 
home, as I could not determine the suitability of the home environment for this purpose. My 
first choice was to use the Counselling Clinic Room at City University as the safety and 
confidentiality of the environment could be controlled. With the room on the ground floor 
next to security, and a telephone in the room, there was immediate assistance available from 
security or staff, if the participant became very distressed or threatening. I asked a colleague 
to be available in the event of an emergency. Thereby, the clinic room provided a safe 
environment for the both the participant and myself.  
 
There were several occasions when, due to expansion of the geographical catchment, using 
the clinic room was not feasible. I considered not interviewing people on this basis; however, I 
was aware that this would seriously limit my potential sample, due to the other factors that I 
was taking into consideration. Of the 8 interviews I refer to in my analysis 7 were in 
employment, this already indicated to me that there was a level of affect stability that enabled 
the individuals to cope in a work environment, and on this basis I decided that I would offer 
the opportunity to see people in alternative locations. Had the individuals not been in 
employment I would have considered other indicators of stability, as a means of determining a 
suitable location. This, in the majority of cases meant arranging a meeting room at a 
conference facility, again where they were assured confidentiality, and there were staff on 
hand if there was a problem (see Appendix 9 for costs). I offered the opportunity to those 
participants living out of London and south-east to suggest suitable venues where they felt 
they would be most comfortable.  I then made arrangements based on preferences and safety 
considerations. The participants were provided with venue details and asked to contact me if 
there were any problems on the day.  
60 
 
In addition I introduced other safety precautions: rooms were set up to ensure that I could 
easily access the telephone and leave the room quickly if necessary, as a last resort. The 
participants were also advised to inform somebody where they were going, at what time, with 
whom and what time they expected to be back and to give this person my contact number; I 
did the same. I explained at the beginning of the interview to all participants that if at any 
point they felt they wanted to stop or needed a break in the interview they could do this. I also 
explained again that the aim of the interview was to get them to share as much of their 
experience as they felt comfortable doing. I was also aware that I may need to manage 
disclosure; to check out whether they wanted to be sharing such personal information within 
this context, a skill that King (1996) emphasises as being essential to the role of the psychology 
researcher.  
 
In addition I was aware of the contingencies that I would be using to manage distress within 
the interview (Appendix 6). The potential for negative affect was discussed and I explained that 
I did not intend to bring about intense or negative emotions, such as anger, distress, 
impulsiveness or dissociation. However, if this occurred I explained that following employment 
of a range of interventions an emergency contact would be used if required. If they disclosed 
anything which suggested that they or anybody was at risk I would have a duty to break 
confidentiality. None of the participants required any intervention outside of core counselling 
skills. I think that this was for two reasons; one was because I was there to listen to them no 
matter what they said or whether it made any sense; and because I was empathic, non-
threatening, friendly and relaxed, providing the opportunity for validation. Although this is my 
perception of how I came across, there was some agreement in this as participants appeared 
at ease and commented that it was a much more relaxed and less threatening interview than 
those experienced within the mental health system. King (1996) draws comparisons between 
the research and the counselling interview and the importance of using counselling skills. 
 
I provided a debriefing at the end of the research interview; the participant was asked about 
their participation and whether they had experienced any negative effects. It was my aim to 
ensure that the participants did not leave the research environment in a negative state, and 
were in at least a good a state as when they arrived. The feedback that I received reflected 
this, with all participants reflecting that they left the research environment feeling more 
positive than when they entered. In preparation for this I compiled a resource pack (Appendix 
5) outlining details of appropriate support, including signposting and details of suggested 
reading, I also had information leaflets available about BPD, coping with crisis, dealing with 
loneliness, types of treatment found to be effective and dissociative symptoms (Appendix 10). 
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All the participants commented that this pack was helpful and were pleased to be receiving 
additional information.  
 
While it was not anticipated that the research was putting human participants in danger, 
contact details of therapists with experience in BPD, who agreed to provide therapy within 72 
hours, were available and participants were informed of this at first contact. This was to 
ensure that any issues raised could be explored further if necessary with a qualified 
professional, thereby providing support following any negative impact brought about by their 
involvement in the research. I had arranged to pay for a one-off session with either one of 
these identified professionals if it was required and agreed that any further sessions would 
need to be agreed separately between the therapist and participant. When I expanded my 
geographical catchment area, I made it clear to individuals that I would put them in touch with 
a suitably qualified professional living locally to them, if required. None of the research 
participants used this resource. I did receive both written and oral follow-up feedback after the 
interview that the research had been a good experience, with several participants commenting 
positively on having somebody to listen to their experiences (see Appendix 10 for participant 
feedback examples). 
 
B.3.5.4   Transcription 
I used two Olympus Digital Audio Recorders for the interviews; one was placed close to the 
participant and one close to me. This was to ensure that I had back up recordings; and to 
counteract the low volume at which some participants might speak. I was then able to refer to 
both recordings during the transcription process.  
 
There are many schools of thought regarding the transcription of interview data depending on 
its intended purpose. I used principles of the Jefferson system, as described by Potter and 
Wetherell (1987). This system includes fine details such as lengths of pauses, intonation, 
overlapping and extension of vowels. I did not include all the fine details as the purpose was to 
conduct a descriptive analysis which informs interpretation and social analysis, and not solely a 
linguistic or conversation analysis, this is supported by Parker (2005) who identifies that it is 
important to consider the purpose of the transcription. I did transcribe without punctuation 
other than a full stop to indicate a pause of less than 0.2 seconds, longer hesitations were 
indicated in brackets and timed in seconds. The purpose of not using punctuation was so as 
not to alter the text through my interpretation of the placement of the punctuation. This is a 
lengthy process, and it can sometimes render the transcript difficult to read. I have identified 
the length of time taken to transcribe each interview in Appendix 12. Within the analysis 
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chapter I have simplified the extracts by presenting the basic transcription, with contextual 
information, non-linguistic communication included as appropriate. I have collapsed the 
dialogue where I have simply used active listening skills to enable the text to be more easily 
comprehended.   
 
B.3.6   Analytic Procedure  
Through the use of CDA I wanted to explore individual experiences of the diagnosis of BPD, 
and how their internalisation of this was constructed through language. There is not one 
method of doing CDA and the process I used is just one approach, in fact, Fairclough (2001c) 
guards against allowing the process to become prescriptive, instead advising that the method 
be in the approach and not dictated by it. The analysis evolved over months of reading and re-
ƌeadiŶg the tƌaŶsĐƌipts. Theƌe is Ŷo ͚ƌeĐipe ďook͛ foƌ CDA aŶd the appƌoaĐh ƌeƋuiƌes a good 
enough knowledge of linguistics to enable the analysis to be performed. This was the first time 
that I had attempted to employ this methodology, and it is not one that has been widely 
applied within psychology research, this required me to engage in an extensive period of time 
gaining understanding of the terminology, process and broad methods, effectively learning a 
new language. I had to become familiar with the discourse of CDA. My aim in this description 
of my analytic procedure is to demonstrate the process that I undertook, explain important 
aspects of the approach and provide explanations of the terminology. I hope to do this in a 
way which makes CDA accessible to all readers.  
 
The analytical process was undertaken as a modified version of the analytical framework used 
by Fairclough (2001a, 2003, 2009) and considered the ideas of Bhaskar (1993) and Sims-
“ĐhouteŶ, ‘ileǇ aŶd Willig ;ϮϬϬϳͿ. The fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ aŶalǇsis aĐĐoƌdiŶg to FaiƌĐlough͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ 
dialectical-relational approach to CDA is a four stage process, followed by critical reflection 
upon the process of analysis, however, he identifies this is not a prescriptive process and does 
not dictate the order in which presentation of the analysis should occur. Table 3-1 identifies 
this framework and how I modified it to my research.
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FaiƌĐlough͛s 
Stage 
Number 
FaiƌĐlough͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of stage Chapter in which each stage is 
considered within this research 
1  Identify a social problem Chapter 1 - Introduction 
2  Identify obstacles to the problem being 
tackled 
Chapter 4 – Analysis  
3  Consider whether the social order 
needs the problem 
Chapter 5 - Discussion 
4  Identify whether there are any ways 
past the obstacles 
Chapter 5 - Discussion 
Table B.3-1: Fairclough͛s ;2009Ϳ CDA AŶalytical Fraŵework 
Relating Table B.3-1 to my own framework, Stage 1 relates directly to my Introduction in 
Chapter 2, positioning the problem of BPD diagnosis and treatment in relation to its 
psychological, legal, psychiatric, political, anthropological and sociological contexts. Stage 2, 
which I shall describe in more detail in B.3.6.1, relates directly to analysis of my interview 
transcripts in Chapter 4. This stage involves conducting a linguistic analysis of the text
5 
(description); the text in relation to other associated communicative events and chain of other 
social events (intertextuality); the discourses drawn upon within the text and how they are 
(interdiscursivity); the content, constructions and positioning appearing in the text 
(interpretation); consideration of the constructions in terms of ideologies through social 
analysis of the topic (explanation); consideration of the extra-discursive features as described 
by Sims-Schouten et al. (2007). Stages 3 and 4 then relates to my discussion, in Chapter 5, 
what the analysis suggests about the BPD diagnosis, treatment, the ideologies and institutions 
that are involved in it, and how this impacts upon individuals. I also consider potential ways in 
which counselling psychology can assist with regard to the navigation of individual, 
organisational and system obstacles both in professional practice and through academia and 
research.  
 
In order to conduct the analysis I initially identified the questions that I wanted to consider in 
relation to the texts. The purpose of identifying these questions was to guide my analysis and 
keep it focused, such that I could return to the questions to consider what each part of the 
process was telling me in relation to them. The questions I used are in Table B.3–2.  
                                                          
5
 ͚Teǆt͛ is used to ƌefeƌ to the iŶteƌǀieǁ tƌaŶsĐƌipts. WithiŶ DA the teƌŵ ͚teǆts͛ is used to ƌefeƌ to aŶǇ 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe eǀeŶt ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe eǆaŵiŶed ďǇ ŵeaŶs of disĐouƌse aŶalǇsis as a ͚speeĐh͛ eǀeŶt that is 
meaningful and as such may include but it not limited to written text, conversations, speeches, music, 
art.  
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How do participants construct their experience of BPD as a phenomenon? 
How do participants construct their experience of the diagnosis? 
How do participants construct their experience of treatment? 
How do participants position themselves through their constructions? 
Considering the Genre chain what are the participants trying to do by making those 
constructions? 
What do these constructions suggest about the ideology of the social practices which are 
represented in their talk? 
What are the dominant discourses apparent within their talk and through their constructions? 
Table B.3-2: Questions guiding process of analysis 
The process of analysis involved continuous repeated reading of the transcripts (texts), for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, as there are a large number of textual features to consider 
throughout the process and it would not be possible to identify them all on a first reading. 
Secondly, this prevented me from conducting an analysis based on my initial thoughts, 
opinions, ideas, which could have been influenced by my context at the time of reading, by 
returning to the texts I was able to determine whether they had changed at different points in 
time. Finally, the interviews were rich in content and in order to be able to consider the texts 
in relation to each other I needed to ensure I was constantly refreshed of the individual and 
collective content.  I also listened to the audio recordings of the interviews regularly as this 
enabled me to focus on the texts from an audio rather than visual perspective, which assisted 
with the analysis in relation to changes in tone, volume, tempo, and audibility. It was also 
useful to return to the notes that I made about non-spoken features of the text, which I made 
following the interviews, in relation to the audio. This enabled me to identify the visual picture 
that was constructed for me by each participant in the way that they presented themselves 
visually and audibly.  
 
As identified at the beginning of B.3.6, the approach taken was founded in the dialectical-
relational approach of Fairclough (2009). This means that all aspects of the analysis are 
considered to be linked and related to each other. Hence the process of describing the steps of 
analysis is complex. The procedure for carrying out the analysis involved moving in and out of 
each type of analysis throughout. Thereby, while conducting the descriptive stage of the 
procedure, or linguistic analysis, I was also considering how this related to other 
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communicative events that the individual may have been involved in and how these may have 
influenced or been integrated into the constructions within the interview transcripts, defined 
by CDA as intertextuality. In addition to this I considered what other discourses an individual 
may have had access to and how these influenced when they were integrated into the 
discourses apparent in the transcripts, defined by CDA as interdiscursivity.  
 
When an individual takes an aspect of a discourse and integrates it within their own discourse, 
foƌ eǆaŵple ͚depƌessioŶ͛ Đoŵes fƌoŵ a psǇĐhiatƌiĐ disĐouƌse aŶd aŶ iŶdiǀidual ŵaǇ use it 
within their own talk about how they feel on a general basis, this is known within CDA as 
contextualisation. When the integration into a new discourse changes the meaning of the 
original term this is described as recontextualisation. Further while conducting the linguistic 
analysis stage of the overall process, I considered what the structure and content was 
indicating about the underlying ideologies through a process of social analysis. In its most basic 
form social analysis involves considering how different aspects of society, history, culture and 
politics may have influenced both the iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs of eǀeŶts, eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd 
people, as well as the creation of the ideologies. Diagram B.3-3 identifies this process visually, 
as identified by Fairclough (2001a). In essence this presents description, interpretation and 
explanation as occurring as an integrated process rather than an isolated sequential one.  
 
In this analysis I define ideology further, as identified with Marxists, as the world-view of the 
dominant group in society. This is something which is maintained by, or created by, the most 
influential people in society. This ideology may be influenced by political positioning, 
hierarchical status within a community, socioeconomic experience, education and other social 
factors as well as cultural. These ideologies can become problematic when they disadvantage 
those who do not belong within the most dominant groups within society, or when their 
purpose is for social control of others which is not explicit or transparent; and those who are 
placed in a lesser position as a result of the ideology believe that their position is necessary 
and required. Hegemony is the term used to describe how this dominant group maintains its 
dominant position through non-coercive means by convincing individuals, groups, 
communities, nations that this position is the right one, or required, or necessary for social 
oƌdeƌ aŶd ƌepƌeseŶts the ͚tƌuth͛ ;GƌaŵsĐi, ϭϵϳϭͿ.  
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Description  
(Text analysis) 
 
 
 
Interpretation  
(Processing analysis) 
 
 
 
Explanation 
(Social analysis) 
 
 
Diagram B.3-3 Graphical representation of the process of analysis as described by Fairclough 
(2001a) 
B.3.6.1  Analytical procedural steps 
After transcribing each interview (time scales for this transcription are identified within 
Appendix 12) I undertook the following procedural steps, with regard to these steps I was 
continually considering the grammar, vocabulary, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and social 
factors involved throughout the process. I spent time returning to theory and research to 
consider my thoughts around the analysis. Therefore, they should not be considered to be a 
fine detail recording of my steps as this is not possible due to the nature of the methodology. 
The intention of these steps was to enable me to obtain information which would answer the 
questions identified in Table B.3-2.  
 
Initially I considered the choice of vocabulary, with regards to content, knowledge, beliefs, 
expressive value and metaphors; and grammatical choices with regard to their experiential, 
relational and expressive values (Fairclough, 2001a). I also considered what these suggested 
about the individuals interpretation of the context in which the research interview (social 
event) occurred; where they positioned themselves and others, and what roles they placed 
themselves in. I used the questions identified in Table B.3-4 as a guide when going through 
each transcript. I then produced a summary of the answers to these questions for each 
participant for ease of reference.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociocultural practice 
(situational, institutional, societal)  
 
Process of production 
 
 
 
Process of 
interpretation 
 
Discourse practice 
 
Text 
(interview 
transcripts) 
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Difference  Which (combination) of the following scenarios characterize the orientation to 
difference in the text?  
an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of 
difference, as in 'dialogue' in the richest sense of the term  
an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, 
power  
an attempt to resolve or overcome difference  
a bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity consensus, a 
normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or 
suppresses differences of meaning and over norms 
Intertextuality 
– Between the 
network of 
texts 
Of relevant other texts/voices, which are included and which are significantly 
excluded?  
In relation to the speaker and to other voices how are these voices reported? 
(active/passive; negative/positive) 
Are attributed voices quoted (directly reported) or indirectly reported?  
Are other voices attributed specifically or non-specifically 
Assumptions What assumptions are made?  
Existential – about what exists;  
Value – about what is good or desirable;  
Propositional – about what is or can be or will be the case 
Are any of these potentially ideological? (supporting the view of a dominant 
institution) 
Semantic/ 
grammatical 
relations 
between 
sentences and 
clauses 
Predominant semantic relations between sentences and clauses?  
Causal (reason - because, consequence - so, purpose – in order to) 
Elaboration; Contrastative – but; Conditional – if; Temporal – when; Additive – and;  
Higher-Level Semantic Relations? – e.g  Problem-solution 
Are grammatical relations predominantly:  
Hypotactic -  one clause is subordinated by the other (but, because, when) 
paratactic – clauses are grammatically equal or coordinate (and) 
or embedded – once clause functions as an element of another clause or as an 
element of a phrase (where I would put commas or brackets round) 
Are particularly significant relations of equivalence and difference set up in the text? 
hedging expressions - instead of, rather than; kind of; sort of  
Exchanges, 
speech 
junctions and 
grammatical 
mood  
Activity exchange or knowledge exchange? 
Speech function: Statement, question, demand, offer – (as it appears) 
What types of statement are there:  
Statements of fact  - about what is, was, has been the case 
Evaluation  - (about people, things etc) 
Hypothetical – (I might – statement given certain conditions) 
Prediction – (I will – future statement) 
Are there metaphorical relations between exchanges, speech functions or types of 
statement:  
Demands which appear as statements  
Evaluations which appear as factual statements – tƌeated as ͚ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ͛ 
What is the predominant grammatical mood: declarative, interrogative, imperative? 
Representation 
of social events 
What are the predominant process types?  
Material  - ͚doiŶg͛ soŵethiŶg ;a ŵateƌial aĐtioŶͿ 
Mental  - phenomena such as state of mind or psychological event (think, know, feel, 
smell, hear, see, want, like, hate, please, disgust, admire, enjoy, fear, frighten 
Verbal – speeĐh ƌealised ďǇ ǀeƌďs suĐh as ͚said͛ ͚saǇ͛ 
Relational  - realised by the verb or other copular verb ie seem, become, appear, 
have, own, possess 
Existential – about what exists only 
Are there instances of grammatical metaphor in the representation of processes? 
Verbs becoming nouns - nominalisation 
How are social actors represented  
activated/passivated – Is the social actor the Actor in processes (loosely, the one 
who does things and makes things happen) or the Affected or Beneficiary (loosely, 
the one affected by processes)  
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personal/impersonal  - social actors can be represented impersonally such as 
ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the poliĐe as ͚the filth͛  
named/classified – represented by name or category (Fred Smith or the Doctor)  
specific/generic- where social actors are classified  is it a specific group within the 
classification or more general 
Identities – 
(Styles) 
What are the features that characterise the styles that are drawn upon  
body language, pronunciation and other phonological features, vocabulary, 
metaphor, modality or evaluation? 
What styles are drawn upon in the text? 
Modality – 
modality 
choices can be 
seen to texture 
how people 
self-identity 
What do interviewees commit themselves to in terms of truth? 
To what extent are modalities categorical (assertion, denial, etc)? 
Knowledge exchange:    Statements: authors commitment to truth: 
Assert: The window is open 
Modalise: The window may be open 
Deny: The window is not open 
Questions:  authoƌ eliĐits otheƌ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to tƌuth 
Non-modalised positive: It the window open? 
Modalised: Could the window be open? 
Non-modalised negative: Isnt the window open? 
 
What do interviewees commit themselves to in terms of obligation? 
Activity exchange:  Demand: authors commitment to obligation/necessity 
Prescribe : Open the window 
Modalise: You should open the window 
Proscribe: DoŶ͛t opeŶ the ǁiŶdoǁ 
Offer – authoƌ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to aĐt 
UŶdeƌtakiŶg: I͛ll opeŶ the ǁiŶdoǁ 
Modalised: I may open the window  
Refusal: I wont open the window 
 
To what extent are they modalised (with explicit markers of modality)? (modal verbs: 
can, will, may, must, would, should etc) 
What levels of commitment are there where they are modalised?   
modal adverbials: truth: high –certainly, must have; median – probably, will have; 
low – possibly, may have; obligation: high – required, must; median – supposed, 
should; low – allowed, can 
Other  markers include: in fact, obviously, evidently, usually, often, always – Hallidays 
modality of usuality; Sort of, kind of; speakers intonation also indicates level of 
commitment 
Evaluation To what values (in terms of what is desirable or undesirable) do authors commit 
themselves? 
How are values realised – as:  
evaluative statements – statements about desirability or undesirability (what is good 
or bad)? 
statements with obligation/necessity – use of modal adverbials etc 
statements with affective mental processes – subjectively marked evaluations ie I 
like this  
or assumed values – less appaƌeŶt aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ŵaƌkeƌs foƌ eǆaŵple ͚helps to….͛ 
Assumptions of shared familiarity, belief in shared values 
Legitimation – 
Is there any 
evidence of 
this? 
Authorisation – legitimation by reference to the authority or tradition, custom, law 
and or persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested 
Rationalisation – legitimisation by reference to the utility of institutionalized action, 
and to the knowledges society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity 
Moral evaluation – legitimation by reference to value systems 
Mythopoesis – Legitimation through narrative 
Ideational  How is the thought of the author transformed into the message?  
What can we infer about what author trying to do? 
Table B.3-4 Fairclough (2003) Textual Analysis Checklist (adapted) (p.191-194) 
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Following this I returned to the transcripts and identified the different constructions and 
discourses that appeared within them. The discourses were identified by considering the items 
in Table B.3-5. This resulted in the identification of 54 possible discourses. I was then able to 
identify those which were repeated, occurred frequently, or could be considered as part of a 
larger discourse framework identifying 9 discourses.  
 
I then returned to the texts and collated all the samples of text from each of the transcripts 
under each discourse. This then enabled me to identify what the text was trying to do or 
construct in relation to that discourse. Once I had done this I was able to identify the 
constructions present within each discourse. Of the 9 discourses it was then apparent that 6 
could be considered within the other 3 according to what was being constructed by the 
participants. This provided me with the 3 dominant discourses: blame, stigma and recovery. 
 
Following this I revisited the texts again with regard to each dominant discourse and 
considered further the social determinants, ideologies and effects of these discourses. 
Throughout this process I considered intertextuality, recontextualisation, interdiscursivity. 
With regard to intertextual analysis I considered that for each individual their interviews drew 
upon other conversations relating to BPD involving professionals/friends; other research 
iŶteƌǀieǁs; iŶteƌǀieǁees oǁŶ ͚ƌeseaƌĐh͛ ƌelatiŶg to BPD. The iŶteƌǀieǁ also took plaĐe iŶ a 
chain of other social events related to this one: responding to advert, emailing, making 
arrangements, meeting participant, contact following interviews, receiving feedback upon 
completed research. As a specific genre of social practice I considered the semi-structured 
psychology research interview to be placed amongst other social practices which these 
participants may have experienced including: psychiatric appointments; appointments with 
mental health professionals; receiving treatment; work place behaviour. When considering the 
individuals reasons for participation and, consequently the purpose for which they constructed 
their talk it was important to consider the genre chain, and this I determined to be: the 
research interview; then the transfer of my findings to thesis; the transfer of thesis to scientific 
journal; and finally the potential for the research findings to influence possible social change. 
 
Next I had to determine which sections of text I would use within the analysis section to 
present what I had discovered. This was a matter of identifying those which provided the 
strongest examples of the discourse while also being rich with information regarding discursive 
constructions, subject positioning, use of vocabulary and grammar.  
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What I have presented in the analysis section are the dominant discourses as I identified them. 
With regard to the main constructions within those dominant discourses, another researcher 
may have chosen to label these differently or to identify other constructions, as the interview 
texts were rich with these, however, as a result of the scope of this research I had to 
determine those which occurred mostly frequently or represented deviation, not agreeing with 
other discursive constructions. The result of this is presented within the next chapter 
 
 
Table B.3-5 Fairclough (2003) Discourse identification checklist (adapted) (p.193) 
 
B.3.7   Credibility of the research and dependability of the data 
Qualitative research data is by definition naturalistic (Willig, 2001), therefore, it has been 
argued that the same positivist paradigm of quantitative research cannot be appropriately 
applied. Instead Merrick (1999) describes the qualitative equivalents to validity and reliability 
within quantitative research as credibility (validity) and dependability (reliability).  
 
Within my interviews one of the credibility controls involved summarising and paraphrasing 
regularly what I thought the participant was saying, and at the end of the interview I 
summarised the main points that I thought the participant had said, this is a method 
highlighted by a number of researchers including Potter (1996) and Willig (2001). A major part 
of the quality measure within my research involves reflexivity, relevant not only because of the 
qualitative methodology but also because of my social constructionist position. I have reflected 
upon my position within, and impact upon, the process throughout the research. This 
highlights where my perceptions and discourses influence the text and my analysis of it (Willig, 
ϮϬϬϭͿ. While Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh is less ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ͚ƌeliaďilitǇ͛, theƌe is a diffeƌeŶĐe iŶ 
opinion between researchers about its importance. However, because of the transparency of 
the analysis and reflexivity it should be possible for another researcher to examine my data 
Discourse identification  
Think of discourse as: 
(a) representing some part of the world and  
b) representing it from a particular perspective 
So in text analysis: 
Identify the main parts of the world (including areas of social life) which are represented – the main 
͚theŵes͛ 
Identify the particular perspective or angle or point of view from which they are represented 
What are the features that characterise the discourses (semantic relations between words, 
collocations, metaphors, assumptions, grammatical features)? 
Identify the relevant classification systems (what words are used that belong to that classification 
system and enable us to understand what is being talked about without being explicit) – synonym, 
hyponym, antonym 
Identify what vocabulary is used but also how it is used 
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and identify how I reached my conclusions (Silverman, 2005) referred to by Potter (1996) as 
readers evaluation.  
 
The sample I used was self-selecting, while participation was determined by the individual, the 
sampling strategy enabled over 10,000 people (statistics provided by Google ad account) who 
were searching for information on the internet to access the research if they wished. The 
Google Ad was shown 10,000 times when certain keywords were keyed in; this provided a link 
to the website. Therefore, with regard to representativeness it is possible to assume 
universality within groups of individuals with the BPD diagnosis who have similar discourses, as 
suggested by Willig (2001). In addition, this analysis can build upon the small body of work 
conducted in the field already on the experiences of individuals with the diagnosis of BPD, 
identifying coherence in the data (Potter, 1996). In addition, coherence highlights any deviance 
in patterns and whether there are any special features of the deviant-cases which provide 
eǆplaŶatioŶ, if Ŷot theŶ this ĐaŶ ďe deteƌŵiŶed to ďe a patteƌŶ ǁhiĐh is ͚uŶƌeliaďle͛ ;Potteƌ & 
Wetherell, 1987). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
B.4 Chapter 4: Analysis  
 
B.4.1   Setting the scene - Introduction to the Chapter  
In this chapter I present the results of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which I conducted 
on the interview transcripts using the analytic procedure outlined in C3.6. I begin by briefly 
introducing my participants, setting the context for the analysis. Following this I will present 
the discourse framework, identifying the dominant discourses I determined through my 
analysis and present the evidence for these. After drawing this chapter together in a summary, 
I will then present my reflections on the process of analysis, in conjunction with the 
considerations and difficulties I was presented with through the analysis. 
 
Where I provide quotes
6
 I have differentiated between texts with fictitious names, as identified 
in B.4.2. Individual identities have been protected, and where names of people and places 
occur in the quotes the specifics have been removed and replaced with general categories or 
the fictitious names identified by italics. In order to aid understanding of the linguistic analysis 
some words in quotes have been placed in bold to identify those to which I am referring.  
 
B.4.2   Introducing my research participants  
Each one of the individuals who responded to my research advert is unique. Their life 
experiences, educational, economic, cultural and social backgrounds, as well as biology, result 
in this uniqueness; they are heterogeneous. Despite their heterogeneity, just three words 
bring them together with a single diagnostic category used to describe their collective 
experience, BPD. It is apparent from my interviews with them that after this categorisation all 
individuals, no matter how variant their experience, are considered only in relation to these 
three words. Perhaps unsurprisingly individual meaning is lost; cause is glanced over, and 
prospect of recovery unconsidered in relation to the individual. Nonetheless, each in their own 
individual way seeks resolution of these issues, and the diagnostic category appears to fail to 
provide these answers either directly or by indirect consequence.  
 
Appendix B13 provides a brief description of each participant. It presents the participants in a 
way which enables the readers to have a greater understanding for their discursive positioning 
and use of discursive constructions. These are real people and each has come to participate in 
                                                          
6
 There are many quotes which have not been included as examples for this section, this is due to the 
need to manage the qualitative data effectively so as not to include superficial data which dilutes the 
presentation of the results, and also due to limitations on space. However, I consider the implications of 
this and my position as transcript editor within my reflections as this presented a significant challenge.  
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this research for their own reasons, and thus their language can be viewed to be constructed 
accordingly. I believe that as a scientist-practitioner I have a duty not only to further the 
knowledge of the field of counselling psychology for the benefit of future generations, but also 
to do justice to the voices of those in the present. I hope that I have accomplished this within 
my analysis.  
 
In keeping with the qualitative methodology, I have selected fictitious names for each 
interviewee, these names were the most popular in England during the 17
th
 Century, pre the 
diagnostic classification systems that we know today, and pre-borderline concept. The names 
were chosen from the Top 50 names, as identified by Smith-Bannister (1997), selected in 
alphabetical order. From hereon the participants will be identified as Anne, Beatrice, 
Clemence, Dorothy, Ellen, Francis, Grace and Helen.  
 
Some of the experiences of these individuals are similar: each has experienced varying types 
and degrees of childhood trauma; each has received additional diagnoses over the years; each 
is looking for an explanation, a meaning, an answer to the enigma of an experience labelled 
BPD, and seeks to resolve the dilemma of permanence that the diagnosis clearly brings with it. 
Stigma, blame and recovery all fall within the overall enigma of the disorder and are the 
dominant discourses apparent within the transcripts.   
 
B.4.3  Discourse Framework 
One of the most striking features of the interviews was the presentation of BPD as an enigma. 
Across the 8 interviews it became clear that while the use of a label had brought with it, 
initially, a sense of identity, of belonging, of relief even for many. The term itself and the 
method by which it was presented to the individual resulted in more questions than answers; a 
loss of meaning and increased lack of understanding between and within people. The impact 
of this apparent void, this unexplained phenomenon being dependant upon the individual and 
the coping resources they employed, along with the availability of certain types of treatment. 
The dominant discourses apparent throughout all the interviews adding to the construction of 
this enigma were those of blame, stigma and recovery. Figure B.4-1 identifies the discourse 
framework visually as I perceive it to have unfolded across the interviews.  
 
The Venn diagram, in Figure B.4-1, represents the overlapping dominant discourses and the 
point at which they each overlap identifies the enigma construction. While each discourse 
contributes to this phenomenon, they cannot be seen to be distinct from each other, they are 
dialectically related. Each can be said to be separate from one another and Enigma as well as 
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being part of it.  The external circles represent the main discursive constructions of the 
dominant discourse; that is the ways in which the participants chose to construct or represent 
the diagnosis of BPD, which were identified as contributors to the dominant discourse. That is 
not to say they were the only constructions, however, these are the most frequently occurring 
ones that I have chosen to discuss within this Chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4-1: Discourse Framework 
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B.4.3.1  Enigma 
Upon being asked how they would describe BPD to somebody who had no knowledge of the 
diagŶosis ŵost of the paƌtiĐipaŶts stƌuggled to defiŶe it. EǆtƌaĐt ϭ, fƌoŵ AŶŶe͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ, 
highlights how difficult she found it to describe. Her dialogue was stilted and her statements 
were spoken with uncertainty, there are significant pauses in the text, which are not apparent 
in the rest of the interview which was free-flowing and spoken with assertion and certainty. As 
identified in B.4.2, those who are diagnosed with BPD aƌe a heteƌogeŶeous gƌoup; AŶŶe͛s 
struggle to define the diagnosis appeared to result from this heterogeneity. Also Anne appears 
to have become so familiar with referring to her collection of symptoms as BPD that she is no 
longer able to describe what the term means to her.  
 
This eǆtƌaĐt fƌoŵ AŶŶe͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ also deŵoŶstƌates a sǁitĐhiŶg ďetǁeeŶ talkiŶg aďout 
collective symptoms and her own experience. While her tendency to talk generally about a 
collective experience may be related to her positioning and role within her social context as 
campaigner; it also highlights that for each person the experience is unique and without 
reference to this individualism the diagnosis cannot be accurately defined. Overall, this 
appears to construct BPD as an enigma, something which is difficult to define, a mystery, with 
no clear or simple answers.  
 
Similarly to Anne, Francis had difficulty defining the problem without reference to the 
diagnostic label. He speaks less fluently in Extract 2, compared to the rest of his interview. He 
ƌesoƌts to defiŶiŶg it iŶ teƌŵs of ďeiŶg diffeƌeŶt to ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ peƌsoŶalities. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this 
pƌeseŶts a fuƌtheƌ diffiĐultǇ iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg ǁhat ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ peƌsoŶalitǇ ƌepƌeseŶts. He diƌeĐtlǇ 
references how hard it is to define something without referring to the diagnosis. When Francis 
received his diagnosis (Extract 47) he did not ask any questions about it or receive any 
information about what it meant in his past, present or future, he simply accepted the 
Anne:  I think I would say it’s (3) the main symptoms for me are that you’re 
that you (3) it’s very difficult this question isn’t it that it’s about mood 
swings you might meet people that have go sort of from one extreme 
to the next within minutes. Erm that people that just seem not friendly 
a bit sort of withdrawn erm they are sometimes incredibly eccentric 
sort of odd ((laughs)) erm that (3) I don’t I think I’d probably I’d have 
to maybe I’ll just think about it hold on a minute I’ll write it down for 
you and I’ll give you a book on it ((laughs)) I think I think it’s really 
difficult I think there’s so many things about it that actually it would 
take you hours and hours to talk about it because we are all different.  
 Extract 1: Anne 
76 
 
diagnosis as a simple answer to the problems he had been experiencing. The diagnosis itself 
appears to have removed meaning for him, in the same way that Anne has spent so long 
referring to the diagnosis, so has Francis. Again, similarly to Anne, Francis attempts to answer 
the question by referring to the collective experience of those diagnosed with BPD. For both 
Francis and Anne there is an apparent reliance upon psychiatric discourse. When they are 
unable to use this to define their experience they struggle with identifying an alternative 
discourse to use. This presents an enigma, something which appears not to exist in the world 
outside of psychiatry, indescribable outside of the psychiatric discourse community.   
 
For others they found that defining BPD involved discussion of an inability to control emotions 
or as disorder of the emotions. They appeared to find it slightly easier than Anne and Francis to 
think about and describe. This was true for Beatrice, Dorothy, Ellen and Grace. Interestingly, 
what appears to be the same for all is that in order to define it, there is reliance upon 
individual experience despite the diagnostic label itself implying homogeneity. 
 
BeatƌiĐe, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϯ, likeŶs heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe to that of a Đhild͛s eŵotioŶs, hoǁeǀeƌ, she 
generalises this through the use of evaluative statements, which appear as facts, and through 
the imperative mood; she relies upon metaphor and psychological discourse to illustrate her 
description. By presenting her response in this way Beatrice seeks to construct a sympathetic 
position with her difficulties and a reduction in expectations of personal responsibility. 
Children are not generally held responsible for their emotions and behaviours in the same way 
as adults. BeatƌiĐe͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of BPD uses a ĐolleĐtiǀe pƌoŶouŶ ;theǇͿ, hoǁever, it is 
apparent that this is a construction of the way she experiences BPD and what she believes 
Francis:  What would I tell them erm ((laughingly)) what would I tell them erm 
(5) that’s a tough one yeah erm …..erm well I mean at first you know 
would I go about it erm because I mean you’ve got your sort of normal 
your normal personalities as it were erm what’s seen as normal 
personality and they’d see themselves as different wouldn’t they so it 
would be like erm (4) oh I don’t know ((laughs)) how would I go about 
that. I never I honest I never thought of that erm (4) no naming system 
it’s really hard ((laughs)) can you give me an easier one….Erm  
 
Extract 2: Francis 
Beatrice: Well I would say the first thing that it’s a it’s a disorder of the emotions 
and it’s basically like having the mind of a child (I:Okay.) trapped in an 
adult’s body and that when distressed they regress to a childlike state. 
The worst thing someone can do is kind of pull yourself together or or 
raise your voice or insult someone this will escalate the anxiety and 
the attack.  
Extract 3: Beatrice 
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Dorothy:  Erm (6) I would say that it’s basically where you can’t control your 
emotions in the way that normal people do and you can’t deal with 
things like stress as well as ordinary people do or the majority of people 
do. Erm and (4) you can’t erm what is it ((laughingly)) I don’t know 
I: It’s okay it’s not it’s not a test you’re all right it’s it’s just really kind of 
erm how do you assist them to understand the problems that you 
experience 
Dorothy:  Erm (3) like when like the majority of the time I’m pretty okay I’m pretty 
well it’s like I just fly off like I I don’t I think I just say to them that I can’t 
deal with stress or like and I can’t deal with emotions like if I get angry I 
can’t cope with it I don’t know how to cope with it I don’t know how to 
like process it properly so I just fly off the handle or overreact a lot all 
the time I over react. My mum would say I’d a drama queen or 
whatever. Yeah and people do often say you’re so you’re so fucking 
dramatic Dorothy you’re such a drama queen and ((laughingly)) this 
that and the other. So erm I think I just say look it’s my it’s to do with my 
emotions that I can’t deal with them and stress I can’t cope with a lot of 
stress.  
 
would be helpful to her. The contextual information required to determine this relates to her 
having had very minimal contact with anybody else who has the disorder. Her information is 
also assembled from the many books she has read on the topic, she brings this into her own 
disĐouƌse aŶd ŵakes use of phƌases suĐh as ͚ƌegƌess to a Đhildlike state͛; ͚esĐalate the aŶǆietǇ͛; 
aŶd ͚disoƌdeƌ of the eŵotioŶs͛.  
 
Dorothy and Ellen also construct the diagnosis as emotional disorder. There is a focus within 
both their interviews upon dislocating blame by identifying that the problem lies outside of 
theiƌ ĐoŶtƌol. DoƌothǇ, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϰ, ƌefeƌs to ͚Ŷoƌŵal people͛ aŶd ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ people͛ aŶd theŶ 
falters struggling to find a way to describe it further. After a further prompt on how to think 
about the question she provides examples of being unable to control her emotions. Her 
desĐƌiptioŶ ĐoŶtaiŶs aŶ eleŵeŶt of siŵpliĐitǇ, puƌpoƌtiŶg that it is too diffiĐult to eǆplaiŶ ͚“o 
erm I thiŶk I just saǇ look it͛s ŵǇ it͛s to do ǁith ŵǇ eŵotioŶs that I ĐaŶ͛t deal ǁith theŵ aŶd 
stƌess I ĐaŶ͛t Đope ǁith a lot of stƌess͛. This stateŵeŶt is aŶ atteŵpt to ĐoŶstƌuĐt the 
experience in terms which appear in most everyday language, the concept of stress. Within 
this theƌe is the ǀalue assuŵptioŶ that ͚Ŷoƌŵal people͛ ĐaŶ aŶd should ďe aďle to Đope ǁith 
stress.  
 
Ellen draws on medical and biological discourse in her interview, identifying the cause of the 
pƌoďleŵ as the ͚aŵǇgdala͛, agaiŶ disloĐatiŶg blame by placing her problems outside of her 
control. Both Dorothy and Ellen, similarly to Francis, present their description as one of 
Extract 4: Dorothy 
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difference, being different to most people. This relies upon an assumption that there is a 
commonly held agreement about the way human beings should manage their emotions. 
However, this is something which is determined according to the current social order, 
historical and cultural factors. Therefore, this is an assumption which is socially constructed. If 
we examine emotions through the ages and across different cultures, there are different views 
aŶd peƌĐeptioŶs of ͚aĐĐeptaďle͛ eŵotioŶal eǆpƌessioŶ. Theƌefoƌe, oŶ its oǁŶ theiƌ desĐƌiptioŶ 
of the problems experienced does not provide enough information to clearly define the 
diagnosis, once again suggesting somewhat of an enigma. There is a reliance upon 
psychological discourse which is unlikely to have been available to them had they not been 
ďƌought iŶto ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith the ŵeŶtal health sǇsteŵ, foƌ eǆaŵple teƌŵs suĐh as: ͚stƌess͛; 
͚pƌoĐess it pƌopeƌlǇ͛; ͚I ĐaŶ͛t alǁaǇs ƌegulate theŵ͛; these ideŶtifǇ the psǇĐhologiĐal disĐouƌse 
available to them.     
 
Grace provides perhaps the most distinguishing description of the diagnosis in Extract 5. She 
provides examples of how the criterion of the diagnosis applies, stating relationship problems 
and mood regulation difficulties. She also attempts to convey the intensity of the experience 
͚those feeliŶgs Đoŵe fƌoŵ so deep inside (4) the anxiety you literally feel ill with it (5) and you 
just cannot control it at all until you literally just ďuƌst ǁith it͛. The plaĐeŵeŶt of the adǀeƌďs, 
represented in bold type, emphasise extremes of the actions that follow them. This presents 
the experience somatically, an attempt to construct an empathic position within me as the 
Grace: I would tell them (8) that it you can be very much controlled by your 
emotions. That those emotions can fluctuate within hours so you can 
go from feeling intensely happy and euphoric to suddenly feeling very 
low erm (5) that (5) you’re constantly doubting people that it’s 
impossible to form any kind of half decent relationship with anybody 
because you’re constantly ((sighs)) (3) looking further into them 
looking at what their real erm (3) what their intentions are between 
about being friends with you. Erm you become very paranoid and see 
things that are not there erm you read people (3) from not just what 
they’re saying to you but the way they’re looking at you erm the way 
they’re smiling at you. (8) One minute you hate them for the stupidest 
of things and the next you’re completely idolising them. Erm you go 
from wanting to push them away and never have anything to do with 
them again to ten minutes later being completely scared that they’re 
going to leave you. (I:Hm.) Erm (10) and when you’ve got those 
feelings they come from so deep inside (4) the anxiety you literally feel 
just ill with it (5) and you just cannot control it at all until you literally 
just burst with it all and then you either end up hurting yourself or you 
you hurt other people because of it 
Extract 5: Grace 
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listener and others who may come across her text. Grace retains her position as mental health 
pƌofessioŶal ďǇ usiŶg ĐolleĐtiǀe pƌoŶouŶs, she does Ŷot use ͚I͛. This ŵaǇ ďe aŶ atteŵpt to 
distance herself from the experience and retain her role as a professional. However, her 
pauses are significant and require her to call upon constructions of her own experience to 
describe the features of the diagnosis. Grace uses extremes to describe the experience: 
͚euphoƌiĐ͛, ͚ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ͛, ͚iŵpossiďle͛, ͚ĐoŵpletelǇ͛.  
 
GƌaĐe͛s ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the diagŶosis pƌoǀides the ƌeadeƌ ǁith a seŶse of ǁhat the diagŶosis 
means by way of its symptoms. Upon considering how Grace has been able to do this, I 
referred to the discourses available to her. As a mental health professional working in 
secondary care mental health services she is familiar with the diagnostic criteria, this provides 
her with an awareness of the features of the diagnosis in psychiatric discourse. Her personal 
experience of those features enables her to relate the parts which are relevant to the 
diagŶostiĐ Đƌiteƌia. Also, a good fƌieŶd of GƌaĐe͛s ǁeŶt thƌough eaĐh ĐƌiteƌioŶ iŶ detail aŶd 
applied them to her behaviours, this appears to have brought meaning to the diagnosis which 
the other participants did not have available to them.   
  
 
 
CleŵeŶĐe ;EǆtƌaĐt ϲͿ aŶd HeleŶ͛s ;EǆtƌaĐt ϳͿ aŶsǁeƌs fuƌtheƌ pƌeseŶt eǀideŶĐe of BPD 
constructed as an enigma. They provided similar responses by reference to historical 
psǇĐhiatƌiĐ teƌŵiŶologǇ ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe ďetǁeeŶ psǇĐhosis aŶd Ŷeuƌosis͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this defines 
the diagnosis by reference to other diagnoses. Clemence clearly identifies her struggle with 
constructing the meaning of the diagnosis and how this does not appear to provide any 
answers, merely a holding term perhaps, something to refer to an experience by when you are 
Ŷot ƌeallǇ suƌe ǁhat it is. “he also deŵoŶstƌates heƌ laĐk of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the teƌŵ, ͚I ĐaŶ͛t 
get it͛.  
Clemence:  Borderline personality even to this day I still don't understand it I just 
don’t what borderline to what. (I: Hm). I mean I understand the 
historical thing I think of borderline between psychosis and neurosis 
erm I think that’s where it comes from I’m not entirely sure on that. 
Erm and I can und-- I understand where it come from but it seems so 
out of date it doesn’t actually say anything you know what does it 
mean I can’t get it you know.  
 
Helen: Er I think the shortest answer to that would again be erm like a a 
professional term that border line between psychosis and neurosis 
 
Extract 7: Helen 
Extract 6: Clemence 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
HeleŶ͛s ĐhoiĐe of ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ ;EǆtƌaĐt ϴͿ iŶdiĐates being given something important which is 
Ŷot uŶdeƌstood oƌ peƌhaps deseƌǀed, ͚ďestoǁed͛. “he pƌoǀides ƌefeƌeŶĐe iŶ siŵplistiĐ teƌŵs to 
ďehaǀiouƌ ǁhiĐh she ǁas uŶaďle to uŶdeƌstaŶd eitheƌ, ͚eƌƌatiĐ͛, as heƌ oŶlǇ aǀailaďle 
understanding of where the diagnosis came from. Further on in the interview Helen states the 
ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ used iŶ the diagŶosis is aĐtuallǇ adǀaŶtageous as it pƌeseŶts ͚aŶ eŶigŵa it͛s like 
people doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ kŶoǁ ǁhat it is ǁhiĐh is gƌeat iŶ faĐt͛.  
 
All the participants, with the exception of Grace, construct BPD as an enigma when asked to 
define the diagnosis. This is apparent through the inability to determine the meaning of the 
term. Grace, as a result of her working for the NHS within a secondary care mental health 
setting, has access to discourse which is not available to the other participants, consequently 
she presents what appears to be missing, that is understanding the diagnosis as it relates to 
them as individuals, how she has come to understand the enigma. In the next sections of this 
Chapter I will move on to consider the three dominant discourses which appear to further 
construct BPD as enigma.  
 
B.4.3.2   Blame  
Apparent in all the interview texts was the struggle with regard to blame and the question of 
responsibility. This was something that was debated throughout all the interviews, with each 
participant positioning themselves in relation to the discourse of blame. This discourse varied 
across the interviews with regard to overt constructions of blame, or responsibility, and those 
which appeared to be a response to an unspoken question with regard to implications of 
blame, either in relation to the symptoms of the disorder or the question of the effectiveness 
of treatment. The participants positioning appeared to be related to the extent to which the 
individual had resolved, what I would identify as the dialectic of responsibility.  
 
 
 
Helen: someone hands you a label and you’re not really sure what it is that 
you're you know… it was like bestowed on you but I didn’t have a clue 
about it. All I know was out of you know I displayed all these these 
behaviours I guess that’s what it is isn’t it it’s all this erratic behaviour 
erm you know..  
Extract 8: Helen 
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B.4.3.2.1 Blame constructed by Mental Health Services 
 
WithiŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁs theƌe ǁas eǀideŶĐe of the assuŵptioŶ of ďlaŵe foƌ the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛, ǁith 
some of the participants explicitly identifying the need for mental health professionals to state 
that they were not to blame. For example in Extract 9, Ellen uses a verbal process to suggest 
theǇ saǇ ͚its Ŷot Ǉouƌ fault͛ ǁheŶ iŶfoƌŵiŶg theŵ of the diagŶosis. WheŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts ŵoǀed 
their grammatical mood from declarative to imperative they highlight the importance of 
allaying such assumptions. This was evident in all the interviews when the participants were 
asked whether anything needed to be added to treatment and diagnosis of BPD, the mood was 
imperative, this may have been as a consequence of my sentence construction or phraseology, 
or it could be as a means of expressing their opinion to the powerful object that is the mental 
health discourse community.  
 
The use of eǀaluatiǀe stateŵeŶts iŶǀolǀiŶg ŵeŶtal pƌoĐesses ideŶtified ďǇ ǁoƌds suĐh as ͚thiŶk͛ 
͚feel͛ ͚feaƌ͛ ͚see͛ suggest opiŶioŶs aŶd ďeliefs. CoŵŵitŵeŶts to stateŵeŶts aŶd the ͚tƌuth͛ teŶd 
to ďe eǆpƌessed ŵodeƌatelǇ thƌough ǁoƌds suĐh as ͚Đould͛, ͚ŵight͛, ͚pƌoďaďlǇ͛, ͚ǁould͛ 
indicating an intention not to appear to directly challenge the way things are done but suggest 
an alternative. This avoidance of direct challenge positions the mental health professionals as 
poǁeƌful, uŶappƌoaĐhaďle ͚eǆpeƌts͛, holdiŶg the aŶsǁeƌs. This possiďlǇ a ƌesult of ĐoŶsideƌiŶg 
those ǁith BPD to ďe ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛, aŶd theƌefoƌe, uŶdeseƌǀiŶg of help aŶd suppoƌt, 
implicitly the suggestioŶ eǆeŵplified iŶ ElleŶ͛s, EǆtƌaĐt ϵ, that the iŶteƌǀieǁees feel judged ďǇ 
the mental health professionals presenting somewhat of a paradox.  
 
Using Extract 9 as an example, a number of the participants presented BPD as an actual event, 
or something whiĐh aĐtuallǇ eǆists, ͚its happeŶed͛. The iŵpliĐatioŶ ďehiŶd this legitiŵatioŶ of 
Ellen: I think I think really that I think it would be so helpful if there was erm a 
a manual a book or something to help people when they’re when 
they’re actually ready to look at it to actually say look this is this is the 
situation it’s not your fault it’s happened probably because of this and 
these things might help you I would say. ((clears throat)) And and also 
that if if people like MIND or people are writing leaflets if they could get 
the reason the little sentence about why the mind doesn’t regulate 
before the actual er description of symptoms because that’s hideous 
((laughs)) do you know what I mean and at at least you know because 
of (I: Hm.)…because of A B occurs where it seems to be at the minute 
on a lot of the articles and things that I see erm these are the 
symptoms but there’s only you know it doesn’t cover I think the causes 
should be put before the symptoms and then it’s less of a blow 
((laughs)). 
Extract 9: Ellen 
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the construct is that within medical discourse there is an assumption of cause-effect-solution 
͚kŶoǁledge͛. EaĐh paƌtiĐipaŶt iŶdiĐates the iŵpoƌtaŶt of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the Đause of BPD, of 
ďeiŶg aďle to attƌiďute a pƌeĐipitatiŶg faĐtoƌ, ͚ďeĐause of A B oĐĐuƌs͛, ͚it doesŶ͛t Đoǀeƌ the 
Đauses͛. This ǁould peƌhaps aĐt to allaǇ ďlaŵe, if soŵethiŶg oĐĐuƌƌed to Đause the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛, 
such as a neurological problem, it potentially places it outside of the individuals control and 
therefore within moral philosophy outside of the conditions for blame to occur. In addition, 
the ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ aƌe the pƌedoŵiŶaŶt foĐus, ǁith feǁ paƌtiĐipaŶts ĐoŶǀeǇiŶg theiƌ 
understanding of the meaning behind the syŵptoŵs. The use of the ǁoƌd ͚ďloǁ͛ ǁithiŶ EǆtƌaĐt 
ϵ ďǇ ElleŶ, suggests that theƌe is soŵethiŶg aďout the ͚diagŶosis͛ ǁhiĐh is ĐoŶsideƌed 
significantly shocking; undesirable; or a setback, Ellen is contending that the knowledge of 
cause makes the knowledge of this shocking.  
 
 
There is a commonality across all the interviews with all participants describing a collective 
experience evidenced by their use of pronouns, particularly when relating negative 
experiences for example, treatment by professionals or emotions, although primarily the 
pƌoŶouŶs used aƌe ͚Ǉou͛, ͚theǇ͛, aŶd ͚its͛, a feǁ paƌtiĐipaŶts usiŶg ͚ǁe͛ ďut oŶlǇ oĐĐasioŶallǇ. 
For example, Grace in Extract 10 positions herself by non-identification with the collective, 
͚they doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to feel like they do͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚we doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to feel like we do͛. This ŵaǇ 
relate to a dialectical relationship between blame and recovery discourses. While presenting a 
position aimed at promoting compassion within the reader, me as the researcher in the first 
instance, there is also a positioning of difference and constructing the assumption of recovery. 
Grace positions herself with regard to the blame discourse, by challenging the idea of choice 
͚hoǁeǀeƌ it ŵaǇ seeŵ Ǉou kŶoǁ that people aƌe doiŶg these thiŶgs, as a ĐaŵpaigŶeƌ for 
inclusion, while trying to avoid including herself as belonging to the collective through the use 
of ͚people͛.  
Grace:  I think you know the other thing that’s going through my head is that 
(3) however it may seem you know that people are doing these things 
they don’t actually want to be they don’t want to feel like they do inside 
because it’s torture it (I: Yeah.) it it’s a horrible feeling when you get to 
the point that you just feel like you’re going to explode and the build up 
to that it’s it’s an absolute living nightmare and people don’t want to 
feel this way no matter what professionals may say you know that 
they’re attention seeking and they want this attention because that’s 
so far from the truth (I: Hm.) because I think at the end of the day you 
just want to be normal you want to be able to have friendships and 
relationships (4) without always being on the edge of a cliff.  
Extract 10: Grace 
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Clemence: It’s it’s seen as this kind of oh it’s a shit thing and it’s all very awful 
and everything. But not enough credit is given to people who have 
survived it. Isn’t it incredible that they’ve bloody survived all this stuff 
when they were a kid and they haven’t killed themselves you know. 
(I: Hm.) Really and I don’t think there’s enough credit given to that 
and it’s not respected enough that people have survived what they’ve 
survived and and actually the very fact that they’re in therapy (I: Hm.) 
means that actually they want to he-- they they don’t want to die (I: 
Hm.)you know there’s a bit of them that wants to survive and wants 
to get better even if that bit’s you know outweighed by the other shit 
at times you know. But I don’t think there’s enough credit given and I 
don’t think people respect what you're having to struggle with. And 
just what a bloody nightmare it is. (I: Hm.) It’s it’s absolutely a living 
nightmare (I: Hm-mm.) you know it’s every day is a living nightmare 
you know and it’s-- I mean I sort of when I think about it now I just 
think Christ you know but it is it’s there is this permanent deafening 
deafening noise in your head that is a disturbance in the whole of 
your body (I: Hm-mm.) and it’s it’s it makes you ill. You know and this 
disturbance this noise is trauma which you can’t process you can’t 
make sense of. Nobody else can make sense of because they’re 
speaking russian and and it’s it is an absolute nightmare it really is. 
And I hope to god I never ((laughingly)) have to go through it ever 
again.   
 
 
The use of the ǁoƌds ͚toƌtuƌe͛, ͚aďsolute liǀiŶg Ŷightŵaƌe͛, ͚eǆplode͛, ͚a distuƌďaŶĐe iŶ Ǉour 
ǁhole ďodǇ͛, as eǀideŶĐed iŶ EǆtƌaĐts ϭϬ aŶd ϭϭ, pƌeseŶt a ŵetaphoƌ of agoŶǇ aŶd 
persecution, this implores the reader to feel compassion as opposed potentially to the value 
assuŵptioŶ of Ŷegatiǀe ŵoƌal judgeŵeŶt. IŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϭϭ, ͚a peƌŵaŶeŶt deafeŶiŶg Ŷoise in your 
head͛ dƌaǁs ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ to soŵethiŶg uŶĐoŶtƌollaďle, as suĐh seekiŶg to disloĐate the ďlaŵe 
disĐouƌse. The use of the ƌepeated phƌase ͚doŶ͛t ǁaŶt͛ suggests aŶ assuŵptioŶ that if theǇ did 
͚ǁaŶt͛ it ǁould ďe a ĐhoiĐe aŶd theƌefoƌe ďe ǁoƌthǇ of ďlame. Grace commits herself strongly 
to the statement again demonstrating her position in opposition to that of the general mental 
health ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, as ĐaŵpaigŶeƌ foƌ justiĐe, ͚people doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to feel this ǁaǇ Ŷo ŵatteƌ 
ǁhat pƌofessioŶals ŵaǇ saǇ͛. GƌaĐe does sǁitĐh ďetǁeeŶ heƌ use of the pƌoŶouŶs ͚theǇ͛ aŶd 
͚Ǉou͛ suggestiŶg ŵoǀeŵeŶt iŶ the teǆt ďetǁeeŶ heƌ pƌofessioŶal aŶd peƌsoŶal positioŶs, this 
appeaƌs to add poǁeƌ to heƌ stateŵeŶts ͚Ǉou just feel like Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to eǆplode͛, ͚Ǉou just 
want to be norŵal͛. The pƌoŶouŶ ͚Ǉou͛ eŶaďles aŶ authoƌ to eǆpƌess soŵethiŶg as appliĐaďle 
to the self as well as others. This makes statements less isolating and reduces the risk of 
vulnerability that is inherent in revealing a personal experience. 
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The use of the word ͚eǆplode͛ depiĐts the ŵetaphoƌ of a poǁeƌful eǀeŶt that Ǉou haǀe Ŷo 
ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ aŶd, theƌefoƌe, ĐaŶŶot ďe ďlaŵed foƌ. ͚People doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to feel this ǁaǇ Ŷo 
ŵatteƌ ǁhat pƌofessioŶals saǇ Ǉou kŶoǁ that theǇ͛ƌe atteŶtioŶ seekiŶg aŶd theǇ ǁaŶt this 
attentioŶ͛ these stateŵeŶts pƌeseŶt ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶals as ŶegatiǀelǇ attƌiďutiŶg 
behaviour of those with this particular collection of symptoms, and suggests that this is the 
prevailing opinion, despite, as suggested by Grace, that this is incorrect from the position of 
the individual. This is a proposition that the reality of the individual is quite different to that 
conceived by professionals.  
 
Theƌe is ƌefeƌeŶĐe to a desiƌed positioŶ of ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ ǁithiŶ all the iŶteƌǀieǁs, foƌ eǆaŵple 
Extract 10. The assumption behind this position being that this is a shared social value, and 
assumes that mental health professionals possess this value. This is hegemonic; the belief that 
professionals are normal protects the dominant view in society of hierarchical superiority 
according to status. Anybody that is not therefore considered normal cannot be worthy of 
ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ ǁith ƌegaƌd to eǆpeƌieŶĐe oƌ ƌealitǇ. GƌaĐe iŶ this tƌaŶsĐƌipt states ͚atteŶtioŶ-
seekiŶg͛ ǁith aŶ assuŵed ǀalue of it ďeiŶg uŶdesiƌaďle aŶd Ŷegative. The supposition is that 
she has experienced the pejorative use of this vocabulary as part of a discourse that is 
available to her through her cultural and social experience; whichever discourse this 
experience draws on constructs the experience as being ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛. Thus the aĐtual 
meaning of the word appears to have been lost; for example an infant who cries to attract the 
ŵotheƌ͛s atteŶtioŶ, is liteƌallǇ ͚atteŶtioŶ-seekiŶg͛ ďehaǀiouƌ, hoǁeǀeƌ, the ĐoŶŶotatioŶs aƌe 
different to that of an adult who is in distress and cries out to attract care-giving, even though 
the desired outcome might be the same. This presents a moral value, whereby there are right 
and wrong ways of behaving, and an individual must request attention in ways which are 
deemed to be socially acceptable. To err from this implies blame for moral value violation.     
 
Fuƌtheƌ the ǀieǁ of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ ďeiŶg shaƌed ďǇ ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶals pƌeseŶts a 
potential dilemma of positioning between personal and professional identities, which may 
ideŶtifǇ the iŵpeƌatiǀe to ideŶtifǇ ǁith a ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ suďjeĐt positioŶ. Both GƌaĐe aŶd CleŵeŶĐe 
are mental health professionals, and their transcripts clearly demonstrate the use of powerful 
metaphors, an attempt to convey an alternative experience to that perceived by outsiders. It 
suggests that it is essential to construct their experience to evoke empathy and compassion, to 
prevent judgement by the desirably positioned mental health professionals on account of their 
diagnosis, and thus resisting a subjeĐt positioŶ of ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛. Theiƌ tƌaŶsĐƌipts ďoth suggest the 
eǆtƌeŵe iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ĐhalleŶgiŶg the ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ held ǀieǁ oƌ ͚tƌuth͛ aďout those ǁith the 
diagnosis. It would seem that the price one would have to pay as a mental health professional, 
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if others did blame and judge you based on diagnosis would be too high and challenge 
professional identities. This unveils the power of the ideology underpinning the mental health 
communities.  Further evidence of this discourse can be seen in Extract 11. 
 
Clemence in her interview describes BPD as a reaction to trauma and in Extract 11 the subject 
under discussion is taken to mean the cause of the diagnosis. Clemence uses powerful 
metaphors and emotive language to construct the experience of trauma, to enable 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of heƌ positioŶ, aŶd ƌeloĐate ďlaŵe attƌiďutioŶs. The use of pƌoŶouŶs ͚I͛ aŶd 
͚that people͛ aŶd ͚theǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚I͛ oƌ ͚ǁe͛ eŶaďles a ĐolleĐtiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe to ďe desĐƌiďed 
ǁhile ďeiŶg distaŶĐed fƌoŵ it. Fuƌtheƌ statiŶg: ͚I hope to God I never have to go through it 
agaiŶ͛; this ideŶtifies ǁith aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe suďjeĐt positioŶ of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛.  
 
Evident within this discourse, and as I have already identified, there is a lack of understanding 
and acknowledgement of the experience by mental health professionals. Clemence draws a 
ĐoŶtƌast ǁith foƌeigŶ laŶguages ďǇ statiŶg: ͚ŶoďodǇ else ĐaŶ ŵake seŶse of ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe 
speakiŶg ‘ussiaŶ͛. This ŵetaphoƌ suggests Ŷot oŶlǇ a laĐk of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd 
communication with mental health professionals but also potentially hints at a different 
cultural experience and the problem inherent between discourse communities, that of mental 
health professionals and service users with the BPD diagnosis. When constructing this lack of 
acknowledgement in discourse participants tend to identify more clearly to their commitment 
to this positioŶ of ďeiŶg ͚deǀalued͛. Foƌ eǆaŵple CleŵeŶĐe iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϭϭ suggests ͚its Ŷot 
ƌespeĐted eŶough that people haǀe suƌǀiǀed ǁhat theǇ͛ǀe suƌǀiǀed͛, although at tiŵes she 
moderates this ďǇ ideŶtifǇiŶg that she is eǆpƌessiŶg heƌ opiŶioŶ, ͚I doŶ͛t think theƌe͛s eŶough 
Đƌedit giǀeŶ to that͛. CleŵeŶĐe also ŵakes ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the assuŵptioŶ of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ ďeiŶg 
desiƌaďle, ͚theƌe͛s a ďit of theŵ that ǁaŶts to suƌǀiǀe aŶd ǁaŶts to get ďetteƌ͛.  
 
B.4.3.2.2  Blame constructed as Individual Responsibility 
 
Each of the participants refers to their position with regards to a construction of internally 
loĐated ͚ďlaŵe͛. This is ĐoŶstƌuĐted iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs ǁith ŵost paƌtiĐipaŶts iŵpliĐitlǇ 
Francis: what what you do you’ve got to do for yourself you can’t rely on 
anyone else to do stuff for you you’ve got to want it and you’ve got to 
do it there’s no other way otherwise you’re just stuck you stay where 
you are. So ((laughs)) (I: Yeah wow.) Yeah I mean I’ve I’ve I’ve been 
beaten and starved and nearly drowned and I’ve seen people die and 
so just I’ve I’ve been told I’ve got erm erm post traumatic stress 
 
Extract 12: Francis 
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identifying a struggle with regards to being to blame for their problems. Use of phrases such as 
͚it͛s Ŷot ŵǇ fault͛, ͚uŶĐoŶtƌollaďle foƌĐe͛, ͚it happeŶs͛ suggest a desiƌe to eǆpƌesslǇ deŶǇ ďlaŵe 
oƌ to ideŶtifǇ that theǇ aƌe Ŷot ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛ oŶ aĐĐouŶt of it ďeiŶg uŶĐoŶtƌollaďle. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
a deviant case example is that of Francis who represents this internal location differently and 
positioŶs hiŵself as ͚ĐoŶtƌolleƌ͛. Theƌe is eǀideŶĐe ǁithiŶ his tƌaŶsĐƌipt of the aĐĐeptaŶĐe of 
the internal location of the problem and that if he does not seek to manage this he will be 
͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛. Therefore, while there appears to be a general tendency to resist blame 
attributions there is also evidence of acceptance of them which has assisted in moving to a 
positiǀe suďjeĐt positioŶ ǁithiŶ this attƌiďutioŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďǇ eǆaŵiŶiŶg FƌaŶĐis͛ eǆtƌaĐts iŶ 
more detail there is also evidence of a rejection of elements of the discourse.  
 
FƌaŶĐis positioŶs hiŵself as a ͚suƌǀiǀoƌ͛; ǁhile eǀideŶt ǁithiŶ otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s transcripts he 
infers reference to blame vocabulary rather than using it to construct the position. In Extract 
ϭϮ he ƌefeƌs to eǆtƌeŵelǇ adǀeƌse life eǀeŶts ͚ďeateŶ͛, ͚staƌǀed͛, ͚dƌoǁŶed͛ aŶd ͚seeŶ people 
die͛. He appeaƌs to siŵilaƌlǇ deŶǇ ďlaŵe thƌough Đause iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ to the otheƌ 
participants, suggesting these are events which are outside the realms of normal human 
eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg; his uŶspokeŶ stateŵeŶts Đould ďe iŶfeƌƌed to ďe ͚its Ŷot ŵǇ fault, I͛ǀe doŶe all I 
ĐaŶ, despite ŵǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐes͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, he also aĐĐepts ďlaŵe ǁith stateŵeŶts suĐh as ͚Ǉou͛ǀe 
got to do it͛, ͚theƌe͛s Ŷo otheƌ ǁaǇ͛, ͚Ǉou staǇ ǁheƌe Ǉou aƌe͛. This appeaƌs to liŶk ǁith the 
͚self-help͛ eƌa of ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes, as ĐoŶsideƌed ďǇ Nehls ;ϭϵϵϵͿ, suĐh that if Ǉou do Ŷot 
͚help Ǉouƌself͛ theŶ Ǉou ĐaŶŶot ďe helped aŶd the ƌeasoŶ foƌ that is iŶteƌŶallǇ loĐated aŶd 
thereby implies internal location of blame. With regard to this he uses the imperative mood 
and represents evaluative statements as facts. This demonstrates his construction of reality; 
his perception of the opportunities for change; and his subject positioning.  
 
This ͚self-help͛ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ǁithiŶ the disĐouƌse of ďlaŵe ideŶtifies the ideologǇ, the ǀalues 
and beliefs of current mental health services; and one which Francis has integrated into his 
oǁŶ disĐouƌse. Hoǁeǀeƌ, FƌaŶĐis͛ tƌaŶsĐƌipt ŵaǇ also pƌoǀide iŶformation on the impact of this 
type of construction. The reason this particular discourse and positioning was open to Francis 
is likely to be as a result of the alternative discourse being unavailable to him, possibly as a 
result of his life experiences.  He had to depend on himself, as do many individuals who have 
experienced severe and prolonged abuse in childhood with limited social support or validation. 
For some individuals and Francis in particular, participating in this research may have been an 
attempt to see whether an alternative experience would present itself to him, an opportunity 
to ďe ͚helped͛ fƌoŵ his positioŶ as ͚suƌǀiǀoƌ͛.  
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The internal location of blame also appears to provide the opportunity for a protective or 
permissive positioning; one which enables mistakes to be reasoned and behaviour to be seen 
as a ͚sǇŵptoŵ͛ of the disoƌdeƌ. This ǁas eǀideŶt iŶ the disĐuƌsiǀe constructions of both Francis 
and Anne. Both relate to the buffer this provides for them to behave in certain ways and not 
be held to account for this. For example Francis, Extract 13, suggests ͚giǀe ŵe a little ďit of 
fƌeedoŵ to ŵake ŵǇ ŵistakes͛, aŶd AŶŶe positioŶs heƌself as ͚Ŷeǀeƌ haǀ[iŶg] to gƌoǁ up͛. It 
would appear that the blame discourse can be used to rationalise some events and actions.  
 
As described in B.4.3.1 the meaning of the diagnosis appears to have been lost for most of the 
participants, and this appears in part to be related to a lack of knowledge about the diagnosis, 
either due to information being unavailable, withheld or controlled. As such Francis, evident in 
EǆtƌaĐt ϭϯ, ƌefeƌs to his ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ thiŶg͛. IŶ the aďseŶĐe of aŶǇ Đleaƌ answers Francis has 
ĐoŶstƌuĐted his uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the diagŶosis aŶd ƌepƌeseŶted it as a ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ thiŶg͛. The 
issue with regard to disclosure, non-disclosure, and limited disclosures will be explored further 
in Chapter 5. However, it would seem that there is an overall reluctance to inform individuals 
of the diagnosis which appears dialectically related to all discourse within the framework.  
 
Using Extract 13 as an example, a number of the participants refer to different identifications 
of self, before and after a period of change following receiving the diagnosis. They present a 
past aŶd pƌeseŶt self, ǁith the ƌeĐeiǀiŶg of the diagŶosis appeaƌiŶg to ďe a piǀotal poiŶt, ͚the 
ǁaǇ I used to ďe͛. FƌaŶĐis states that ͚it ďeĐoŵes positiǀe͛, this plaĐes the diagŶosis ;͚it͛Ϳ as the 
suďjeĐt aŶd that ͚it͛ ĐhaŶges ;͚ďeĐoŵes͛Ϳ to soŵethiŶg diffeƌeŶt ;͚positiǀe͛Ϳ. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to the 
initial appearance of the text content this is based on an assumption that the diagnosis is 
negative. He makes use of the hedging expƌessioŶ ͚soƌt of͛. This suggests a Ŷeed to lesseŶ the 
impact of the statement for some reason, potentially related to social impressions, perhaps 
that considering the diagnosis as positive is socially undesirable.   
Francis: Erm I can be erm a little bit prone to mishap and sometimes can’t do 
right for doing wrong you know that sort of thing. So to say to them 
look you know my personality thing it’s it just it explains everything 
about me now so they can sort of understand and give me that little bit 
of freedom to make my mistakes because sometimes you know erm 
even the simplest little things sometimes can be so stressful trying to 
get it right that I get it wrong you know. There’s still that part of me 
that’s still goes back to the way (I: Hm-mm.) I used to be (I: Hm-mm.) 
you know so have to let people know. Erm it generally it generally 
does it becomes positive because they can sort of give me that little 
bit of freedom to to do what I’m doing and take the pressure off me so 
yeah.  
Extract 13: Francis 
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Dorothy: (3) Erm I can kind of see where they’re coming from because I know 
that when I’m in that state when I’ve gone into psychosis I am just 
completely argumentative will not-- I think that I know what is best I 
will not agree with anybody I will put myself in dangerous situations lie 
to get out of things and stuff. So I can kind of see why they think oh 
god we can’t deal with this just medicate her up and put her in the 
locked ward for a month that’ll ((laughingly)) sort her out. Because I 
can see that maybe that’s the only way that they know how to kind of 
deal with someone like that especially when it’s someone’s so 
unpredictable that they-- it’s like I suppose it’s their job if I were to like 
they were to let me go or believe what I said and then I went and killed 
myself they’d probably lose their job or have to go through a whole 
procedure of like being questioned and why did you do this and why 
did you do that and (I: Hm-mm.) you know she was suicidal in the first 
place. So I can kind of understand it in some ways but I also just think 
that they could be more tolerant and understanding and maybe try and 
talk to people a bit more and explain to them what’s going on and why 
they’re doing the things they’re doing rather than just say right that’s it.  
 
B.4.3.2.3 Blame constructed as Institutional Responsibility  
There is significant reference within the transcripts to institutional responsibility for the social 
welfare of individuals who present a risk of harm to themselves, however, there is some 
variance in where individuals position themselves in relation to this. This may be related to 
context and extra-discursive elements, such as the treatment that people have received and 
where they position themselves in relation to recovery. For example, Clemence, Dorothy, and 
Grace hold similar positions in relation to institutional responsibility in regard to risk 
management. While Beatrice and Anne hold similar positions in relation to non-recovery.  
 
 
In Extracts 14 and 15, Clemence and Dorothy both construct their understanding of the need 
for mental health services to manage the risk that they present to themselves to prevent the 
professional being held accountable should an individual harm themselves. This suggests an 
underlying ideology related to social responsibility, a culture of blame and punishment. 
Professionals find themselves in a caring role and are concerned about being punished for not 
taking enough care. This highlights that contrary to naïve dialecticism, which requires a search 
Clemence: Erm and I think that because I was self harming so badly erm that I 
that in itself makes people feel anxious clinicians feel anxious because 
there’s always that anxiety amongst clinicians that you’re going to kill 
yourself. Or you’re going to self harm on their watch type of thing. And 
they’re going to be sort of you know held responsible.  
Extract 14: Clemence 
Extract 15: Dorothy 
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for a compromise, in Western culture, the resolution occurs through identifying who was in 
the wrong.  
 
Both Clemence and Dorothy identify their own actions through ownership of their statements 
ďǇ usiŶg the pƌoŶouŶ ͚I͛, aŶd the iŵpaĐt theiƌ aĐtioŶs haǀe oŶ otheƌ people. TheǇ desĐƌiďe 
theiƌ aĐtioŶs thƌough the use of the phƌases ͚so ďadlǇ͛ aŶd ͚so uŶpƌediĐtaďle͛ iŵplǇiŶg thƌough 
the use of the adǀeƌď ͚so͛ aŶ eǆtƌeme of the adjective, the outcome of which resulting in the 
ultiŵate ƌisk of death. This fuƌtheƌ iŶdiĐates aŶ aĐkŶoǁledgeŵeŶt that ǁhile aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
behaviour is perceived by the Western society to place an individual at risk, and an 
acknowledgement of this perception. There is also an implied assumption by both participants 
that fƌoŵ the iŶdiǀidual͛s positioŶ this is Ŷot iŶteŶded, although it pƌeseŶts a ƌisk.  
 
Dorothy highlights a direct statement in regard to being better understood by professionals, 
aŶd theƌe ďeiŶg spaĐe foƌ ŵoƌe ĐoŵpassioŶ aŶd less puŶitiǀe appƌoaĐhes, ͚I also just thiŶk that 
theǇ Đould ďe ŵoƌe toleƌaŶt aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛. DoƌothǇ͛s stateŵeŶt heƌe ƌefeƌs to the 
ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶals ĐolleĐtiǀelǇ thƌough the use of the pƌoŶouŶ ͚theǇ͛, ƌatheƌ thaŶ oŶe 
individual, suggesting that within this discourse community all professionals construct the act 
in the same way when they believe an individual presents a risk of harm to themselves. Also 
DoƌothǇ, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϭϱ, states ͚I thiŶk I kŶoǁ ďest͛, the uŶspokeŶ opposite of this ǁould ďe to 
assume somebody else, in this instance mental health professionals, know best. This again 
suggests an ideology related to the hierarchical and hegemonic nature of mental health 
services, and the assumption that the opinion of mental health professionals is the correct 
one. Further in relation to this, the meaning behind the perceived risk of harm appears to be 
lost. The extracts of Clemence and Dorothy tell me as immediate recipient of them, that their 
actions are constructed as aspects of risk and not as constructions of meaning, or indicators of 
an attempt to communicate an experience of inner turmoil.   
 
IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to EǆtƌaĐts ϭϰ aŶd ϭϱ, EǆtƌaĐts ϭϲ aŶd ϭϳ deŵoŶstƌate BeatƌiĐe aŶd AŶŶe͛s 
positions, which involve them having passive roles in the situations they describe, unlike 
Clemence and Dorothy who identify themselves having an active role in events. The subject of 
ďoth BeatƌiĐe aŶd AŶŶe͛s eǆtƌaĐts aƌe psǇĐhiatƌists, although foƌ BeatƌiĐe heƌ stateŵeŶts relate 
to psǇĐhiatƌists geŶeƌallǇ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a speĐifiĐ iŶdiǀidual as iŶ AŶŶe͛s eǆtƌaĐt.   
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IŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϭϲ, BeatƌiĐe uses the ǁoƌd ͚aďuse͛ aŶd ƌelates heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of psǇĐhiatƌists as a 
ŵetaphoƌ to ͚aŶotheƌ dǇsfuŶĐtioŶal faŵilǇ͛, this pƌeseŶts heƌ positioŶ as oŶe of ďlaŵe agaiŶst 
the profession and of her being passive in the event, identified by the placement of the subject 
of the seŶteŶĐe afteƌ the aĐtioŶ; ͚soŵe poŵpous psǇĐhiatƌist pumps you full of dƌugs͛, ͚throws 
you to the ǁolǀes͛. Heƌ ĐhoiĐes of ŵetaphoƌs aĐt to ĐoŶǀeǇ aŶ eǆtƌeŵelǇ tƌauŵatiĐ aŶd 
harrowing experience. Her construction of how, in her reality, psychiatrists have acted to 
ignore her individuality and, thereby, devalued her personal experience and removed 
ŵeaŶiŶg, ͚ǁith a ŵishŵash of dǇsfuŶĐtioŶal people aŶd if Ǉou doŶ͛t get oŶ ǁith theŵ it͛s Ǉouƌ 
fault͛. This is a poǁeƌful iŵage of ďeiŶg Đast aside ǁith otheƌs ǁho aƌe Đlassified ďǇ psǇĐhiatƌiĐ 
diagnoses. In comparison to Clemence and Dorothy, Beatrice relates risk in terms of 
psǇĐhiatƌists ďeiŶg uŶĐoŶĐeƌŶed, aŶd Ŷot feaƌful foƌ theiƌ aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ ͚ĐouldŶ͛t Đaƌe less 
ǁhetheƌ Ǉou liǀe oƌ die͛. This stateŵeŶt is Đƌeated ďǇ BeatƌiĐe as a faĐt, ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶ 
evaluation, although earlier in the clause she highlights this as being the way she feels. It acts 
in conjunction with the rest of the extract to further demonstrate there is a risk, which is the 
responsibility of mental health but that they have ignored the meaning of her behaviours and 
as a result re-enacted painful childhood experiences for her. This construction indicates the 
power that psychiatrists hold over their patients when they are able to invoke this type of 
reaction. Helen expressed a similar experience in her interview, extract 17. This indirectly 
identifies an assumption of risk requiring physical restraint, despite a perceived belief that an 
individual is not worth saving.  
 
 
 
 
 
Beatrice: and that is the the rage it’s like being abused a second time because 
a lot of people with BPD have had abusive childhoods and go into the 
mental health system as it is today I feel is another form of abuse it’s 
another dysfunctional family with someone who is just some pompous 
psychiatrist pumps you full of drugs couldn’t care less whether you 
live or die throw you to the wolves with a mishmash of dysfunctional 
people and if you don’t get on with them it’s your fault. Okay. So I’m 
very angry about it… 
 
Extract 16: Beatrice 
Helen: I think they assume that you’re mad and that you’re really not well 
and there’s no point saving you. But then all these people came from 
nowhere and they used a a sort of unnecessary amount of force that 
was very frightening’.  
 
Extract 17: Helen 
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In Extract 18, Anne goes slightly further than Beatrice by identifying a particular psychiatrist in 
her experience ǁhoŵ she Đaŵe to Đall ͚Dƌ Death͛. The iŵpliĐatioŶs of heƌ stateŵeŶts aƌe the 
same as Beatrice, a suggestion of serious incompetence on the part of a psychiatrist which 
could have resulted in fatality. However, by personalising the experience and specifying a 
paƌtiĐulaƌ psǇĐhiatƌist aŶd aŶ eǀeŶt, ǁhiĐh ideŶtifies diƌeĐtlǇ a ͚Ŷeaƌ-ŵiss͛, heƌ stateŵeŶts aĐt 
to convey blame and accountability to the psychiatrist and positions herself as a passive actor. 
Similarly, to Extracts 14, 15 and 16, the text constructs institutional responsibility which 
ƌeŵoǀes ŵeaŶiŶg ͚haǀiŶg a ĐoŶsultatioŶ ǁith soŵeďodǇ that doesŶ͛t eǀeŶ uŶdeƌstaŶd the 
diagŶosis͛. While this Đould ďe deteƌŵiŶed to ƌefeƌ to the ƌisk assoĐiated ǁith the ďehaǀiouƌs 
characteristic of the diagnosis, it would seem that her reference is to the fact that there is a 
laĐk of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aďout heƌ iŶdiǀiduallǇ ͚oŶ my care plan it states do not give Anne any 
ŵediĐatioŶ ďeĐause she ǁill take it iŵpulsiǀelǇ͛. AŶŶe͛s eǆtƌaĐt seƌǀes to disloĐate 
responsibility for her own life to that of mental health professionals who create a care plan for 
her.  
 
AŶŶe͛s eǆpƌessioŶs of ĐǇŶiĐisŵ aďout the psǇĐhiatƌist͛s iŶteŶtioŶs, ͚he ǁaŶted to see ŵe a 
ŵoŵeŶt of guilt oƌ is that guilt ŵŵ͛, seeŵ to iŶdiĐate that she is positioŶiŶg him as being 
concerned for his own self-preservation, his job, similarly to Dorothy. The extract is powerful in 
its suggestion of incompetence, and acts to give Anne justification for impulsive behaviour. 
Mental health services and psychiatry through their hegemony create a context in which they 
remove responsibility from individuals for their own life preservation, by failing to account for 
meaning, and place the responsibility in their own hands; apparent through the passive role 
identified by both Beatrice and Anne. This as I mentioned earlier, however, may be further 
mediated through the experience of recovering personal meaning in a later stage of recovery.  
Anne:  And then he kept phoning me at home because he wanted to see me 
a moment of guilt or is that guilt mm and I waited and then I called in 
Dr Death because I’d I’d since found out that actually on my care plan 
it states do not give Anne any medication because she will take it 
impulsively and I have tried them and they don’t work on me they 
make you go for poohs I put weight on they do all sorts of nasty 
things erm and I take herbal tablets because I believe that they’re 
healthier for you than taking mainstream medication. So that’s when 
we called him we call him Dr Death because he could have killed me 
because when I got home I was so suicidal if it wasn’t for my son 
sleeping next to me that night I would have gone because you feel 
like there’s no hope what’s the point what’s the point of wasting my 
time and energy and having a consultation with somebody that 
doesn’t even understand the diagnosis.  
 
Extract 18: Anne 
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B.4.3.2.4 Blaŵe ĐoŶstruĐted ďy ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛ 
 
 A discursive construction which appears to be described by several of the interviewees is that 
of ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛, ǁith AŶŶe usiŶg this phƌase speĐifiĐallǇ. This ĐlassifiĐatioŶ desĐƌiďes 
a process by which relationships between patients and psychiatric healthcare professionals 
have broken down to such an extent that a casual attitude and casting aside of any hope for a 
patieŶt oĐĐuƌs. This is as a ƌesult of staff peƌĐeptioŶs that a patieŶt͛s ďehaǀiouƌ is pƌoǀoĐatiǀe 
and unreasonable (Potter, 2009), whereby death is considered inevitable, with the whole 
process having been found to end in a fatal outcome (Watts & Morgan, 1994). This is not a 
well-known term outside of the psychiatric community and is not something which has been 
taken up in the training of mental health professionals; however, the vocabulary has been 
used by Anne, as identified within Extract 19.   
 
AŶŶe uses the phƌase ͚ŵaligŶaŶt alieŶatioŶ͛ to ĐoŶstƌuĐt ǁhat happeŶs ǁheŶ a ŵeŶtal health 
pƌofessioŶal is ͚Ŷot ďeiŶg supeƌǀised pƌopeƌlǇ͛ ǁheŶ ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith iŶdiǀiduals ǁith the 
borderline personality diagnosis. Anne uses the term to lay blame with the institution, if the 
health pƌofessioŶal is Ŷot pƌoǀided ǁith ͚good ƋualitǇ͛ supeƌǀisioŶ. “he ƌepeats the ǁoƌd 
supervision many times throughout this extract, repetition when used in this way may suggest 
the level of importance with which the concept is regarded. This may indicate that an 
expression of complexity and challenge, setting up a defensive position. Anne acknowledges 
an element of her behaviour within the response she describes receiving, however, this is 
mediated by statements suggesting that it is the responsibility of the mental health 
pƌofessioŶal to ŵaŶage heƌ appƌopƌiatelǇ at all tiŵes, ͚soŵetiŵes it Đoŵes fƌoŵ the otheƌ 
otheƌ peƌsoŶ it͛s ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot ďeiŶg supeƌǀised pƌopeƌlǇ͛.  
 
Anne:  I think sometimes yeah you can be reactive with somebody on the 
other line I do do that and I apologise when I’m doing that but there 
are some times it comes from the other other person it’s because 
they’re not being supervised properly you’ve got to have proper 
supervision if you’re working with somebody like me otherwise you get 
this this malignant alienation I love that term which means really fuck 
off and die ((laughs)) in my you know. (I: Absolutely.) and I think if 
they don’t get it that’s what happens so I always say sup get 
supervision if you’re going to work with me sign a piece of paper 
telling me you’re going to be supervised by a proper person who 
knows what they’re talking about not any old supervision you have to 
have really good quality otherwise it won’t work. 
Extract 19: Anne 
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Social practices can identify discourses, for example Anne refers to the signing of a document 
inferring its binding nature. The assumption behind this being blame is attributable if it does 
not happen. This indicates a legal discourse of blame attribution. The implication being that 
without appropriate hierarchical, traditional lines of responsibility in place, they would be to 
ďlaŵe foƌ heƌ aĐtioŶs. Heƌ use of the teƌŵ ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛ also deŵoŶstƌates that this 
particular discourse has been made available to her, and she has brought it into her own 
disĐouƌse ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd pƌoǀided heƌ oǁŶ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of its ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ heƌ oǁŶ life ͚fuĐk 
off aŶd die͛. This is the ǁaǇ that disĐourses become translated and transferred into new 
discourses and reflect ideologies. Anne has used this phrase to provide reason for the difficult 
relationships she has had with many mental health professionals and identifies the extent to 
which the institutioŶ of psǇĐhiatƌǇ has takeŶ oǀeƌ iŶdiǀiduals͛ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ ĐhaŶge.  
 
Extracts 20-Ϯϰ, deŵoŶstƌate ǁhat Đould ďe desĐƌiďed as ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛, ǁithout 
explicit reference to it, as this is not a discursive term which is available to the other 
participants. Instead they draw on alternative resources to construct the same idea. Grace 
uses metaphorical language in Extract 20, providing a visual representation of an event, 
reproducing the verbal transaction that occurred. This refers to an exchange following a 
hospital admission with her allocated mental health professional. Grace justifies the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s aĐtioŶs ďǇ suggestiŶg she ďelieǀed the iŶdiǀidual thought she ǁas ͚Ƌuite a 
foƌtuŶate peƌsoŶ͛, this iŶ itself suggests that ͚foƌtuŶate people͛ should Ŷot haǀe pƌoďleŵs 
which lead them into the mental health system. This extract acts to suggest to the reader that 
Grace believes she was considered to blame for her problems. At the same time she is 
protecting her new professional identity by supporting the mental health professional with a 
justification for their response. This identifies the impact the mental health institution can 
have upon an individual.  
Grace:  Erm (9) she came in on my discharge meeting she came in to hospital 
and kind of stormed into the room and you know flew her arms up in 
the air how did you end up here you know I was absolutely 
gobsmacked that you’re here what are you doing here erm (3) I I don’t 
understand at all why you’re feeling like this erm because I think from 
the outside (3) it probably appeared that I was quite a fortunate 
person.  
Extract 20: Grace 
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In Extract 21, Helen describes her experience of mental health professionals with the 
adjeĐtiǀes: ͚dehuŵaŶised͛, ͚disƌegaƌded͛, ͚iŶdiffeƌeŶĐe͛, ͚guiŶea pig͛ aŶd haǀiŶg ďeeŶ ͚passed 
from counsellor to – pillaƌ to post͛ aŶd feeliŶg ͚like a aŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶt͛, the choice of each of 
these words suggest a experience of being invalid, part of a system, a lower ranking part of a 
soĐial sǇsteŵ. ͚HaǀiŶg a ǁhole paŶel of people͛ ĐoŶtiŶues a ŵetaphoƌ of aŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶt oƌ 
project, with nobody knowing the answers but professiŶg to ďe the eǆpeƌts, ͚Ǉou͛ƌe soƌt of at 
the ŵeƌĐǇ of these thiŶgs that theǇ doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ kŶoǁ hoǁ it ǁoƌked͛, fuƌtheƌ puƌpoƌts ďeiŶg 
ĐoŶtƌolled ďǇ ŵediĐatioŶ, the suďjeĐt ƌefeƌƌed to ďǇ ͚it͛ aŶd ͚these thiŶgs͛, aŶd those ǁho 
prescribe it. Fundamentally this positions responsibility with the institution of mental health 
and psychiatry, highlighting how, through a process of being objectified and a problem to be 
solved removes the responsibility from the individual, and also meaning of their experiences 
bǇ attƌiďutiŶg ĐuƌƌeŶt state of ŵiŶd to the ƌight leǀel of psǇĐhiatƌiĐ ŵediĐatioŶ ͚the pills had 
ŵade ŵe ǁoƌse͛, ͚theǇ ǁeƌe tƌǇiŶg ǀaƌious ŵeds͛, a ŵediĐal ŵodel of ŵeŶtal health 
positioŶiŶg the staff as ͚eǆpeƌts͛. Theƌe Đould ďe said to ďe a hiddeŶ ideology that the panel of 
people that HeleŶ ƌefeƌs to aƌe tƌǇiŶg to ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ heƌ aŶd ŵake heƌ ŵoƌe like theŵ. IŶ aŶotheƌ 
paƌt of heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ HeleŶ states ͚I thiŶk theǇ assuŵe that Ǉou͛ƌe ŵad aŶd that Ǉou͛ƌe ƌeallǇ 
Ŷot ǁell aŶd theƌe͛s Ŷo poiŶt saǀiŶg Ǉou.͛ This further provides evidence of the construct of 
͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛, ǁheƌe iŶdiǀiduals ǁith BPD aƌe positioŶed as Ŷot ǁoƌth saǀiŶg. 
AdditioŶallǇ, this eǆtƌaĐt eǆeŵplifies the positioŶiŶg of ŵeŶtal health ǁoƌkeƌs as ͚eǆpeƌts͛, aŶd 
I:  How have staff within the mental health system responded to you 
Helen: ((laughs)) Erm with varying deg-- sort of degrees of disregard erm sort 
of indifference erm sort of treating you like a erm I don’t know sort of 
feeling quite dehumanised by it as well as having psychiatrists and 
counsellors who did care. Erm but my early experience of it was there 
was no cont-- continuity you were sort of passed from counsellor to-- 
pillar to post that was upsetting initially. Erm (3) feeling like a I 
remember at hospital in erm erm city when I before I’d moved back to 
the county and stuff just being in absolute you know I was very I was 
quite suicidal because the the pills had taken me made me worse and I 
remember going in for these reviews and like having a whole panel of 
people I remember once there were like there was the lead consultant 
psy-- psychiatrist and then all these other people and I was just in bits 
and just feeling so I don’t know like a like a you know like a an 
experiment I suppose (I: Hm.) like a guinea pig in the whole thing. And 
and I did feel like a guinea pig because they were trying various meds 
erm so you did you know I cer-- I did feel like that and it w-- you know 
and then you’re left to your-- you’re sort of at the mercy of these things 
that they don’t actually know how it worked ((laughs)) you know.  
Extract 21: Helen 
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ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, the ͚patieŶts͛ as ͚ŶoŶ-eǆpeƌts͛. The assuŵptioŶ ďeiŶg ͚eǆpeƌts͛ hold the 
͚kŶoǁledge͛; if this ͚kŶoǁledge͛ is Ŷot foƌthĐoŵiŶg theŶ theǇ aƌe poteŶtiallǇ ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛. 
AlteƌŶatiǀelǇ, ďǇ ďeiŶg positioŶed as ͚eǆpeƌts͛ theǇ aƌe, ďǇ assuŵptioŶ, Ƌualified to adjudiĐate 
blame.  
 
DoƌothǇ, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϮϮ, desĐƌiďes ďelieǀiŶg that ͚psǇĐhiatƌists aŶd stuff͛ ͚kiŶd of get fed up ǁith 
ŵe͛. While she hedges heƌ stateŵeŶt ǁith ͚kiŶd of͛ to softeŶ the stateŵeŶt aŶd appeaƌiŶg to 
commit to it less, still it presents the suggestion of causing annoyance, a value judgment of not 
being pleased with her. This can act to attribute blame for non-response to treatment 
ŵethods ďut also poteŶtiallǇ eǀideŶĐe foƌ ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛, ǁheƌe the ĐlieŶt is Ŷot 
likeable and the behaviour is perceived to be within their control and manipulative. This is 
fuƌtheƌ deŵoŶstƌated ǁith ͚oh god she͛s ďaĐk agaiŶ͛, aŶd ͚ǁhat do ǁe do ǁith heƌ Ŷoǁ͛. 
Again, in similar ways to the previous aspects there is an assumption of social responsibility 
thƌough the use of ͚ǁe͛, as though the iŶdiǀidual is a pƌoďleŵ to ďe solǀed, aŶd ǁheŶ ͚theǇ͛ 
are not solved they become annoying. However, Dorothy seems to be conveying that there is 
no attempt to explore the meaning for the individual. Dorothy provides justification for the 
ƌespoŶse she ƌeĐeiǀes ďǇ saǇiŶg ͚I doŶ͛t thiŶk people kŶoǁ hoǁ to deal ǁith it͛, aŶd ƌepeatiŶg 
the words within this evaluative statement in the next clause. The diagnosis is constructed as 
an object in her statements and this extract suggests that there are no answers amongst the 
mental health professionals who, through implied assumption through all the interviews, are 
the ones that are expected to hold the answers. My question to Dorothy also asks about non-
professionals and she refers to theŵ Ŷot kŶoǁiŶg hoǁ to ƌespoŶd to heƌ ͚theǇ doŶ͛t people I 
doŶ͛t people doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ hoǁ to deal ǁith deal ǁith it oƌ ǁhat to thiŶk aďout it ƌeallǇ͛. 
This statement acts to objectify the diagnosis as a separate entity, this again isolates the 
behaviours, symptoms and label, without considering the reasons for them.  
 
I: How did you find that people responded to you either professionals or 
kind of people outside of the mental health world 
Dorothy: Erm (7) I think ((clears throat)) (4) professionals like I suppose like erm 
like psychiatrists and stuff they just like look at me ((tuts)) oh god she’s 
back again they kind of get fed up with me (I: Okay.) and they’re a bit 
oh no what do we do with her now and what are we going to do with 
her and stuff. Like my family I think well my brothers and my sister I 
think they’re just like-- and I don’t think people don't know how to deal 
with it really they’re just like oh no she’s gone off on one again erm 
yeah they don’t people I don’t people really don’t know how to deal 
with deal with it or what to think about it really.  
Extract 22: Dorothy 
96 
 
B.4.3.2.5 Summary of Blame Discourse 
Through examining all the texts in relation to the discourse of blame a significant dialectical 
pair is present, there are contradictory positions of individual responsibility (blame) and social 
responsibility (blame). This presents a dilemma or ideological struggle, common in Western 
Đultuƌe, of diffeƌeŶtiatiŶg ǁhiĐh positioŶ is ĐoƌƌeĐt. It ǁould seeŵ that Aƌistotle͛s Laǁ of ŶoŶ-
contradiction (Gottlieb, 2007) plays out in a number of the transcripts presenting an 
unresolved dilemma quite overtly for some. This is when the individual appears to struggle to 
decide whether the problems they experience are their fault or whether there is a reason out 
of their control which is to blame; the Law of non-contradiction states that two opposing 
positions cannot both be correct, and, thereby, the individual must decide between the two. 
This cultural polarisation has benefits for self-preservation, such that publicly an individual 
could save face by dislocating blame to another, while privately there is potentially a struggle 
over what it would mean if they were to blame for their problems. There is also evidence of 
the consideration of the part that the mental health community has in maintaining or helping 
their progress. Here individuals consider whether they themselves are to blame when 
treatments are unsuccessful or whether the professionals are to blame. This leads to discursive 
constructions of incompetence. Incompetence on the part of the professionals also presents 
the benefits of this polarisation, such that responsibility is removed from the individual and in 
addition a sympathetic position is potentially made available to the reader. Similarly, there is 
also the dileŵŵa of ǁhetheƌ the ͚eǆpeƌts͛ should take ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ theiƌ Đaƌe oƌ ǁhetheƌ 
the individual should take this responsibility.  
 
B.4.3.3   Stigma 
The seĐoŶd doŵiŶaŶt disĐouƌse to ďe appaƌeŶt thƌough aŶalǇsis is ͚“tigŵa͛. All the paƌtiĐipaŶts 
constructed their experience of the diagnosis through language which could most readily be 
attributed to stigma and its associated causes, influences and impacts.  This discourse is one 
which has developed over recent years and is dialectically related to discrimination and 
prejudice. That is, while discrimination and prejudice can be studied individually, they are not 
distinct from stigma, the impact of discrimination or prejudicial attitudes or behaviour is likely 
to be the creation of stigma, and inversely stigma may be related to an actual experience of 
discrimination or prejudicial attitudes, although it may also be anticipated as a result of 
cultural background and knowledge misinformation (Thornicroft, Mehta, Brohan & Kassam, 
2010). Thornicroft et al. (2010) identify that stigma can be identified as containing three main 
elements: knowledge problems or misinformation, attitude problems, and behaviour 
problems. Each of these along with the components already highlighted was apparent in the 
interview transcripts.  
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B.4.3.3.1  Stigma constructed by attitudes 
 
 
 Attitudes of mental health professionals towards the diagnosis were identified within the 
stigma discourse of participants. In describing this participants drew on different discourses 
with Clemence, Dorothy and Francis drawing particularly on a trauma discourse, evidenced in 
Extracts 23, 24 and previously 12. They constructed mental health professionals as identifying 
negatively with the nosological term, BPD, such that there was a disregard for the meaning of 
the behaviours or for understanding the developmental precipitants, only a stereotypical 
positioning of them by those they encountered resulting in a lack of empathy for their 
contexts.  
 
Clemence: if it did say chronic trauma this person has experienced you know 
major trauma blah de blah de blah and self harms because of it they 
would treat me a lot differently you know. I I feel they would. I feel that 
people would perceive me differently. (I: Hm-mm.) Even professionally 
they’d go oh you survived it and you're all right now well done 
((laughingly)) do you know what I mean (I: Yeah absolutely.) It would 
like like well done for getting through all of that bloody hell you know. 
Do you know what I mean if somebody was it’s you know it’s like you 
know yourself if somebody has been in a major trauma you know like 
say you know that tsunami on boxing day the tsunami and that if 
somebody survived that it was traumatic or whatever like that or even 
911 (I: Yeah.) Okay 911 right biggest bloody trauma ever right and 
somebody survived that they’d gone through the trauma they’ve had 
to have therapy blah de blah de blah and then they’re holding down a 
decent job and got their life sorted out people are like bloody hell well 
done well done for getting through that. And they wouldn’t actually 
think that person’s still traumatised they’d actually go cor well done.  
Extract 23: Clemence 
Dorothy : Yeah because I have often thought I’d rather have ((laughingly)) PTSD 
than BPD and I kind of did I kind of am-- have been diagnosed with 
that as well so maybe I could just say I’ve got that one (I: Hm.) 
because that’s like I know somebody that’s got PTSD and it’s like I 
don’t know people seem more tolerant of his kind of behaviours and 
stuff because of it. Because like his event was it is so traumatic it’s just 
like oh my god how can anyone live through that experience but it’s 
like people actually just like kind of tend to support him more and stuff 
like that. And I don’t know (I: Hm.) so I think yeah I think it would be 
better as a kind of trauma-- post traumatic thing 
Extract 24: Dorothy 
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Both Clemence and Dorothy suggest that if the diagnosis contained reference to the trauma 
they had experienced they would be positioned differently by those they encountered. They 
do this by drawing on examples of attitudes of mental health professionals positioning of those 
ǁho haǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐed eǀeŶts ǁhiĐh ŵight ƌesult iŶ a diagŶosis of PT“D, ͚theǇ ǁould tƌeat ŵe a 
lot diffeƌeŶtlǇ͛ ;CleŵeŶĐeͿ, ͚people seeŵ ŵoƌe toleƌaŶt͛ ;DoƌothǇͿ. The tƌauŵa disĐouƌse is 
one which can most readily be empathised with by all readers particularly when raising large-
scale traumatic events such as 9/11, and the Boxing Day Tsunami. These comparisons by 
Clemence enable her to position herself differently in relation to the stigma discourse as well 
as the blame and recovery discourses. Both Clemence and Dorothy make reference to survival 
of eǆtƌeŵe eǀeŶts outside of oŶe͛s ĐoŶtƌol as tǇpified ďǇ the disĐuƌsiǀe ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of tƌauŵa 
͚ǁell doŶe oŶ gettiŶg thƌough that͛ ;CleŵeŶĐeͿ, ͚oh ŵǇ god hoǁ ĐaŶ aŶǇoŶe liǀe thƌough that 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ ;DoƌothǇ).  
 
Further without a direct reference to trauma within the discursive label there is an underlying 
assumption evident within a number of the participant's teǆts that theǇ aƌe ͚defeĐtiǀe͛, theǇ 
aƌe ͚Ŷot Ŷoƌŵal͛. Foƌ eǆaŵple DoƌothǇ states ͚if I haǀe to haǀe aŶǇthiŶg͛ aŶd ͚I͛d ƌatheƌ haǀe͛. 
There is an implicit acceptance within this that her problems predicate an assumed reality that 
there is something wrong with her. This reflects further the power of a culture, which defines 
behaviours and experiences outside the range of those usually expressed by that community 
as Ŷot ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aŶd theƌeďǇ, uŶaĐĐeptaďle; the iŶstilliŶg of these assuŵptioŶs ǁithiŶ ŵeŵďeƌs 
of that cultural group create an experience of being different. Another example appears in 
Extract 29, where Helen identifies that depression is a preferred diagnosis, as it positions you 
as different but not as different as having a PD.  
 
In Extract 23, CleŵeŶĐe ŵakes ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the desiƌaďle Đapitalist attƌiďutes of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ 
such as being employed, having a stable relationship and an organised life, suggesting the 
assumption that to have these indicates mental health and without these one is considered 
different. Where this can be directly explained as resulting from a traumatic event there is less 
stigma and more understanding. This further identifies the ideology underlying the 
construction of mental health services and society in general, the desirability perhaps of 
productivity and conformity to the societal rules and norms. These references to employment, 
secure housing, stable relationships are apparent throughout all the transcripts.  
 
Clemence also raises an important issue with regard to medical notes. Research suggests that 
mental health professionals are reluctant to disclose diagnoses to the individual concerned but 
will document their diagnoses within written documentation (Allen, 2004). This is something 
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which was identified by Ellen, Dorothy, Beatrice, and Helen. This has been identified as 
occurring for a number of potential reasons with concern about stigma being one of them 
(Lequesne & Hersh, 2004). In effect this actually acts to increase stigma rather than protect the 
individual from it, as highlighted by Clemence in Extract 23.  
 
Both Dorothy and Clemence use verbal processes within their dialogue to convey the 
perceptions of others, and the alternative perceptions. This identifies how powerful language 
can be in conveying attitudes, expressing opinions, and how dependant upon them we are as 
human beings for communicating. This use of a verbal process gives much information, such as 
how the person might say something, what they might say, as well as intimating meaning.  
 
B.4.3.3.2 Stigŵa ĐoŶstruĐted as ͚KŶoǁledge͛ 
 
 
AŶotheƌ aspeĐt of stigŵa disĐouƌse dƌaǁŶ oŶ ďǇ AŶŶe aŶd DoƌothǇ aƌe the ͚kŶoǁledge͛ 
problems that occur when people heaƌ the teƌŵ ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛ aŶd hoǁ this Đƌeates 
perceptions of fear and danger. They both use extremes of vocabulary to construct this: 
͚paedophile͛, ͚ŵass ŵuƌdeƌeƌ͛, ͚ŵultiple peƌsoŶalities͛, ͚Đoŵplete fƌeak͛. Theiƌ stateŵeŶts iŶ 
Extracts 25 aŶd Ϯϲ, set out uŶdesiƌaďle attƌiďutes aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐes ͚theǇ thiŶk Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to 
ďe ŵass ŵuƌdeƌeƌs aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to staď people͛ ;AŶŶeͿ, ͚I just thought that I I had like all 
these different personalities and that people are just going to think I was a Đoŵplete fƌeak͛ 
(Dorothy). Both Anne and Dorothy identify through their choice of statements how 
terminology creates a position for them as dangerous which, they wished to reject. The fear 
for both being that they would be socially excluded as a result of ŵisiŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďǇ otheƌs: ͚I 
doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe eǀeŶ iŶ that little ďoǆ ďut Ŷo I thiŶk I thiŶk its sĐaƌǇ foƌ people͛, iŶ this 
Anne: ‘I’m not a paedophile oh no I don’t want to be even in that little box but 
no I think I think its scary for people or they think you’re going to be 
mass murderers and you’re going to stab people no its its not that its 
not as clear as clear cut as that’  
 
Dorothy: Erm I think without it being explained properly I think it’s quite scary 
it’s like you just think that there’s something wrong with you. I I 
thought for a long time that I had like multiple personalities and I was 
too scared to tell anyone because I just thought that I I had like all 
these different personalities and that people are just going to think I 
was a complete freak if I told anyone.  
Extract 25: Anne 
Extract 26: Dorothy 
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statement Anne is rejecting the identity which is assumed as a result of the diagnosis, a wish to 
be in a different category so as to be socially included; the underlying assumption being if 
something is scary it is undesirable and therefore avoided. Dorothy, similarly, by stating she 
did Ŷot ǁaŶt to ďe seeŶ as ͚a Đoŵplete fƌeak͛, suggests this is uŶdesiƌaďle aŶd ŵaǇ theƌefoƌe 
be avoided. Heƌ use of the ǁoƌd ͚Đoŵplete͛ suggests theƌe is ŶothiŶg else, theƌe is a 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to the ŶouŶ ͚fƌeak͛, aŶd this Đould assuŵe that if this is the Đase people ǁould 
discriminate due to there being no room for doubt as would be suggested by less commitment 
to the ŶouŶ ďǇ: ͚a bit of a fƌeak͛.    
 
ElleŶ also desĐƌiďes eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg people as ďeiŶg fƌighteŶed ďǇ heƌ iŶ EǆtƌaĐt Ϯϳ: ͚she looked 
teƌƌified͛. This is soŵethiŶg that she attƌiďutes iŶ heƌ disĐouƌse to ŵisiŶfoƌŵatioŶ: ͚its alǁaǇs a 
relief when I can talk to soŵeďodǇ that that kŶoǁs͛. The uŶdeƌlǇiŶg assuŵptioŶ ďehiŶd this 
stateŵeŶt Đould ďe said to ďe that the iŶdiǀidual ǁho ͚looked teƌƌified͛ did Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat the 
diagnosis meant. This again positions the experience of Ellen as one of being stigmatised. In 
additioŶ ElleŶ dƌaǁs oŶ hoǁ ǁidespƌead this eǆpeƌieŶĐe is ďǇ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to ͚theǇ͛ ǁheŶ saǇiŶg 
͚theǇ felt it appƌopƌiate to ďe ƌefeƌƌed oŶ to soŵeďodǇ else͛, this ĐoŶǀeǇs a ĐolleĐtiǀe 
behaviour towards excluding her from their care, a potential experience constructed as 
discrimination. Ellen draws a distinction between her experience of what was said to her 
͚pleasaŶt͛-ly and the other non-ǀeƌďal iŶdiĐatoƌs ǁhiĐh suggested eǆtƌeŵe feaƌ, ͚teƌƌified͛. “he 
goes on to suggest that I do not look scared and thus indicates her positioning of me as 
soŵeďodǇ ͚that kŶoǁs͛. 
 
Ellen: There was a lady that I saw erm for an assessment in January and 
she’d seen the letter from my doctor and I was going to be seeing her 
for CBT but she’d spoken she told me that she’d spoken to her 
supervisor and that they felt it appropriate to be referred on to 
somebody else and she looked terrified ((laughs)) she looked terrif-- 
she looked terrified do you know what I mean. And that felt hard she 
was she was perfectly pleasant but erm  
I:  You felt that 
Ellen: She she I actually felt that she yeah she was terrified. It’s a really it’s 
always a relief when I can talk to somebody that that knows 
I:  Yeah.  
Ellen: I’m not because you don’t look scared ((laughingly)) you don’t look do 
do you know what I mean  
 
Extract 27: Ellen 
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B.4.3.3.3 Stigma constructed as Social Exclusion 
 
 
 
 
A number of participants construct social exclusion through describing isolation occurring as a 
result of difference. Beatrice, Helen and Francis in Extracts 28, 29 and 30 exemplify this. While 
each positions themselves differently and draws on different discourses to construct that 
Francis: I keep I mean I do go through bouts of depression and and erm mood 
swings and one thing and another but I keep them to myself erm. My 
wife my wife knows she she can see it a mile off but no one else can 
tell if I can help it you know erm it’s between me and her now any any 
physical any outside signs that I am suffering or whatever erm I try to 
keep it in because just to show it shows everyone that you’re mad and 
it can alienate people that’s that’s the difference. (I: Okay.) So yeah I 
don’t like people to see if I'm not well (I: Hm.) because that’s that’s 
that’s how I see it. I don’t see the personality disorder as an illness but 
various aspects of it the depression and so on can be an illness 
 
Helen: Erm I do obviously I feel alone because I I feel I I can’t go and chat to 
anyone about it and it would be great actually in like ten years or five 
years if someone ca-- perhaps I should start a group ((laughs)) but 
what would I call it you know ((laughs)). Erm BPD anonymous or 
something you know because as as well I think I I it will be hard to get 
people to actually come to to something like that because maybe there 
is a lot of not shame but just erm I don’t know erm not embarrassment 
it it’s sort of somewhere along those lines you know where people don’t 
want to admit actually because it’s like so you’re really you know off the 
wall. I think all those eccentric people (I: Hm-mm.) you know those 
quirky peop-- and that’s how I describe myself to cover all my mental 
((laughingly)) health issues I think you know the way I come across. 
And often in the office I just go oh I’m having another neurotic day. I in 
that way I’m quite honest but I’m not going to go hey I have a 
personality disorder that’s a step too far I think I don’t think people are 
ready to hear any of that yet erm it’s bad enough just saying you suffer 
from depression I think.  
Extract 29: Helen 
Extract 30: Francis 
Beatrice: There’s also this feeling that I’ve never met anyone else with this 
illness even when I went to mental health drop-ins I was an outcast 
because I’d be babbling away and being inappropriate and yet this 
clique of nutters were able to get on all right. (I: Hm.) So imagine how 
I felt. (I: Yeah.) And then so it’s this terrible feeling of isolation in the 
community everywhere in the outside world in the mental health 
community with so called well they’re not peers but other people with 
difficulties.  
Extract 28: Beatrice 
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which they are trying to convey, the effect is to portray the same context. Beatrice draws on 
stigma discourse and her own stereotypes of individuals with ŵeŶtal health pƌoďleŵs ͚ĐliƋue 
of Ŷutteƌs͛, ideŶtifǇiŶg the appaƌeŶt stigŵa pƌeseŶt ǁithiŶ laǇ disĐouƌse; she positioŶs heƌself 
outside of this as well as the group she wishes to identify with. Helen draws on what might be 
described as mystical discourse ǁith ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚eĐĐeŶtƌiĐ͛ aŶd ͚ƋuiƌkǇ͛ to positioŶ heƌ 
difference and social isolation. Francis draws on psychiatric and lay discourse to construct 
alieŶatioŶ as a ƌesult of the steƌeotǇpes of ͚ŵadŶess͛.  
 
Each of these participants identifies less favourable treatment due to the diagnosis, as 
previously identified with B.4.3.3.2, by virtue of misinformation, discrimination and prejudice. 
They also raise the issue of how to define the problems they experience without reference to 
the disorder, somethiŶg ǁhiĐh is appaƌeŶt iŶ otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶteƌǀieǁs also foƌ eǆaŵple ͚do 
Ǉou desĐƌiďe it as soŵe kiŶd of defeĐt͛ ͚that Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot a ǁhole Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot fuŶĐtioŶiŶg as 
Ŷoƌŵal people should ďe͛ ;HeleŶͿ. This ideŶtifies that the diagŶosis pƌeseŶts aŶ uŶdesiƌable 
position of being outside of the majority.  
 
Identifying further the stereotypes with which the general public create stigma discourse, 
FƌaŶĐis dƌaǁs oŶ aŶ eǆaŵple of ďeiŶg ǁitŶessed to ͚ďe ŵad͛ ;EǆtƌaĐt ϯϬͿ, ͚I doŶ͛t like people to 
see I͛ŵ Ŷot ǁell͛, this presents an underlying assumption that this is not desirable and 
undesirable behaviour results in social exclusion. It would appear that in order to exist within 
this disĐouƌse he has ĐoŶstƌuĐted BPD Ŷot to ďe aŶ ͚illŶess͛, ďut that otheƌ aspeĐts of it can be. 
This presents an interesting perspective in essence he continues to identify with the label 
while not accepting the medical model inherent within it. This is in contrast to the other 
participants and might identify the usefulness of alternative models of understanding which do 
Ŷot ƌelǇ oŶ a ͚disease͛ ƌatioŶale. This deŵoŶstƌates the ǁaǇ that aŶ iŶdiǀidual ĐaŶ peƌĐeiǀe a 
diagnostic label and recontextualise it within their life to make sense for them. Francis appears 
to have taken the terminology and constructed it as a foundation for his experience and a 
fundamental part of him. This is something which other participants alternatively try to reject 
as it has implications for recovery.   
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B.4.3.3.4 Stigma constructed as Shame 
 
A common construction for the participants was an initial feeling of relief upon receiving a 
diagnosis followed by an increasing experience of shame and embarrassment. These 
experiences appear to be drawn out through the use of stigma discourse, for example Grace in 
EǆtƌaĐt ϯϭ states: ͚Ŷoǁ I ǁouldŶ͛t tell a soul eƌŵ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhǇ I thiŶk I͛ǀe ďeĐoŵe oǀeƌ 
tiŵe I͛ǀe ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe aǁaƌe of the stigŵa attaĐhed to it͛; aŶd ElleŶ also iŶ heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ 
ideŶtifies ͚iŶĐƌediďle shaŵe͛; CleŵeŶĐe states ͚I doŶ͛t thiŶk its shame its more I would feel 
ǀulŶeƌaďle͛. GƌaĐe͛s stateŵeŶt that she ǁould Ŷot ͚tell a soul͛ suggests she is highlightiŶg aŶ 
intense desire to keep the diagnosis from anybody rejecting a subject position. Grace also 
highlights as others have in their iŶteƌǀieǁs less diƌeĐtlǇ, that ͚people ĐaŶ ǁith that diagŶosis 
ĐaŶ just get put iŶ oŶe ďƌaĐket aŶd uŶdeƌ oŶe uŵďƌella aŶd aŶd that͛s it͛. This stateŵeŶt 
reflects the position that the diagnosis creates a lifetime identity for people at the hands of 
others perceptions; a collective identity which places a heterogeneous group of individuals as a 
homogeneous one with regards to others attitudes and behaviours. Grace also makes what 
appears to be a factual statement towards the end of the extract, on which I ask for 
I:  Hm okay. And are there any differences in erm your experience 
between then and now. Do you have any do you still have similar 
thoughts do you still feel relief do you feel anything else as well 
Grace:  No very, very different now (I: Okay yeah) Erm I think over time I 
became more embarrassed and more ashamed of it I think at the 
time I told quite a lot of people erm but now I wouldn’t tell a soul erm I 
don’t know why I think I’ve become over time I’ve become more 
aware of the stigma attached to it erm and how people can with that 
diagnosis can just get put in one bracket and under one umbrella and 
and that’s it erm (3) and I think after the diagnosis I would say things 
spiralled even more and I became more and more embarrassed and 
ashamed of what I was doing and who I was. Erm certainly now erm I 
don’t know because my attitude towards people with borderline 
personality disorder is very much a sympathetic one because I know 
how it feels on the inside but and how you know (2) I don’t know how 
awful those emotions are to deal with but (3) I know a lot of other 
people don’t think that way I know people are just seen as a pain 
really claiming the services erm 
I:  And is that what you get from you know the professionals around you 
the kind of (Grace: Yeah) Is it the things they say or just kind of a 
feeling that you get from them or both 
Grace:   Both both but I’ve I’ve heard a lot of a lot of bad things said yeah  
 Extract 31: Grace 
104 
 
ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ: ͚I kŶoǁ people aƌe just seeŶ as a paiŶ ƌeallǇ ĐlaiŵiŶg the seƌǀiĐes͛. This iŵplies aŶ 
actual experience of this attitude, which Grace goes on to confirm.  
 
B.4.3.3.5 Stigma constructed as Discrimination 
 
 
 
 
Extracts 32-36, demonstrate how the stigma associated with mental health problems and BPD, 
are constructed by Francis, Anne, Clemence and Helen in relation to employment. In Extract 
ϯϮ, ŵeŶtal health pƌoďleŵs aƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐted ďǇ FƌaŶĐis͛ as ďeiŶg fƌauduleŶt aŶd, theƌefoƌe, Ŷot 
being justified in receiving benefits. In itself this construction highlights cultural attitudes to 
mental health which would be considered discriminatory but nevertheless exist within political 
ideologies. 
 
 
AŶŶe, EǆtƌaĐt ϯϯ, ǁho ĐaŵpaigŶs foƌ ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐe iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts, states ͚people doŶ͛t 
know about my diagŶosis͛ iŶĐludiŶg ͚people ǁho I ǁoƌk foƌ͛, speĐifiĐallǇ attƌiďutiŶg the ƌeasoŶ 
for this to stigma, the intimation being that she would be treated less favourably if they knew.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The assumption upon which Clemence bases her statement (Extract 34) is that mental health 
services in the NHS should be promoting social inclusion across society including modelling 
employment opportunities. However, the commitment with which she makes this statement 
as a fact constructs the opposite reality. 
 
Anne: People don’t know about my diagnosis. They know about my OCD but 
not my BPD people close to me know about it but people who I work for 
they don’t not unless its if they need to know then they’ll know because 
there’s a stigma behind it’  
Extract 33: Anne 
Francis: I didn’t dare take benefits because I sort of saw myself as a fraud 
you know not working and not having any real physical reason not to 
be working. 
 Extract 32: Francis 
Clemence: mental health services are the worst worst people for stigmatising 
mental health problems. You know if you’ve got a mental health 
service and you want to work in the NHS god help you…you know 
especially if you want to work in mental health.  
 
Extract 34: Clemence 
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Clemence: I was terri-- absolutely terrified of them finding out (I: Yeah.) that I’d 
been in hospital and you know it makes me laugh you know all this 
business of the medical health service is saying you know oh yes we 
know we need to kind of promote this kind of what do they say they’d 
need to promote this ((clears throat)) trying to get away from the 
stigma of mental illness (I: Hm-mm.) I have to say that the mental 
health services are the worst worst people for stigmatising mental 
health problems. You know if you’ve got a mental health service and 
you want to work in the NHS god help you (I: Hm-mm.) you know 
especially if you want to work in mental health you know. And erm you 
know this idea that you can have a mental health problem and yes you 
can you if you have enough insight you can control it you can take 
care of yourself you can look after yourself you can look after you 
protect yourself and your patients and all that kind of stuff seems to 
bypass them you know. It’s it’s it’s absolutely awful. I don’t know 
maybe it’s changed now and you don’t have to do that but certainly 
when I was doing it you had to put everything (I: Hm.) And there was 
this thing if you did put everything they could sack you. 
 
 
 
CleŵeŶĐe ĐoŵŵeŶĐes, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϯϱ, ďǇ highlightiŶg that she ǁas ͚aďsolutelǇ teƌƌified of theŵ 
fiŶdiŶg out͛ ǁheŶ she ǁoƌked foƌ the NH“. This ĐoŶǀeǇs to the ƌeadeƌ aŶ eǆtƌeŵelǇ fƌighteŶiŶg 
experience. While this was not an event that occurred for her the anticipation of the possible 
treatment she would have experienced if it had is verbalised as traumatic and harrowing. 
Clemence describes a lose-lose situation. Similarly, Helen (Extract 36) states how despite the 
stigma attached to depression, she would prefer to disclose her depression than BPD because 
that would be worse, and therefore, declares depression on applications for employment. In a 
social climate where depression is considered as one of the highest causes of sickness amongst 
employees, this positions BPD as more highly stigmatising as a result of high levels of 
misinformation, shame, embarrassment, discrimination and prejudice towards the diagnosis 
and the categorisation of those with the diagnosis.  
 
Helen: I think they have a problem of mental health issues anyway erm you 
know and if you’re seen as a depressive anyway you’re you’re seen 
as you know unemployable or you know there’s a lot of stigma with 
that so erm it’s it’s probably worse to say you’ve got I’m certainly not 
going to be waving a placard saying I suffer from BPD. Erm and so so 
in that respect erm how do I feel about it now (2) I I don’t really talk 
about it as such. Erm on a on employment forms and stuff I just say I 
suffered from depression and let that kind of be an umbrella for 
covering all that.  
 
Extract 36: Helen 
Extract 35: Clemence 
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B.4.3.3.6 Summary of Stigma Discourse 
Noticeably, with regards to the stigma discourse all the extracts in B.4.3.3 highlight a tendency 
to ǀeƌďalise eǀeŶts, eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd thoughts ǁith use of the pƌoŶouŶ ͚I͛. CoŶǀeƌselǇ, the 
ŵost used pƌoŶouŶ ǁith ƌegaƌd to the ďlaŵe disĐouƌse appeaƌs to ďe ͚theǇ͛, although, I have 
not validated this through content analysis. Qualitatively the significance of this would be that 
geŶeƌallǇ theƌe is a ŵoǀe, ǁith iŶĐƌeasiŶg puďliĐitǇ aŶd eduĐatioŶ that ͚stigŵa͛ iŶ all its guises 
is immoral and personal identification with experience is considered acceptable. However, 
there is no such agreement, all be it in its infancy, with regard to the attribution of blame for 
mental health problems.  
 
B.4.3.4  Recovery  
The thiƌd doŵiŶaŶt disĐouƌse ǁithiŶ the tƌaŶsĐƌipts ǁas that of ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛. This ǁas pƌeseŶted 
in different ways and drew upon different constructs and concepts for each of the participants, 
however, participants demonstrated recovery as a dialectical dilemma of permanence, one 
which may fundamentally impact upon treatment outcomes; shaped by their discursive and 
extra-discursive constructions. Two of the participants used a drowning analogy to exemplify 
their experience of the diagnosis and their construction of recovery; I will discuss this towards 
the end of the section, as this presents a powerful presentation of the enigma of the diagnosis 
and suggests that the diagnosis itself as a construction is in fact dialectical in nature.  
 
B.4.3.4.1  Recovery constructed as Treatment 
 
I:   Erm what what treatment have you actually received 
 
Anne:  I have a CBT that does not work with people with b-- personality 
disorder does not did not do anything to me did not help me in any way 
and don’t know why but I’ve since spoken to somebody who knows 
their stuff and said well Anne actually it’s a waste of time it will never 
work and it wasn’t they didn’t tell me why but the but the person’s quite 
experienced she knows what she’s talking about there must be a 
reason why she told me that she said don’t worry Anne it doesn’t work. 
And I had CAT therapy (I: Okay.) which was helpful but very unhelpful 
because I didn’t tell them I’d had flashbacks (3) and you know it could 
be quite helpful for somebody to say well actually when you’re having 
CAT therapy you do realise you know there is a small percentage a 
small chance that you might have flashbacks or nightmares I had 
flashbacks. And then I remembered some stuff that actually I wish I 
hadn’t but I remember now but that’s okay that’s good and it makes me 
realise why I do certain things  
 
Extract 37: Anne 
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Extracts 37, 38 and 39, find Anne, Beatrice and Grace respectively constructing treatment for 
BPD each from a different position. Anne in Extract 37, presents her discursive position of 
haǀiŶg ƌeĐeiǀed the ͚ǁƌoŶg͛ tƌeatŵeŶt aŶd iŶfeƌs this has pƌeǀeŶted ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ; BeatƌiĐe͛s 
positioŶ is that the ƌeŵoǀal of the ͚ƌight͛ tƌeatŵeŶt has pƌeǀeŶted heƌ ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ; aŶd GƌaĐe 
positions herself as having received treatment which helped her recovery but that others are 
prevented from recovering due to the withholding of effective treatment due to professional 
attitudes.  
 
Evidence-based treatment dominates the field of mental health, it has its origins in the 
positivist paradigm and as such operates within essentialist ideas, that a treatment that is 
found to be helpful through empirical research can be applied universally relying on 
homogeneous groups of problems. The problem with regards to BPD is that effective evidence-
based treatments have only recently been identified, as such they are not widely available, 
expensive and further they are being applied to a heterogenous group of individuals. The 
research evidence suggests that when an individual is offered treatment and it is not viewed to 
͚ǁoƌk͛, the ƌeasoŶ foƌ it Ŷot ǁoƌkiŶg is plaĐed ǁithiŶ the iŶdividual. This is evident within the 
discourse in Extract 37; Anne discusses two treatments that she has received, CBT and CAT, 
both of which have demonstrated variability in effectiveness for those with the BPD diagnosis. 
However, CBT in particular is widelǇ thought of as ͚the͛ eǀideŶĐe-ďased tƌeatŵeŶt. AŶŶe͛s 
statements act to defend her against this individualism; she tries to dislocate the blame 
discourse for her non-recovery following the treatments she has received. She uses the 
imperative mood and strong commitment to statements of fact to achieve this and further 
ďaĐks heƌ positioŶ ǁith ͚eǆpeƌt͛ opiŶioŶ. Heƌ stateŵeŶts also aĐt to positioŶ heƌ as a Ŷaïǀe 
recipient of this information, unclear why they would tell her this. Further there is evidence of 
her constructing errors in the way that treatment was delivered, the underlying premise being, 
if it had been delivered correctly it might have been more helpful. This further identifies the 
underlying ideology of the discourse within the BPD field, the tendency to consider individuals 
to hold responsibility for the effectiveness of treatment, that they make a choice about 
ǁhetheƌ soŵethiŶg ͚ǁoƌks͛. AŶŶe dƌaǁs oŶ psǇĐhotheƌapeutiĐ disĐouƌse, the aĐƌoŶǇŵs ͚CBT͛, 
͚CAT͛, ͚flashďaĐks͛ aŶd ͚the ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ of ŵeŵoƌies͛, to iŶdiĐate heƌ positioŶiŶg as a ͚laǇ eǆpeƌt͛ 
ǁho ͚kŶoǁs͛ the laŶguage of theƌapǇ.  
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CoŶŶeĐted ǁith this ǀieǁ that the ͚patieŶt͛ is ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ the outĐoŵe is the idea of the 
͚good patieŶt͛. Theƌe is aŶ eǆpeĐtation within mental health services, and the medical model 
ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ, that aŶ iŶdiǀidual is ƌeƋuiƌed to oĐĐupǇ a ͚siĐk ƌole͛ aŶd ďe a ͚good patieŶt͛. 
This ƌefeƌs to the idea that aŶ iŶdiǀidual ǁill ďe ĐoŵpliaŶt, gƌateful aŶd ͚get ďetteƌ͛. WheŶ aŶ 
indiǀidual does Ŷot appeaƌ to ĐoŶfoƌŵ to this ƌole theǇ aƌe ǀieǁed as ͚ŵaŶipulatiǀe͛ aŶd 
͚atteŶtioŶ-seekiŶg͛. This ǁas eǀideŶt ǁithiŶ the tƌaŶsĐƌipts of ŵost of the paƌtiĐipaŶts. 
BeatƌiĐe, iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϯϴ, eǆeŵplifies this positioŶiŶg heƌself as ͚the good patieŶt͛, ĐoŵplǇiŶg 
with treatment and that this was because she believed that she was supported by a team of 
people and she wanted to show her appreciation, or gratitude. She constructs their 
ĐoŵpassioŶ: the teaŵ ͚said ǁe͛ƌe all ǀeƌǇ pƌoud of Ǉou͛, this suggests the inherent power with 
which mental health professionals have to validate or invalidate an individual and invoke 
ƌeĐipƌoĐal ďehaǀiouƌs. Hoǁeǀeƌ, BeatƌiĐe theŶ sǁitĐhes to pƌeseŶt the teaŵ as ͚ŶegligeŶt͛ foƌ 
not advising her of the diagnosis. She sets up an alternative position of having tried to be a 
͚good patieŶt͛ ďut that the ĐhaŶged ďehaǀiouƌ of otheƌs toǁaƌds heƌ alteƌed this, dƌaǁiŶg oŶ a 
legal disĐouƌse to iteƌate heƌ poiŶt usiŶg ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal͛ aŶd ͚ŶegligeŶt͛. This aĐts to puŶish those 
who she positions as rejecting her, although not specifically, enabling her to maintain her 
construction of their compassion. Beatrice attributes the problems further to a loss of hope for 
recovery with age, suggesting that her chances to recover are prevented by the withholding of 
tƌeatŵeŶt as a diƌeĐt ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe ͚theǇ thiŶk ǁell this peƌsoŶ is Ŷot goiŶg to ƌespoŶd to 
tƌeatŵeŶt aŶd I͛ŵ left ǁith ŶothiŶg͛.  
 
This extract demonstrates how a medical model of symptoms would interpret her text, as one 
of extremes between idealising and devaluing, and avoidance of abandonment. However, the 
discourse suggests reading this text from a different position that these positions are reflected 
Beatrice:  I you know because I was making progress at the with the team at the 
unit in ’96 because I had a team behind me I I got on with them and 
the I really felt that I wanted to to work hard because I felt they were 
you know valuating me (I: Hm-mm.) and and this psychiat-- psychiatric 
nurse said we’re all very proud of you and this no one had ever said 
that to me. And I was just making progress but they never told me 
which was negligence. And I think so many people are committing 
suicide because of the incompetence of the mental health system in 
this country and it’s absolutely criminal that I’m left to suffer. And I 
think the older you get the more they think well this person is not going 
to respond to treatment and I, I’m left with nothing so that’s my spiel. 
 
Extract 38: Beatrice 
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ďǇ ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes theŵselǀes, ƌespoŶdiŶg to the ͚good patieŶt͛ as aŶ ideal aŶd 
devaluiŶg the ͚ďad patieŶt͛.  
Implicit within the recovery idea is the assumed goal of successful outcome being no longer in 
Ŷeed of seƌǀiĐes. WheŶ this is liŶked ǁith the ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs of ͚good patieŶts͛ aŶd ͚eǀideŶĐe-
ďased tƌeatŵeŶt͛ a fuƌtheƌ assuŵptioŶ ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified, to aĐhieǀe the goal iŶ the shoƌtest 
time possible with minimum costs. These assuŵptioŶs aƌe appaƌeŶt ǁithiŶ GƌaĐe͛s eǆtƌaĐt ϯϵ. 
“he positioŶs heƌself as ƌeĐoǀeƌed ďǇ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚these people͛ aŶd ͚stop theŵ͛, this aĐts to 
set up an alternative position for herself as no loŶgeƌ ideŶtifǇiŶg ǁith ͚these people͛. GƌaĐe 
draws on the assumption of recovery and mental health services aiding this. However, she 
ideŶtifies the politiĐs of ŵeŶtal health iŶ ƌelatioŶ to Đost saǀiŶg, ͚Đost effeĐtiǀe͛. Heƌ 
construction suggests that the goal of recovery cannot be achieved through the current 
methods being employed. That mental health services do not operate from a position of the 
individual, but from the capitalist demands of the service, identified by Flannagan, Miller and 
Davidson (2009).  
 
Further evident in this extract is the impact that shame and blame appear to have on an 
individual positioning themselves as recovered. The difficulty that appears apparent in her 
disĐouƌse at ƌeĐoŶĐiliŶg heƌ ƌoles as pƌofessioŶal aŶd patieŶt. Heƌ stateŵeŶt ͚I thiŶk I should 
have I think I could have been moƌe iŶ ĐoŶtƌol of it͛, highlights heƌ dileŵŵa aloŶg ǁith the 
length of her pauses, searching for the right discourse, and makes me question what she chose 
not to say. It is possible that the hidden ideology is that mental health professionals are 
expected to ďe ͚higheƌ ďeiŶgs͛, to ďe ŵoƌallǇ iƌƌepƌoaĐhaďle aŶd the shaŵe she eǆpeƌieŶĐes is 
ďased oŶ heƌ iŶsideƌ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes as a pƌofessioŶal, peƌhaps iŶ the 
way individuals are discussed or the judgements that are passed about their behaviours. This is 
further evidenced in Extract 40.  
 
Grace: I think the services should be there for these people because at the 
end of the day it helped me it helped me move on it helped me recover 
erm you know and I no longer need to see anybody in services from 
from wherever so at the end of the day I think (5) it’s more cost 
effective if somebody’s getting that the treatment that they need and 
that will ultimately stop them seeing people. Erm personally ((sighs)) 
(11) I don’t know (6) because in a way I’m going to be quite harsh on 
myself (I: Yeah.) but (4) I think the things that I was doing (6) I’m quite 
ashamed of and I think I should have I think I could have been more in 
control of it. (7) So I don’t know. I feel it’s completely contrasting.  
 Extract 39: Grace 
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B.4.3.4.2 Recovery constructed as Dilemma of Permanence 
 
I:  Okay. Do you think that this is something that you can recover from 
people can recover from 
Grace:  That’s an interesting question because to an extent yeah because I am 
miles away from where I was two years ago. (I: Hm.) (12) I’m trying to 
think how I can describe how how different I am (4) you know I think 
two years ago (10) I am ashamed of a lot of things I’ve done (13) I 
think if I told people now that only know me as a professional they 
wouldn’t believe (I: Hm-mm.) a lot of the a lot of the things that I did 
and why I did it ((coughs)). Erm those emotions that I felt during that 
period were just always always up and down and then I would act on 
those emotions erm (4) and just so impulsive (7) and I think I have 
recovered to a certain extent erm both through counselling erm and 
through that friend I was telling you about (I: Hm.) (3) to a point where 
my (4) yes I do still get a lot of the feelings I’m still crap with 
relationships erm deep relationships on a superficial level I’m great 
erm (4) particularly when I’m stressed I will get very very paranoid erm 
(5) and when people touch a raw nerve as well I will still get very very 
anxious and believe that people’s intentions are not what they say they 
are. And I don’t see how that will ever change because I see this as my 
personality. (I: Okay right) The only thing I could change which I have 
changed is (3) my reactions to it how I cope with those feelings (I: Hm.) 
and that’s why I probably (3) don’t come across to people who only 
know me on either a professional or superficial level as having 
borderline personality disorder. 
 
Extract 40: Grace 
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Clemence: You know and I hope that it is and when I say you can recover from it 
I say it but also with wishful thinking because I'm scared you can’t 
because of the label. (I: Yeah.) Do you see what I mean (I: Yeah.) So 
I want to know I want to feel that it’s that you can recover from it 
because if you can’t I’m fucked really and I'm just on a higher level of 
functioning and then what happens if there’s a a crisis do I resort 
back to that I don’t-- I hope not. You know do I resort back back to 
that because that’s my personality (I: Hm.) if you like. And that’s the 
problem with the diagnosis is that it condemns people to a lifetime of 
hell if you like (I:  Hm.) because you're saying you're never going to 
get better. (I: Hm-mm.) Yeah it’s not like post traumatic stress 
disorder you can recover from that. And depression yeah you can 
recover from that you take some tablets you know it’s a lot of tablets 
don’t seem to touch it sometimes either you know. Erm and so and so 
it’s I want to be able to recover from it because if you if you can’t 
recover from it  (I: Hm-mm.) then I’m I'm buggered (I: Hm.) you know. 
So but it’s it is a worry that you can’t recover from it because if it’s 
true and the psychiatrists are right and I am borderline personality 
disorder does that mean I’m always going to be it (I: Hm-mm.) you 
know. And I've always got a little bit of an eye on that you know I 
always kind of think is that a little bit. Perhaps you can talk yourself 
into it as well I think and that’s what it’s a little bit like and that’s the 
other problem with it I’m not I’m going off on a tangent you probably 
want to stop now but but that’s the other problem is that do you give 
people this label and if you give I’ve tried not to do this because I 
could see that and I well I wasn’t really bothered what they put at the 
time but if you if you’re sense of self is so weak and you're just 
relieved to have a label which means that you’ve got an identity then 
you could see how you can buy into that. It’s a little bit like when you 
take medication and you get all the side effects if you read all the side 
effects sure as likely you're going to bloody get them. So 
((laughingly)) don’t read the side effects read the first three, if you 
ain’t got the first three don’t worry too much. (I: Hm.) But if you read 
all the way down to the bottom and this long line and you can then 
know because your sense of self is so fragile you could end up 
bloody developing it ((laughingly)) do you know what I mean I know 
that sounds funny but you could end up (I: Yeah.) buying into it. And 
reading DSM-IV or wherever it is and and the other book and thinking 
yeah that’s me that’s me that’s not me yet but it might be soon 
((laughingly)) do you know what I mean (I: Yeah.) you know. (I: 
Yeah.) 
 
I asked the participants whether they considered recovery possible. As such it could be said 
that I influenced talk within a recovery discourse, although this was a question that evolved 
after several interviews and was suggested by Clemence as an important consideration, 
consequently the question was generated through discourse. The responses that I received 
Extract 41: Clemence 
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indicated a dilemma, one relating to the concept of permanence. Each participant positioned 
themselves differently, those who considered BPD unrecoverable experienced a dilemma 
about what this meant for the future and tended to position themselves as having to manage 
theiƌ ͚disoƌdeƌ͛, those ǁho ĐoŶsideƌed it ƌeĐoǀeƌaďle positioŶed theŵselǀes as ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛, ďut 
eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg a dileŵŵa as to ǁhetheƌ this ǁas tƌulǇ possiďle oŶ aĐĐouŶt of ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ 
the label suggesting their fundamental self was affected. Shame also appeared to influence the 
disĐouƌse, as ideŶtified iŶ eǆtƌaĐts fƌoŵ GƌaĐe, HeleŶ͛s aŶd ElleŶ͛s iŶteƌǀieǁs. This appeaƌed 
further influenced by professional identities, would Clemence and Grace be devalued in their 
pƌofessioŶal ƌoles oŶ aĐĐouŶt of haǀiŶg had the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛? EǆtƌaĐt ϰϬ is puŶĐtuated ďǇ 
hesitation and contemplation, suggestive of role conflict; a need to demonstrate from the 
position of professional as no longer being identified with the collective identity of BPD, while 
fearful that the past prevented this from being the case.  
 
Extracts 40 and 41 demonstrate the struggle to resolve the dialectical dilemma posed by the 
terminology. Is it possible to recover from something which by definition diagnoses your 
personality as disordered and is considered permanent and unchanging within the DSM. 
Furthermore if you cannot recover what does that mean for you as individual? The 
construction of my question to Grace reflects my recognition of her use of pronouns to 
distaŶĐe heƌself fƌoŵ the ĐolleĐtiǀe ideŶtitǇ of BPD, I ƌephƌase ŵǇ ƋuestioŶ fƌoŵ ͚soŵethiŶg 
that you ĐaŶ ƌeĐoǀeƌ fƌoŵ͛ to ͚people ĐaŶ ƌeĐoǀeƌ fƌoŵ͛, ŵǇ iŶteŶtioŶ to ĐlaƌifǇ ŵǇ use of the 
ǁoƌd ͚Ǉou͛, so that I did Ŷot suggest, ďǇ ǁaǇ of iŵpliĐatioŶ, aŶǇthiŶg aďout the status of heƌ 
recovery. Her response, contrastingly, positions her from inside the cultural experience of the 
diagnosis rather than her professional position outside of that experience, by reference to her 
own journey. After distancing herself directly from the experience by referencing time and 
spaĐe, ǁhiĐh aƌe theŵselǀes soĐial ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs as ideŶtified ďǇ FaiƌĐlough ;ϮϬϬϯͿ, ͚I aŵ miles 
(space) away from where I was two years (timeͿ ago͛, this aĐts to tell ŵe aŶd otheƌ ƌeadeƌs 
that she is removed from the event she is describing, that she is now occupying a different 
positioŶ. Afteƌ a sigŶifiĐaŶt pause, she atteŵpts to eŵphasise this distaŶĐiŶg ďǇ ƌefleĐtiŶg ͚I͛ŵ 
trying to thiŶk hoǁ I ĐaŶ desĐƌiďe hoǁ hoǁ diffeƌeŶt I aŵ͛. Afteƌ fuƌtheƌ pauses, ƌefleĐtiŶg heƌ 
contemplation of her past experiences and the need to perhaps find the appropriate words to 
convey the message she wishes to impart to me, she repeats that she experiences shame 
about her past behaviours. This I would suggest as in my discussion of Extract 40 highlights 
that heƌ feeliŶgs of shaŵe iŶflueŶĐe heƌ aďilitǇ to ĐoŶstƌuĐt heƌ ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ as heƌ ƌealitǇ.  
Within their interviews both Clemence and Grace draw on the application of this dilemma to 
their professional roles, this is perhaps constructed as a particular issue because they both 
ǁoƌk iŶ the ŵeŶtal health field aŶd as suĐh the issue of ͚ŵeŶtal health͛ as a pƌofessioŶal is 
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ŵost peƌtiŶeŶt. Theƌe is eǀideŶĐe of aŵďiǀaleŶĐe ǁithiŶ theiƌ disĐouƌse, ͚I thiŶk I haǀe 
ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛ ;GƌaĐeͿ, ͚I hope that it is…I͛ŵ sĐaƌed Ǉou ĐaŶt ďeĐause of the laďel͛ ;CleŵeŶĐeͿ. 
What comes through in the recovery discourse is the lack of consensus around what 
͚ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛ ƌeallǇ ŵeaŶs. GƌaĐe dƌaǁs oŶ disoƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt, aŶd CleŵeŶĐe dƌaǁs oŶ a 
͚higheƌ leǀel of fuŶĐtioŶiŶg͛ as a ǁaǇ of eƋuatiŶg ǁith the idea that paƌts of the peƌsoŶalitǇ aƌe 
perhaps unchangeable. They both appear to be responding to an unspoken assumption or 
judgŵeŶt oƌ ƋuestioŶ fƌoŵ the ͚eǆpeƌts͛ that theǇ haǀe Ŷot ďeeŶ ͚Đuƌed͛ oŶlǇ leaƌŶed to 
ŵaŶage theiƌ ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛, this ideŶtifies aŶ iŶheƌeŶt pƌoďleŵ ǁith the ŵediĐal ŵodel of 
mental health. By defining a social and cultural problem medically without biological markers, 
how does one then determine that the problem has been resolved without reference to 
ďiologiĐal ŵaƌkeƌs. IŶ ǁhose opiŶioŶ should ǁe ĐoŶsideƌ the pƌoďleŵ to ďe ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛? IŶ 
essence it presents an unanswered philosophical question.  
 
IŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϰϬ, GƌaĐe ƌephƌases thƌough aŶ eŵďedded Đlause ;͚ǁhiĐh I haǀe ĐhaŶged͛Ϳ to 
eŵphasise that she does thiŶgs diffeƌeŶtlǇ Ŷoǁ, she has doŶe all she ĐaŶ to ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌ͛ aŶd 
hopes this will be considered enough perhaps. At the end of her extract she suggests that 
otheƌ pƌofessioŶals do Ŷot ͚see͛ the diagŶosis, ďeĐause she has leaƌŶed to ͚ĐoŶtƌol͛ the 
symptoms more effectively or differently. She also suggests that her colleagues have a 
superficial knowledge of her, not a ͚ƌeal͛ kŶoǁledge, ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that she has diffeƌeŶt ƌoles 
aŶd ĐoŶstƌuĐts diffeƌeŶt ƌealities aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ƌoles she is positioŶed iŶ. Does this ͚Ŷot 
seeiŶg͛ of a diagŶosis ŵeaŶ that it is Ŷot theƌe, oƌ does it ŵeaŶ it is hiddeŶ?  
 
Clemence in ExtraĐt ϰϭ asks ͚do I ƌesoƌt ďaĐk to that ďeĐause its ŵǇ peƌsoŶalitǇ?͛ CleŵeŶĐe 
goes oŶ to ĐoŶstƌuĐt ǁhat she ĐoŶsideƌs to ďe the pƌoďleŵ ǁith the diagŶosis ͚ĐoŶdeŵŶed to a 
life of hell…Ǉou͛ƌe saǇiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg to get ďetteƌ͛. What CleŵeŶĐe does Ŷot saǇ, but is 
implied through her construction, is that the ideology is that all individuals seek to be normal 
aŶd the ďƌaŶdiŶg of iŶdiǀiduals as ͚disoƌdeƌed͛ eǆĐludes theŵ fƌoŵ this ŶoƌŵalitǇ, ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ 
disoƌdeƌed͛ ŵakes this iŵpossiďle to eǀeƌ aĐhieǀe, aŶd therefore results in the individual being 
eǆĐluded peƌŵaŶeŶtlǇ fƌoŵ the ĐolleĐtiǀe suďjeĐt positioŶ of ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛. This ideŶtifies thƌough 
the ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ disĐouƌse the ǁideƌ pƌoďleŵ of ǁho deteƌŵiŶes that soŵeďodǇ is ͚ŵeŶtallǇ ill͛, 
according to whose reality we determine that something exists. While Grace and Clemence 
demonstrate the wish to draw on their own reality, what is apparent is the consideration that 
it is peƌhaps the ͚ƌealitǇ͛ as deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ aŶ ͚eǆpeƌt͛ that deĐides this. CleŵeŶĐe states ͚if its 
true aŶd the psǇĐhiatƌists aƌe ƌight͛ she suggests that psǇĐhiatƌists geŶeƌallǇ ƌepƌeseŶted a 
ďelief iŶ the eǆisteŶĐe of ͚disoƌdeƌs͛. This aĐts as aŶ ideŶtitǇ ĐlassifiĐatioŶ sǇsteŵ theŶ ƌatheƌ 
than simply a way of being able to talk about a group of symptoms or experiences by short 
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haŶd ƌefeƌeŶĐe to oŶe teƌŵ, ͚I aŵ ďoƌdeƌliŶe peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚I haǀe 
ďoƌdeƌliŶe peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛. The ĐlassifiĐatioŶ of people ƌatheƌ thaŶ disoƌdeƌs. ͚Does that 
ŵeaŶ I aŵ alǁaǇs goiŶg to ďe it͛ is CleŵeŶĐe dƌawing attention to the discourse which 
suggests a lack of answers, the reductionist foundations of the medical model creates more 
questions which remain unanswered, and in so doing does not assist with the concept of 
recovery.  
 
Similarly, Dorothy, Francis aŶd HeleŶ iŶ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ eaĐh dƌaǁs 
out diffeƌeŶt eleŵeŶts of theiƌ ͚ƌealitǇ͛ to ƌepƌeseŶt this dialeĐtiĐal dileŵŵa, if a disoƌdeƌ 
suggests a fundamental problem with an aspect of yourself which is regarded as permanent, 
does that mean it can ever be eliminated or only managed? This raises a further question for 
ŵe, is the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ soŵethiŶg that ƌeƋuiƌes ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛, oƌ is it siŵplǇ a disĐuƌsiǀe ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ 
used to describe an experience outside of the social norms and rules, and as such is the quest 
foƌ ďeiŶg ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aĐtuallǇ iŵŵoƌal, should ǁe eǀeŶ ďe assoĐiatiŶg a disĐouƌse of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ to 
aŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁhiĐh aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the ŵajoƌitǇ oƌ a gƌoup of 
͚eǆpeƌts͛ is ĐoŶsideƌed aďŶoƌŵal? The aŶsǁeƌ to this question appears to lay in whether we 
determine BPD to be something that does in fact exist. However, it raises important questions 
about the way in which we as mental health professionals give messages about recovery and 
position individuals accordingly. These questions related to the dilemmas of permanence and 
relevance of the concept further demonstrating the enigma that is constructed by BPD as a 
diagnosis.  
 
IŶ soĐial aŶthƌopologiĐal teƌŵs, all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs ƌeƋuiƌe a ͚gƌoup͛ to suƌǀiǀe iŶitially physically 
and ultimately psychologically. By creating desirable groups and undesirable groups the 
psychiatric system inherently sets up a powerful management of social groupings. By creating 
a ďeŶĐhŵaƌk of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ as the desiƌaďle gƌoup to ďe iŶ, all individuals who do not fall into 
this group are faced with different levels of undesirability. This is so powerful that the words 
that CleŵeŶĐe Đhooses to desĐƌiďe this uŶdesiƌaďilitǇ aƌe ͚fuĐked͛ aŶd ͚ďuggeƌed͛. ͚“ǁeaƌ͛ 
words which are used to convey extreme emotion and suggest offence, while part of our 
modern culture, they appear to be used by Clemence to suggest that there are no other words 
with which to describe her sentiment and perhaps to shock me with her unexpected use of 
them. A further example of this feaƌ of ďeiŶg uŶaďle to attaiŶ ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ is eǆpƌessed ďǇ 
BeatƌiĐe iŶ heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ; she saǇs ͚the ǁhole ǁoƌƌǇ that I͛ll Ŷeǀeƌ ďe aďle to lead a Ŷoƌŵal 
life͛.  
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I:  Do you think that this is something that you can recover from  
Dorothy: Erm no I don’t think I can fully recover from it. I think it really scared me 
it it does scare me but erm like looking back in hindsight I can see the 
build up to that breakdown that I had four years like two years ago I 
can see the build up ((clears throat)) in hindsight and everywhere I 
went wrong that kind of would possibly not have helped that kind of 
escalated into that great big kind of erm breakdown. But what scares 
me is that I didn’t see it coming at the time and I didn’t know it was 
coming at the time. Erm and it’s like I was quite stable for quite a long 
period of time and then it just come back and hit me and I’m scared 
that that’s going to happen again in the future. It’s like how do I how do 
I kind of stop that from happening again if I didn’t even know it was 
coming in the first place because erm-- and I also I just think like erm 
(3) it’s like every time I have a ma-- massive breakdown like that well 
I’ve only had two ((laughingly)) when I was 14 and like when I was 25 
but every time I have a massive breakdown like that my whole life 
starts again because I lose everything erm like this time I’ve lost my job 
my child my erm driving licence erm I don’t know how I managed to 
keep hold of my flat that was only because my psychiatrist spoke to my 
landlord ((laughingly)) I think he said please don’t chuck her out. Erm 
but basically I go back to starting complete so I come almost starting 
completely afresh and (I: Hm.) completely again.  
 
Another consideration within the dilemma of permanence and the idea of classifying people 
rather than disorders is related to labelling theory. Evident within a number of the interviews 
ǁas the ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of the diagŶostiĐ Đƌiteƌia list foƌ BPD ƌesulted in individuals recognising 
aspects of their behaviour attributable to the diagnostic criteria, much like a pseudoscience 
such as Astrological charts. Clemence, with a psychology discourse available to her 
acknowledges the possibility of labelling theory in Extract 41, her discourse demonstrates a 
reflection on the idea and her choice of metaphor highlights that, people are able to find 
eǆaŵples ǁheƌe the Đƌiteƌia applǇ to theŵ ǁithout ͚ƌeal͛ eǀideŶĐe foƌ this eǆisteŶĐe. “he is 
highlighting how powerful an effect a diagnosis can have and how it can result in the creation 
of aŶ ideŶtitǇ, despite this dileŵŵa of ͚tƌuth͛ aďout the eǆisteŶĐe of diagŶostiĐ Đƌiteƌia.  
B.4.3.4.3 ‘eĐoǀery ĐoŶstruĐted as ͚Disorder͛ MaŶageŵeŶt 
 
In Extracts 42 and 43, Dorothy and Francis position themselves similarly with their respective 
stateŵeŶts: ͚I doŶ͛t thiŶk I ĐaŶ fullǇ ƌeĐoǀeƌ fƌoŵ it͛ ;DoƌothǇͿ, ͚I peƌsoŶallǇ doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ 
ƌeĐoǀeƌ fƌoŵ it it staǇs ǁith Ǉou͛ ;FƌaŶĐisͿ. While theǇ eǆpƌess their reasoning slightly 
differently they both make statements about their symptoms being part of their identity which 
theǇ ĐaŶŶot ĐhaŶge. DoƌothǇ desĐƌiďes the uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd uŶpƌediĐtaďilitǇ of the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ 
through her statements which result in her having to rebuild her life completely each time she 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes a ͚ďƌeakdoǁŶ͛. FƌaŶĐis desĐƌiďes diƌeĐtlǇ ͚aspeĐts of ŵe that ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ ĐhaŶge͛. 
Extract 42: Dorothy 
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This suggests that they have also taken the biological understanding of personality, as being 
permanent and unchanging, and applied it within their own discourse to construct full 
ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ as Ŷot possiďle due to the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg assuŵptioŶ of the ŵediĐal ŵodel ďeiŶg ͚Đuƌe͛. 
However, in extracts from their transcripts which I have placed later in this section, their 
ambivalence about this construction is apparent. Dorothy in Extract 42, describes her fear of 
haǀiŶg aŶotheƌ ͚ďƌeakdoǁŶ͛ aŶd Ŷot ďeiŶg aďle to ͚see it ĐoŵiŶg͛. ͚I͛ŵ sĐaƌed that that͛s goiŶg 
to happeŶ agaiŶ iŶ the futuƌe͛ this stateŵeŶt suppoƌts the ǀieǁ of the dominant. If there is a 
possibility, or lack of certainty about what might happen then we can not determine that 
recovery is possible in case we are wrong. Through her discourse Dorothy is telling me that to 
assume that recovery is not possible, she ĐaŶ eǆpeĐt the ǁoƌse aŶd lesseŶ the iŵpaĐt ǁheŶ ͚it 
happeŶs agaiŶ͛. Heƌ eǆpƌessioŶ is oŶe of iŶeǀitaďilitǇ ǁhiĐh appeaƌs to ŵatĐh heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe 
of ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶals as ǀieǁiŶg heƌ as a ƌeǀolǀiŶg dooƌ ĐlieŶt ͚she͛s ďaĐk agaiŶ͛ 
(Extract 22).  
Francis: because I'm not cured I don’t think there is a cure as such but (I: okay.) 
you can modify your behaviour you can sort of change the way you are 
to sort of compensate (I: Hm.) you know 
I: Okay. So ((clears throat)) I guess the the erm there’s another kind of 
question that can come off that and and say do you think it’s 
recoverable do you think you can recover from this 
Francis: I I I personally don’t think you can recover from it it it stays with you I 
mean I’ve been I’ve been like it since since my teens because that’s 
when it develops really erm and there’s still aspects of me that will 
never change you know like like I say the the nervousness of simple 
tasks being afraid to get them wrong. Erm the obsessive compulsive 
thing it’s like erm the fear that something really really bad is going to 
happen (I: Yeah.) It’s really weird to explain erm (4) the fear you know 
that’ll never go away that’s the thing just the fear of a mistake (I: Hm.) 
know.  
I: (3) Did the mental health services give you any impression about 
whether this was something that was recov—recoverable 
Francis: Erm no to be honest with you as soon as pretty much as soon as I 
found out then I didn’t really follow it up that much I think I stayed with 
the I worked with the psychiatric nurse for a bit longer erm I can’t even 
remember his name now and I should erm I I stayed with him for a little 
while and then after a period of time he just said right we’ll keep your 
file open and you’re free to come back if you need us erm and that was 
about it. I don’t think I was ever told it would be it’s like a you know a 
disease or something you can cure I mean I don’t see it as an illness (I: 
Hm-mm.) as such because it’s it’s the way you are your personality is 
you so to have a different personality doesn’t necessarily make you ill I 
mean your behaviour as a result of that could be seen as ill you know 
but to give to call it personality I mean I I would go with that to be 
honest personality disorder (I: Hm-mm.) borderline personality disorder 
but you know it it does need thinking about.  
 
Extract 43: Francis 
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In Extract 43, I ask Francis what impression he was given about recoverability by the mental 
health professionals; an attempt for me to understand the context for his exposure to this 
discourse. His response indicates that he does not recall any direct discourse around the 
ĐoŶĐept of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, he states that his psǇĐhiatƌiĐ Ŷuƌse said ͚ƌight ǁe͛ll keep Ǉouƌ 
file opeŶ aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe fƌee to Đoŵe ďaĐk if Ǉou Ŷeed us eƌŵ aŶd that ǁas aďout it͛. This recall of 
the events surrounding his final contact with mental health services implies an existential 
assumption that his requirement for services would continue to exist although he may not 
͚Ŷeed͛ theŵ at the ŵoŵeŶt; ďǇ suggestiŶg that his file ǁould ƌeŵain open implies that an 
expectation he will need them in the future but that at the current time there was no more 
that they could offer him. This suggests further the view of the dominant that BPD is an 
ongoing problem and therefore not recoverable.  
FraŶĐis adds that theǇ had Ŷot led hiŵ to ďelieǀe that BPD ǁas a ͚disease oƌ soŵethiŶg Ǉou 
Đould Đuƌe I ŵeaŶ I doŶ͛t see it as aŶ illŶess͛. He is ƌelatiŶg to ŵe a ŵeŶtal pƌoĐess of 
understanding the construct of BPD as something you have to live with because ͚it͛s the ǁaǇ 
Ǉou aƌe Ǉouƌ peƌsoŶalitǇ is͛, the ͚diagŶosis͛ ŵakes a stateŵeŶt iŶ effeĐt aďout ǁho Ǉou aƌe aŶd 
what group of people you belong to. However, he then goes on to express what appears to be 
an element of doubt about what he was saying. He appears to have an unspoken series of 
thoughts aďout the appƌopƌiateŶess of the teƌŵ ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛. This ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified 
ďǇ iŶĐoŵplete eǆpƌessioŶ of his seŶteŶĐes aŶd the use of ͚ďut͛ aŶd ͚I ŵeaŶ͛. This ŵaǇ ĐoŶŶeĐt 
with his opening statement of Extract ϰϵ, ͚I͛ŵ a ĐoŵpletelǇ diffeƌeŶt peƌsoŶ͛. If he ďelieǀes this 
theŶ is he ƋuestioŶiŶg the use of the teƌŵiŶologǇ ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ͛ ďeĐause foƌ hiŵ this 
means permanent and unchanging, and yet he describes how he has changed. This is further 
evidenced by his statement which appears to question whether BPD as a construct actually 
eǆists iŶ ͚ƌealitǇ͛, he saǇs ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe peƌsoŶalitǇ disoƌdeƌ ďut Ǉou kŶoǁ it it does Ŷeed thiŶkiŶg 
aďout͛. IŶ this fiŶal stateŵeŶt of the eǆtƌaĐt ŵǇ ƋuestioŶ appeaƌs to haǀe tƌiggered a discursive 
event challenging his belief about the diagnosis and the possibility of recovery, drawing 
attention to what could be conceived as a dilemma of permanence.   
 
Overall his response to my question acts to tell me that his experience of the mental health 
system has resulted in his construction of a discourse which places a distinction between 
disease and disorder and, therefore, its implicit conveyance of the assumptions of recovery 
dependant upon a diagnoses placement within the disease and disorder category. Ultimately 
both act to maintain the dominant view that if people do not fit within the undiagnosable 
ĐategoƌǇ of Ŷoƌŵal theǇ aƌe eitheƌ positioŶed ǁithiŶ a ĐategoƌǇ ǁhiĐh suggests ͚Đuƌaďle͛ oƌ 
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͚ŶoŶ-Đuƌaďle͛, ǁith ͚Đuƌe͛ ƌelatiŶg to the ability to become, or gain an identity which is, 
͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ǀieǁ of the doŵiŶaŶt, the psǇĐhiatƌiĐ sǇsteŵ.  
 
 
Helen begins, in Extract 44, by expressing her lack of certainty, immediately making me aware 
of her change of opinion based on her interpretation of her contextual experience. She 
expresses this as a fact, in comparison to her initial opinion. Helen goes on to suggest that 
kŶoǁiŶg this helps heƌ, it pƌeǀeŶts heƌ fƌoŵ seekiŶg ͚a Đuƌe͛ aŶd feeliŶg the pƌessuƌe to ďe 
͚Đuƌed͛. This is a poǁeƌful deŵoŶstƌatioŶ of suďŵissioŶ to the authoƌitǇ of ŵeŶtal 
health/psychiatry. She draws on a metaphor of addiction to illustrate her point and that her 
͚disoƌdeƌ͛ ƌeƋuiƌes ĐoŶstaŶt ŵaŶageŵeŶt ďeĐause it is uŶpƌediĐtaďle. “he has the saŵe ǀieǁ 
of the ĐoŶstƌuĐt of peƌsoŶalitǇ as the otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts aŶd ďelieǀes it to ďe ͚iŶheƌeŶtly a part 
of ŵe͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, she goes oŶ to eǆplaiŶ that foƌ heƌ this is positiǀe, deŵoŶstƌatiŶg a siŵilaƌ 
positioŶ to FƌaŶĐis, ďeĐause it is ͚ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ ŵǇ gƌeat peƌsoŶalitǇ ;;laughiŶglǇͿͿ͛ she 
desĐƌiďes heƌself as ͚ƋuiƌkǇ͛ aŶd ͚eĐĐeŶtƌiĐ͛, ƌejeĐtiŶg the ͚siĐk ƌole͛ positioŶ. “he ideŶtifies that 
ǁheŶ Ǉou add ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ afteƌ ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ it ďeĐoŵes Ŷegatiǀe, suggestiŶg a Đultuƌal teŶdeŶĐǇ 
to see ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ as uŶdesiƌaďle.  
 
By contrast, in another part of her interview Helen refers to how she decided that she ͚ǁaŶted 
to heal͛ aŶd ͚ǁaŶted to ƌeĐoǀeƌ͛ aŶd ͚didŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe iŶ that sǇsteŵ foƌ the ƌest of ŵǇ life͛ 
aŶd hoǁ ͚I͛ǀe doŶe that suĐĐessfullǇ Ŷoǁ touĐh ǁood ;;laughsͿͿ͛. This ĐoŶtƌadiĐts heƌ 
I: Okay. Do you think that ((clears throat)) this is this borderline 
personality disorder is something you can recover from 
Helen: Recover from erm yeah I thought I thought I could erm erm because I 
thought I was okay but again as I said now that I’m in a relationship I 
know it’s something I have to live with. And where I think there’s quite 
erm there’s a certain amount of comfort in that actually erm that I don’t 
have to feel that erm I’ll be cured of it erm you know I suppose it’s like 
er an addict really isn’t it it you know they can manage their addiction 
at times and at times they won’t be able to they’ll have relapses and 
and that’s how I look at it now. (I: Hm-mm.) That it’s erm something I 
have to live with because maybe it was sort of erm conceived through 
my early life experience yeah undoubtedly erm and erm it’s sort of 
inherently a part of me. Erm and it’s interesting I like that word 
personality because for me it’s not when you add disorder on the end it 
seems like a negative but really it’s also responsible for my great 
personality ((laughingly)) as I I feel in those eccentric quirky moments. 
(I: Hm.) So it does define me what I don’t really want it to do is is ruin 
(3) my life really in the way that it had or has done. I want to be able to 
manage it a bit like that addic-- you know an addiction. Erm and that’s 
the tricky part  
Extract 44: Helen 
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statements in Extract 44, suggesting that she is constructing the dilemma of permanence. 
While she considers her personality as something you cannot recover from, she wants to 
recover by changing the way she manages her experiences. What this suggests is that there 
are different constructions of recovery, with different people believing recovery to be 
something different, but believing that the dominant view held by mental health services is 
that ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ is defiŶed ďǇ ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ aŶd ƌeƋuiƌe Đuƌe foƌ ǁhiĐh theǇ use theiƌ oǁŶ ǇaƌdstiĐk. 
Mental health services could be described as being unable to tolerate contradiction, you are 
either cured and, therefore, normal or you are not; there is no middle ground. What this 
assumption does is act to separate mental health professionals who create this distinction 
from the people that they treat, such that the people they treat can never become like them, 
and as far as possible they can never become one of the people they treat. Helen constructs 
the ŵiddle gƌouŶd as ƌeƋuiƌiŶg ͚tools͛ to keep Ǉou theƌe aŶd that this ͚is the tƌiĐkǇ paƌt͛. This 
would suggest that these are not constructed as readily available from those who could impart 
them, that is mental health services, again this could be interpreted to suggest the powerful 
ƌepƌessioŶ of those ĐoŶsideƌed ͚disoƌdeƌed͛ ďǇ those ǁho ĐoŶsideƌ theŵselǀes to ďe ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛. 
The ultiŵate poǁeƌ is to haǀe kŶoǁledge of the ͚tools͛ ƌeƋuiƌed ďut Ŷot iŵpaƌtiŶg theŵ to 
those who require them.  
 
B.4.3.4.4 Recovery constructed by Hope 
Clemence, Dorothy and Anne draw upon the concept of hope in relation to the discourse of 
ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ iŶ EǆtƌaĐts ϰϱ, ϰϲ aŶd ϰϳ. This deǀelops fuƌtheƌ BeatƌiĐe͛s suggestioŶ iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϯϴ 
that professionals give up hope for your recovery with increasing age. Clemence and Dorothy 
instead of increasing age, construct that the diagnosis immediately results in professionals 
giving up hope of recovery. Anne appears to have recontexualised this idea within her 
discourse to suggest that she is unhelpable and in fact predicts her own mortality. 
 
Clemence, in Extract 45, identifies a powerful construction of doom associated with the 
disorder by mental health professionals. Clemence makes a global statement of fact, 
suggesting an overriding discourse of non-recovery inherent within the mental health system, 
she rewords this further demonstrating a dialectical struggle. Clemence states that despite her 
͚kŶoǁledge͛ gaiŶed thƌough heƌ pƌofessioŶal ƌole aŶd oǁŶ tƌeatŵeŶt she is uŶaďle to lose the 
powerful discourse of non-recovery associated with the suggestion of having a disordered 
personality, it appears to overwhelm her and leaves room for an element of doubt about what 
eǆists aŶd is ͚ƌeal͛.  
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Dorothy: I think the other negative thing about it is it’s just like erm it’s like a lot 
of people when like even psychiatrists and stuff they like once you’ve 
got a ((laughingly)) borderline personality disorder it’s like they know 
that nothing’s going to work for you (I: Right) immediately they know 
that whatever they say do nothing’s going to work for you so they don’t 
really take you seriously … 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Clemence points to an ideological assumption by the mental health system 
ǁhiĐh eŶaďles pƌofessioŶals to justifǇ theiƌ positioŶ, she states ͚ǁheŶ theǇ doŶ͛t ƌeĐoǀeƌ theǇ 
go ah see theǇ doŶ͛t ƌeĐoǀeƌ ŶothiŶg ǁoƌks foƌ theŵ Ǉou kŶoǁ theǇ ƌejeĐt all the theƌapǇ Ǉou 
offeƌ͛. This is dialeĐtiĐallǇ ƌelated to the disĐouƌses of ďlaŵe aŶd stigŵa alƌeadǇ disĐussed. The 
ďlaŵe disĐouƌse is ideŶtified ďǇ ͚Ǉou tƌǇ aŶd tƌǇ aŶd tƌǇ ďut theǇ ǁoŶt ďe helped͛ eŶaďliŶg a 
pƌofessioŶal positioŶ of ͚it is Ŷot ouƌ fault͛. The stigŵa disĐouƌse is appaƌeŶt iŶ ͚ah see theǇ 
doŶ͛t ƌeĐoǀeƌ ŶothiŶg ǁoƌks͛; this aĐts to suggest ĐoŶfiƌŵatoƌǇ eǀideŶĐe foƌ Ŷegatiǀe attitudes 
towards those with the diagnosis of BPD. Clemence adds further credence to her statements 
ďǇ fiŶishiŶg the eǆtƌaĐt ǁith ͚AŶd I ;;laughiŶglǇͿͿ I heaƌ it all the tiŵe I heaƌ it a lot͛. This 
statement acts to tell me that this is not something she has imagined but something which she 
has witnessed, has heard, rather than interpreted.  
 
Dorothy chooses similar language to convey her experience of the mental health systems non-
recovery discourse in Extract 46. Interestingly in constructing these statements both Clemence 
aŶd DoƌothǇ speak thƌough aŵuseŵeŶt, poteŶtiallǇ ideŶtifǇiŶg theǇ͛ƌe ŶeƌǀousŶess aƌouŶd 
the idea, making light of something which has far-reaching implications and suggesting a 
meaning for the diagnosis which is difficult to acknowledge. Both Dorothy and Clemence also 
refer to professionals directly as holding a view of non-recovery but express this in a way 
Clemence: What they don't do with borderline personality disorder is think you’re 
going to get through it nobody expects you to get through it you know 
including the people who have diagnosed it you know. (I: Yeah) So 
you’re really basically setting setting that person up not to actually 
recover because of the diagnosis itself suggests you won’t recover 
you know. And even with all the insight and awareness that I’ve 
gained and my professional life there’s still this horrible horrible little 
word inside me that but maybe you don’t recover from this because it 
is a personality disorder you know. And and you set yourself-- set 
people up for it (I: Hm.) you know. And then when they don’t recover 
they go ah see they don’t recover nothing works for them you know 
they reject all the therapy you offer you try and try and try but they 
won’t be helped. And I ((laughingly)) I hear it all the time I hear it a lot  
 
Extract 46: Dorothy 
Extract 45: Clemence 
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which suggests that the common assumption is that mental health professionals should 
believe in the possibility of recovery. DorothǇ does this thƌough the use of the ǁoƌd ͚eǀeŶ͛ iŶ 
the folloǁiŶg stateŵeŶt: ͚it͛s like a lot of people ǁheŶ like even psǇĐhiatƌists aŶd stuff͛; aŶd 
CleŵeŶĐe does this ǁith the ǁoƌd ͚iŶĐludiŶg͛ iŶ the folloǁiŶg stateŵeŶt: ͚including the people 
who have diagŶosed it͛. DoƌothǇ goes oŶ to suggest that the iŵpliĐatioŶs of this disĐouƌse aƌe 
that ͚theǇ doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ take Ǉou seƌiouslǇ͛, ǁhat ǁe ĐaŶ iŵplǇ fƌoŵ this stateŵeŶt is that ǁith a 
diagnosis of BPD you are regarded as less important or deserving than other people, both 
service users within the mental health system and the professionals who are dominant within 
it.  
 
Anne expresses her experience of reality as the inevitability of mortality associated with the 
͚disoƌdeƌ͛ iŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϰϳ. This eǆtƌaĐt eǆeŵplifies AŶŶe͛s atteŵpt to pƌeseŶt the ͚tƌuth͛ aďout 
the disoƌdeƌ, the seƌiousŶess of the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛; iŶ paƌt this appeaƌs to function as a dislocation 
of ďlaŵe to aŶ eǆteƌŶal foƌĐe outside of heƌ ĐoŶtƌol, ďǇ saǇiŶg ͚ǁithout aŶǇ help aŶd suppoƌt 
I͛ǀe doŶe ǁell to get this faƌ͛. This is a stateŵeŶt also ŵade ďǇ BeatƌiĐe, its iŶteŶtioŶ to pƌeseŶt 
an image to the reader of an ongoing battle being fought alone and suggests that with help 
things would be different. While Anne acknowledges it will happen as a result of her own 
ďehaǀiouƌ ͚oŶe daǇ ŵǇ iŵpulses aƌe goiŶg to get ŵe iŶto tƌouďle͛, it positioŶs the eǀeŶt, 
impulses leading to death, as having a foreseeable outcome which is not being prevented. Also 
the extract demonstrates the recontextualisation of the non-recovery discourse suggested by 
otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts to ďe ĐoŶǀeǇed thƌough ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes aŶd psǇĐhiatƌǇ. ͛IŶeǀitaďilitǇ͛ 
suggests a certainty and while death itself is an existential event, a predicted early death is not 
and, therefore, must have arisen from a discursive construction. If mental health services use a 
discourse of non-recovery then this can be recontextualised within an individuals own life, 
dialectically, to mean that the self-harm risks that in part define BPD as a diagnosis, if not 
changeable will eventually end in mortality. 
 
Anne:  I know I haven’t got a long life you know some professionals say don’t 
be silly Anne I know my life isn’t going to be as long as everybody 
else’s life because I know that one day my impulses are going to get 
me into trouble and I am going to die that’s fact and I have to accept 
that but what I can do is make sure my kids are okay well adjusted and 
make sure that they know it’s not their fault. And that’s about writing 
down things and making sure that they don’t feel punished they don’t 
have to punish themselves or blame themselves. But that it’s fact and I 
suppose you talk to a lot of people that probably say the same thing 
it’s fact you have to accept it if I live until I’m 50 that’s great but I don’t 
know (3) it’s great that I’ve got this far but without any help and support 
I’ve done well to get where I am  
 Extract 47: Anne 
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IŶ esseŶĐe AŶŶe͛s eǆtƌaĐt aĐts to iŶǀoke ĐoŵpassioŶ ďǇ heƌ appaƌeŶt ƌesigŶation, expressed 
through her choice of language, to an early death; her statement of concern for her children; 
and the presentation of this event as outside of her control. She identifies how it is dismissed 
ďǇ pƌofessioŶals, ͚soŵe pƌofessioŶals saǇ doŶ͛t ďe silly Anne͛, alŵost as if to ĐouŶteƌ aŶǇ 
deŶial of heƌ eǆisteŶtial stateŵeŶt that I ŵaǇ ďe ĐoŶsideƌiŶg. “he states that she ǁill ͚ŵake 
suƌe ŵǇ kids aƌe ǁell adjusted aŶd ŵake suƌe that theǇ kŶoǁ it͛s Ŷot theiƌ fault͛, dƌaǁiŶg oŶ a 
discourse of blame and indicating her preparation for the event. This is a powerful extract 
which demonstrates the impact of the underlying ideology of mental health services upon 
Anne and her construction of the reality of her life course.  
 
B.4.3.4.5 ‘eĐoǀery ĐoŶstruĐted ďy ͚KŶoǁledge͛ 
A further aspect of the recovery discourse which is drawn upon by Ellen and Francis is that of 
the importance of knowledge in constructing their experiences as recoverable. They refer to 
the diagŶosis as pƌoǀidiŶg theŵ ǁith ͚kŶoǁledge͛ ǁhiĐh eŶaďled them to gain a position in 
ƌelatioŶ to the poteŶtial foƌ theŵ to oǀeƌĐoŵe theiƌ pƌoďleŵs. This ͚kŶoǁledge͛ is ĐoŶsideƌed 
ďǇ theŵ to giǀe theŵ a ďetteƌ ĐhaŶĐe of gaiŶiŶg ĐoŶtƌol, ͚disoƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛. TheǇ ďoth 
construct the receiving of a diagnosis, a name for the problems they were experiencing, as 
beneficial to their long-teƌŵ pƌogŶosis. Hoǁeǀeƌ, theǇ go oŶ to ideŶtifǇ hoǁ this ͚kŶoǁledge͛ 
ďƌiŶgs ǁith it a Ŷeed to aĐĐept that theǇ ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ ͚ďe Ŷoƌŵal͛. IŶ effeĐt it pƌoǀides aŶ 
alternative identity whiĐh eǆĐludes the desiƌed state of ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛.  
 
IŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϰϴ, ElleŶ states ͚I͛ǀe got a ďetteƌ ĐhaŶĐe knowing I͛ǀe got a ďetteƌ ĐhaŶĐe͛, this 
draws on the assumption that something different from her current experience is desirable, 
that her previous reality was not desirable. This is itself a social construction of what is 
Ellen: I think I’ve got a better chance knowing I’ve got a better chance (4) but 
I think that where in the past I just wanted to be normal I don’t ((clears 
throat)) I don’t have that expectation and I don’t have any distress 
relating to that I accept that that this is a condition that I’ve got where I 
can can manage it I’m not you know I am making the steps I'm making 
slow but you know what I mean they are sort of steps forward. Erm 
and I think that understanding the way that it’s affecting me means that 
I can erm do things that are not going to cause the problems do you 
see what I mean. So the awareness I think is so important. But I think 
probably for people I could imagine somebody having this condition 
and not wanting to know and then I think perhaps well if they didn’t 
want to know it would be damaging. But I think where you’ve got a a 
patient that that really does want to know and wants to try and take a 
proactive approach I think it’s important. 
Extract 48: Ellen 
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desirable in relation to interpersonal experiencing and mood states. Ellen does not appear to 
experience the same dilemma of permanence as the other interviewees. She describes 
accepting that she canŶot ďe ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛, ͚I aĐĐept that that this is a ĐoŶditioŶ that I͛ǀe got ǁheƌe 
I ĐaŶ ĐaŶ ŵaŶage it͛, this suggests a underlying assumption of the diagnosis that you cannot 
ƌeĐoǀeƌ. This is tƌeated ďǇ ElleŶ as a faĐt of heƌ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ that she has a ͚peƌsoŶalitǇ 
disoƌdeƌ͛, ElleŶ states ͚I thiŶk ǁheƌe iŶ the past I just ǁaŶted to ďe Ŷoƌŵal I doŶ͛t ;;Đlears 
thƌoatͿͿ I doŶ͛t haǀe that eǆpeĐtatioŶ aŶd I doŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇ distƌess ƌelatiŶg to that͛. Heƌ 
statement suggests an unquestioning acceptance of a mental health discourse of non-
recovery. Ellen refers to the construct of BPD unquestioningly, despite her fears of stigma and 
ďlaŵe, as ďeiŶg ͚ƌeal͛ aŶd faĐtual, aŶd hoǁ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg this ƌealitǇ helps heƌ to ŵaŶage. 
Although the point at which she clears her throat may suggest this is something she does find 
difficulty to construct as her reality, or at least to voice.  
 
As a whole this extract appears to demonstrate how the diagnosis has provided Ellen with an 
identity which she has perhaps accepted, despite her misgivings about its associations 
identified in previous extracts from her interview, and does not challenge its accuracy. This is 
deŵoŶstƌated iŶ heƌ stateŵeŶt ͚I thiŶk that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ǁaǇ that it͛s affecting me 
ŵeaŶs that I ĐaŶ eƌŵ do thiŶgs that aƌe Ŷot goiŶg to Đause the pƌoďleŵs͛, she oďjeĐtifies the 
ĐoŶstƌuĐt of BPD ďǇ heƌ plaĐeŵeŶt of ͚its͛ as the suďjeĐt iŶ the stateŵeŶt. ElleŶ dƌaǁs oŶ the 
assuŵptioŶs of ŵediĐal disĐouƌse, ideŶtified ďǇ the use of ͚ĐoŶditioŶ͛ aŶd ͚patieŶt͛ iŶ this 
eǆtƌaĐt aŶd ͚illŶess͛ aŶd ͚aŵǇgdala͛ iŶ otheƌ paƌts of heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ, that theƌe is soŵethiŶg 
͚ǁƌoŶg͛ ǁith heƌ, she is Ŷot ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛. IŶ the fiŶal paƌt of EǆtƌaĐt ϰϴ ElleŶ ƌeiteƌates that the 
͚kŶoǁledge͛ of the diagŶosis as ďeiŶg ǁhat͛s ͚ǁƌoŶg͛ ǁith Ǉou is iŵpoƌtaŶt, this dƌaǁs fuƌtheƌ 
oŶ the eǆisteŶtial assuŵptioŶ that the diagŶosis ƌepƌeseŶts ͚the tƌuth͛ as she constructs it. This 
demonstrates the power of the psychiatric diagnostic and classification system at creating a 
͚tƌuth͛ aďout ǁhat eǆists foƌ people, aŶd ǁhat that sǇsteŵ iŵplies aďout ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ.  
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The same unquestioning approach to the receipt of the diagnosis and its discursive 
implications was taken by Francis, apparent in Extract 49. This approach is identified by his 
stateŵeŶt: ͚I ǁas ƌelieǀed that theƌe ǁas aĐtuallǇ aŶ aŶsǁeƌ͛. Thƌoughout his iŶteƌǀieǁ this 
͚kŶoǁledge͛, that the diagŶosis pƌoǀided hiŵ ǁith, he ĐoŶstƌuĐts as the ƌeasoŶ for him being 
aďle to ĐhaŶge his eǆpeƌieŶĐes. He states that ͚I͛ŵ a ĐoŵpletelǇ diffeƌeŶt peƌsoŶ͛, this 
stateŵeŶt of ͚faĐt͛ ďǇ FƌaŶĐis appeaƌs as aŶ atteŵpt to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate to ŵe that he Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
experiences the problems that he did before and indicates a new social position and identity. 
However, in Extract 43, he identifies that recovery is not possible. This again calls into question 
the definition of recovery within its common usage. Are there different levels of recovery; does 
the mental health discourse defiŶitioŶ iŶǀolǀe ͚full ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ ŵeaŶiŶg a ƌetuƌŶ to ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛; 
aŶd if so ǁhat defiŶes a ͚full ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛?  
FƌaŶĐis͛ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, ǁhile poteŶtiallǇ appeaƌiŶg to deŵoŶstƌate aŶ ideologiĐal ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith 
regards to the limits of recovery, could indicate that his definition of recovery is based on that 
of mental health services and, therefore, considered unachievable, as he has been discharged 
fƌoŵ ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes ǁith aŶ ͚opeŶ Đase͛ aŶd ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ, theƌefoƌe, haǀe the diagŶostiĐ 
label removed. Francis identifies his experience of change in simplistic terms; he suggests that 
changing his discourse was enough to change his experience. He suggests implicitly in this 
eǆtƌaĐt that the ͚kŶoǁledge͛ he gaiŶed ďǇ the ƌeĐeipt of the diagŶosis saved his life, perhaps 
ǁhat ElleŶ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚daŵagiŶg͛ ǁithiŶ EǆtƌaĐt ϰϴ, ǁheŶ the kŶoǁledge is Ŷot aǀailaďle. 
He ŵakes aŶ iŶteƌestiŶg stateŵeŶt aďout the ͚kŶoǁledge͛ that he ƌeĐeiǀed ǁheŶ he stated: ͚I 
never to be honest considered going into detail with the bloke who diagnosed me so I went 
I: Okay. What do you think the differences are in your experience 
between when you first diagnosed and now 
Francis: I'm a completely different person (I: Okay.) most definitely erm just 
realising that sitting at home feeling sorry for myself isn’t going to work 
isn’t going to change me. And to be honest with you I’d probably be 
dead now anyway you know I would have done something to myself 
simple as. So you know to change things you’ve got to know what the 
problem is to start with (I: Hm-mm.) so that’s how that’s what I did I 
sort of you know borderline personality disorder fair doos er what is it. 
And I never to be honest considered going into detail with the bloke 
who diagnosed me so I went out and looked checked it out for myself.  
I:  Can I ask why you didn’t consider going into detail with him 
Francis: Because I was relieved that there was actually an answer you know it 
wasn’t just depression which is what I was told it was all the time.  
 
Extract 49: Francis 
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out aŶd looked ĐheĐked it out foƌ ŵǇself͛; this agaiŶ iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ to ElleŶ dƌaǁs oŶ the 
assumption that the information he received was therefore not from a psychiatric or medical 
discourse community, beyond the name of the diagnosis itself. This changes the type of 
discourse available to the individual.  
 
Ellen and Francis expressed similar attitudes to the diagnosis, in relation to their unquestioning 
approach, and an acceptance of the diagnosis at basic level. In fact Francis identifies his 
immediate acceptance of the diagnosis that was given to him. This on the basis that he 
ƌeĐeiǀed it fƌoŵ a psǇĐhiatƌist ǁho ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed ͚aŶ eǆpeƌt͛, as he details iŶ aŶotheƌ paƌt of 
his interview, however he did not go on to ask him to explain further or validate his diagnosis. 
This further demonstrates the power with which psychiatrists hold bringing about unrelenting 
belief in what they communicate to their patients at face value.  
 
B.4.3.4.6 Recovery constructed by Understanding 
The final two extracts in this chapter demonstrate Clemence and Helen likening their 
experience to an analogy of drowning and being swept away by a river. However, they focus 
on the diagnosis in different ways within their constructions with different intent. This 
demonstrates how a metaphor can be used differently. It also constructs the heterogeneity of 
those ͚diagŶosed͛ ǁith BPD, iŶ ďoth theiƌ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ aŶd ĐoŶteǆtualisatioŶ of the diagŶosis. 
It highlights how BPD can be constructed as aŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ͚dƌoǁŶiŶg͛ aŶd of saǀiŶg fƌoŵ 
͚dƌoǁŶiŶg͛ at the saŵe tiŵe. Foƌ HeleŶ the diagŶosis itself is eŶough, while for Clemence it is 
what occurs after the diagnosis. This provides a further construction of enigma.  
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In Extract 50, Clemence is describing her experience of an effective therapeutic approach as 
saǀiŶg Ǉou fƌoŵ dƌoǁŶiŶg iŶ ͚BPD͛. This poǁeƌful ŵetaphoƌ ĐoŶstƌuĐts helplessŶess, eǆtƌeŵe 
feaƌ, daŶgeƌ aŶd thƌeat to life. CleŵeŶĐe͛s use of laŶguage ǁith teƌŵs suĐh as ͚iŶ the shit͛, 
͚ŵessǇ͛, ͚sŵellǇ͛, ͚hoƌƌiďle͛, ͚ďloodǇ͛ ĐoŶstƌuĐts BPD as uŶdesiƌaďle, soŵethiŶg ǁhiĐh has the 
poǁeƌ to ƌepel people, aŶd she ĐoŵŵeŶĐes this poiŶt ďǇ saǇiŶg: ͚the pƌoďleŵ is ǁith 
borderline personality disorder people doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to paddle out aŶd get iŶǀolǀed iŶ the shit͛. 
“he highlights hoǁ the theƌapist ĐaŶ ͚haǀe a shoǁeƌ lateƌ oŶ aŶd get ƌid of it͛ ǁhiĐh leaǀes the 
powerful impression with me as recipient of her discourse that this is something that the 
individual caŶŶot do. TheǇ ĐaŶŶot siŵplǇ Đhoose to ͚get shoǁeƌed͛ aŶd siŵplǇ ǁash aǁaǇ theiƌ 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes, fuƌtheƌ deŵoŶstƌated ďǇ ͚it ǁill ďe all ƌight foƌ theŵ͛ 
 
CleŵeŶĐe͛s aŶalogǇ appeaƌs to ďe aŶ atteŵpt to aĐĐeŶtuate the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ĐoŵpassioŶ 
and collaboration in beginning to communicate with individuals diagnosed with BPD; rather 
Clemence: So that’s it isn’t it it’s kind of meeting you halfway and saying come 
over here and talk you know have a go at it (I: Yeah.) you know see 
what it feels like have a little paddle around. You know what I’ll tell you 
what it’s like right it’s like and I always think CBT is like this to be full 
of you’ve got this diagnosis I’m supposed to have is it’s a bit like 
some-- you’re drowning (I: Hm-mm.) right you’re drowning and CBT 
person’s standing on the bank going right what you need to do it’s 
russian language swim right and swim and start paddling and maybe 
stand up see if you're not drowning at all just swim now and I can’t 
understand what they’re saying right. But but when you're off--  when 
you what-- but if you’ve got somebody who’s there and they say and 
they’re offering you a real relationship they paddle out. (I: Yeah.) They 
don’t don’t do that thing where they’re drowning themselves not if they 
know what’s good for them (I: Hm-mm.) Hopefully they’re in 
supervision enough so they don’t do and they’ve got a bit more insight 
but they paddle out they get involved in the shit. (I: Hm.) And I think 
that’s the problem is with borderline personality people don’t want to 
paddle out and get involved in the shit because it’s messy and it’s 
smelly and it’s horrible (I: Yeah.) and it’s bloody in my case. (I: Hm.) 
But with people with if you have a therapist that is not scared of 
paddling out (I: Hm-mm.) and getting kneeling and in the shit and 
paddling out and knowing they’re going to get shit and knowing they 
can have a shower later on and they can get rid of it and be okay with 
themselves and it will be all right for them. But they can paddle out 
they can hold a hand out and they can maybe pull you to the shallows 
a little bit so you can at least stand up. (I: Hm-mm.) And even if you 
don’t understand what you’re saying you can at least at least not 
drown and then you think oh okay you know and once you actually 
stop panicking maybe you can hear them a bit better.  
 
Extract 50: Clemence 
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than being repelled by them and using a discourse which they have yet to understand. She 
suggests it is this which results in the assumption that somebody has not tried to save 
themselǀes, has Ŷot ƌeĐoǀeƌed, she saǇs ͚aŶd eǀeŶ if theǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat Ǉou͛ƌe saǇiŶg 
Ǉou ĐaŶ at least Ŷot dƌoǁŶ͛, ͚oŶĐe Ǉou stop paŶiĐkiŶg ŵaǇďe Ǉou ĐaŶ heaƌ theŵ a ďit ďetteƌ͛. 
This liŶks ǁith ŵǇ disĐussioŶ of CleŵeŶĐe͛s pƌeǀious EǆtƌaĐt ϰϲ, ǁheƌe she identifies that 
mental health professionals displace blame for non-recovery by taking up a position that 
ŶothiŶg ǁill ǁoƌk aŶd if it theŶ doesŶ͛t theǇ aƌe aďle to saǇ ͚Ah Ǉou see͛, iŶ effeĐt ͚I told Ǉou 
so͛.  
 
In essence Extract 50 sets up a blame position with the professionals for non-recovery. 
CleŵeŶĐe states: ͚CBT peƌsoŶ͛s staŶdiŶg oŶ the ďaŶk goiŶg ƌight ǁhat Ǉou Ŷeed to do it͛s 
‘ussiaŶ laŶguage͛, this aĐts to positioŶ heƌ agaiŶst CBT foƌ BPD aŶd ĐoŶstƌucts this as the 
therapist standing on the bank shouting instructions for how not to drown but in a foreign 
language. Linehan (1993) proposes a similar metaphor to Clemence of the use of standard 
behaviour therapy treatments as shouting instructions to a drowning swimmer while sitting on 
a life raft, all be it in a soothing voice. This is a metaphor for trying to bring about change while 
simultaneously invalidating the experience. Clemence constructs this as the reason people do 
not recover, because professionals do not want to get involved themselves in case they 
͚dƌoǁŶ͛. TheƌeďǇ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ atteŵptiŶg to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate usiŶg a disĐouƌse ǁhiĐh ďoth 
therapist and client can understand, they avoid communication. Clemence highlights this when 
she saǇs ͚theǇ paddle out theǇ get iŶǀolǀed iŶ the shit͛ aŶd ͚theǇ ĐaŶ paddle out theǇ ĐaŶ hold 
a haŶd out aŶd theǇ ĐaŶ ŵaǇďe pull Ǉou to the shalloǁs a ďit so Ǉou ĐaŶ at least staŶd up͛.  
 
Helen positions her metaphor differently to Clemence, likening the diagnosis of BPD to a 
͚ďƌaŶĐh oƌ soŵethiŶg to hold oŶ to͛. “he oďjeĐtifies the diagŶosis ǁith this stateŵeŶt as 
soŵethiŶg ĐoŶĐƌete ǁheŶ ͚ďeiŶg sǁept doǁŶ a ƌiǀeƌ͛. “he uses this ŵetaphoƌ to describe the 
Helen: I suppose and all that baggage kind of popped out again. And then I 
thought-- and then it’s almost like you feel you’re being swept down a 
river and in a strange way it’s like a like a like a branch or something 
to hold on to and you think oh I’m holding on to my illness diagnosis 
whatever you know oh and that’s fine actually because it’s I choose 
to embrace it then I don’t feel like I’m going mad. Erm and so that’s 
kind of weird I suppose that’s like almost like a paradox in a way 
because you’re handed this thing and-- but maybe it was supposed 
to define you and then yet it feels as well it feels like a some sort of a 
like a lifeline as well because you hm you can put it down to 
something. It’s nice to sort of erm erm what’s the word erm erm not 
allocate erm attribute it to something in a way.  
 
Extract 51: Helen 
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eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛. HeleŶ ideŶtifies this as ͚stƌaŶge͛ this suggests she is aǁaƌe of a 
value assumption, that this is an unusual way to perceive the diagnosis. She was, perhaps, 
trying to mediate my reaction to her metaphor based on the assumption that I would be 
surprised that she perceives it in this way. Helen goes on to provide a reason for this metaphor 
of the ͚ďƌaŶĐh oǀeƌ the ƌiǀeƌ͛ as oŶe of ͚kŶoǁledge͛ that Ǉou aƌe Ŷot ͚goiŶg ŵad͛. “he fuƌtheƌ 
suggests ͚so that͛s kiŶd of ǁeiƌd I suppose͛ agaiŶ possiďlǇ eǆpeĐtaŶt of ŵǇ ƌeaĐtioŶ, oƌ the 
aǁaƌeŶess of a disĐouƌse ǁhiĐh suggests this to ďe the ͚ǁƌoŶg͛ ǁaǇ to thiŶk of the diagŶosis. 
Helen then presents the diagnosis as a paradox, explaining that in her construction of the 
purpose of the diagŶosis it is to ͚defiŶe Ǉou͛ ďut that it aĐtuallǇ offeƌs a ͚lifeliŶe as ǁell ďeĐause 
Ǉou hŵ Ǉou ĐaŶ put it doǁŶ to soŵethiŶg͛. This is siŵilaƌ to ElleŶ aŶd FƌaŶĐis ǁho ǀieǁ this 
͚kŶoǁledge͛ as piŶŶaĐle iŶ theiƌ atteŵpts at ĐhaŶge. IŶ this ǁaǇ HeleŶ constructs the diagnosis 
as if the underlying assumption within psychiatry is that a diagnosis of BPD places you outside 
of the ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ gƌoup; aŶd Ǉet foƌ HeleŶ it eŶaďles heƌ to ƌeŵaiŶ out of the ͚ŵad͛ gƌoup, ǁhiĐh 
she feared prior to diagnosis. This demonstrates her acknowledgement of the power that 
psychiatry can have to create an identity, but she communicates to me through this metaphor 
that it has not done that, appearing as a disconfirming statement to the discourse 
communities of mental health and psychiatry. 
 
B.4.4   Summary of Analysis Chapter 
This Chapter is not exhaustive and presents only the discourses which I consider to be 
dominant as a result of my analysis. The less dominant discourses and those which appear to 
be touched upon within the interviews have not been discussed in any detail. This is due to 
necessity, however, I acknowledge that there are many different ways in which this data could 
have been approached, which may have highlighted different aspects of experience. I have 
commented upon discourses which appear to have been recontextualised within the dominant 
discourses and how these influence the ideologies presented. Similarly as with all DA there are 
many ways in which the discourse itself could be labelled, I have constructed the discourse 
labels through my own discourse community of counselling psychology and the field of 
professional work with BPD. There will be alternatives to my choice of descriptors for the 
discourses, however, I decided upon the particular vocabulary according to that used by the 
research participants.  
 
I have provided a number of examples of the dominant discourses I refer to and have relayed 
my interpretations of the discourse and begun to discuss the related ideology and 
consequential power relations. In summary, blame is presented within the interviews as an 
unresolved ideological conflict of responsibility for actions with individual or professional being 
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to blame variedly; stigma is identified as constructed by the diagnosis and presents a dilemma 
with regard to its accuracy; and recovery constructs the diagnosis as a dilemma of permanence 
and a concept which remains undefined leaving room for doubt and ideological struggle over 
whether it exists. In the following chapter I identify how I think these discourses demonstrate 
the internalisation of the views of the dominant and more powerful groups in society.  
 
The three dominant discourses are dialectically related. It is not possible to determine a 
hierarchical or causal relationship between them, and they cannot be considered completely in 
isolation from each other as I have demonstrated through drawing on the other dominant 
discourses apparent within the discussion of each. Blame, stigma and recovery could be said to 
be attributed to each other, if an individual believes a condition is unrecoverable does this 
require blame to be present or does it create blame, if an individual feels to blame for their 
condition does this result from stigma or cause it? These discourses all act therefore to 
construct the concept of enigma in relation to the BPD diagnosis. They do this by suggesting 
there are no answers other than the existence of the label itself, where there is a possible 
thesis with regard to a dilemma of meaning there is an antithesis, and as a result of our 
Western reliance upon Aristotelian philosophy of the world we are unable to allow the two 
positions to exist, we strive to resolve which is right and wrong excluding the middle ground.  
 
B.4.5  Reflections 
Fairclough (2009) identifies the importance of considering yourself within your analysis in 
oƌdeƌ to oďtaiŶ ƋualitǇ staŶdaƌds of this tǇpe of ƌeseaƌĐh; aŶd to ideŶtifǇ oŶe͛s oǁŶ ideologies 
which need to be considered within the analysis.  The most significant challenge in conducting 
my analysis was ŵaŶagiŶg ŵǇ positioŶ as ͚editoƌ͛. UpoŶ ĐoŵpletioŶ of the tƌaŶsĐƌiďiŶg of ŵǇ 
interviews I was faced with over 400 pages of text from 8 participants. While in itself I found 
the quantity overwhelming, further as I began the process of analysis I became acutely aware 
of the need to select from the 400 pages, which quotes and extracts would become part of this 
section. This was an uncomfortable process. The reason for my discomfort directly relates to 
the topic of my research, that is the social construction of reality. How then could I be true to 
my epistemological and ontological position and also decide what to include and exclude from 
the texts? I had to find a way to overcome this in order to complete this section. As a result I 
went over each transcript many times and took a significant amount of time to produce, edit 
and present what is now in this Chapter. This process of continual analysis, being part of DA 
approaches more generally, I found that each time I had to approach the text with a different 
question, or concern, and awareness of my expectations of what I was perhaps hoping to 
uncover.  
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As I identified in my introduction to the research, this subject is one which I have been 
interested in for a long time, and I have come from a position of providing interventions, from 
support work to long-term therapy, to individuals formally or informally diagnosed with BPD 
for over 10 years. I have worked for the NHS, Charities, Private Companies, Public Sector, 
Criminal Justice and have, therefore, come to regard the psychiatric institution from different 
perspectives; with different discourses; and different constructions of their power. Therefore, I 
commenced this research, from a sympathetic position considering that the diagnosis of BPD 
was unhelpful; a pejorative term used to describe individuals who proved most challenging to 
their psychiatrists, or whom staff did not like, or who would be well-known to all front-line 
services and would not conform to societal rules with regards to appropriate behaviour. My 
awareness of this position enabled me to question each stage of the research process and 
resulted in some enlightening new constructions. The difficulty was in ensuring I presented a 
balanced position in relation to my views. While the aim of CDA is to identify with the position 
of the oppressed in the investigation of a social problem, I was also aware of the imperative 
not to construct my participants͛ responses according to what I was expecting to find.  
 
As a result of my approach to ensuring validity of my analysis I became aware of findings which 
I was not expecting. Firstly, the relief described by the participants when they first received the 
diagnosis, and for most they perceived this as occurring after a lengthy period of time that 
what was seeŶ as ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁithholdiŶg͛. Foƌ soŵe this ǁas uŶdeƌstood as ͚iŶteŶtioŶal͛, 
while those working in the mental health profession understood this from a position of 
͚ǁithholdiŶg of laďelliŶg͛. I ǁas eǆpeĐtiŶg to fiŶd that ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs of the diagŶosis ǁould 
identify pejorative application of the diagnosis and this was not the case. However, this could 
be as a result of my construction of the questions; although few respondents to my research 
advert identified such a construction.  
 
The second surprising construction was that of the general perception of participants that for 
the lay person there was a relative non-reaction to the diagnosis compared to the reactions of 
mental health professionals. My assumption was that there would be negative responses from 
laǇ people, ŵoƌe iŶ liŶe ǁith the aĐadeŵiĐ liteƌatuƌe aŶd ƌisiŶg ŵedia ĐaŵpaigŶs oŶ ͚“tigŵa͛. 
My overall impression from the interviews and analysis was that the whole process of being in 
the mental health system had been constructed as traumatic for reasons not simply related to 
negative constructions of the diagnosis itself. However, from a critical realist position, this 
could be as a result of all the participants having histories of childhood trauma and thereby, 
limiting the discourses and subsequent positions, available to them.  
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Finally, I was expecting participants to construct their experience of the mental health system 
negatively; partly as a motivation to participate in the research, and also as a result of my own 
experience of mental health attitudes towards individuals with the diagnosis of BPD. However, 
the majority of the participants constructed their experience both positively and negatively, 
although these positive attributions also identified potentially problematic ideologies. There 
was, however, the unexpected outcome for me with regards to recovery discourse and that 
was related to the construction of a dilemma of permanence. This was something that I had 
not previously considered.   
 
Furthermore with regards to ensuring validity, I found that the continual re-analysis of texts; 
discussions with my research supervisor; regularly revisiting the literature available from 
different disciplines; and examining new service user research as it became available enabled 
me to remain true to the texts without becoming distracted by my own agenda. As well as 
giving me the opportunity to consider the transferability of the constructions I was uncovering 
and the ideologies that I considered these constructions to be identifying. However, in keeping 
with my social constructionist position, this is essentially my social construction of the 
disĐouƌses aŶd ideologies that ǁeƌe pƌeseŶt aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ŵǇ ͚ƌeadiŶg͛ of the teǆt. That is Ŷot 
to saǇ that it is the ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ ǀieǁ as this ǁould Ŷeǀeƌ ďe possiďle to obtain, but nonetheless it 
is a construction which is limited by my education, social and cultural experience.  
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B.5 Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 
B.5.1  Introduction to chapter 
The aim of this research was to identify how individuals with a diagnosis of BPD constructed: 
theiƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the pƌoďleŵs laďelled as ͚BPD͛; theiƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the diagŶosis; 
positioned themselves and considered themselves positioned by the diagnosis of BPD. Through 
Critical Discourse Analysis the dominant discourses revealed were blame, stigma and recovery 
which drew upon a range of other discourses such as medical, mental health, lay, therapy and 
trauma amongst others. The dominant discourses dialectically constructed BPD as an enigma. 
In addition to the discursive constructions identified in Figure B.2-1, there were a number of 
subject positions which could be identified as: sick; victim; abnormal; survivor; mental health 
professional; lay expert. My examination of these discourses, constructions and subject 
positions considers the political, social, historical and cultural context alongside the ideologies 
identified and the potential for oppression as a result of this. I further consider the importance 
of these findings in relation to Counselling Psychology as well as the mental health field more 
generally. Finally, I move on to briefly discuss alternative approaches to the construct of BPD 
and to reflect upon the research, its limitations, future work and transferability of my findings.  
 
B.5.2  Interpretation of analysis  
BPD is constructed through the narratives of 8 individuals as an enigma. A diagnostic category 
that, more than any other, reduces a collection of symptoms to three value-laden words; while 
promising hope through identification and existential assumption, it removes meaning and 
decreases understanding of the difficulties individuals experience within their social and 
cultural contexts. The origins of the dominant discourses apparent within the construction of 
the enigma are in the prevailing ideology of mental health, psychiatry, psychology and society.  
 
Currently, our UK political power system is organised according to Enterprise Capitalism, as 
identified by Heywood (2000). This economic model is built upon: self-interest and a drive 
towards increased productivity and wealth; minimal public ownership; emphasis upon market 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ; a ŵiŶiŵal ͚safetǇ-Ŷet͛ ǁelfaƌe-system; and trade unions with minimum influence. 
The economy is further driven through post-industrialisation and technological advancement; 
the foundations for continued and increasing wealth (Jones & Elcock, 2001). The ideology 
uŶdeƌlǇiŶg the politiĐal, aŶd ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ soĐietal, sǇsteŵ ĐaŶŶot ďe positioŶed ǁithiŶ a ͚tƌue͛ 
ideology, with writers describing the major political parties as differing more in relation to 
policy than ideology. However, what can be drawn out upon closer analysis are the more 
general values of individualism, responsibility, tradition and anti-welfare (Heywood, 2000) 
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upon which the ruling parties of recent political history, including those of the newly formed 
coalition government of 2010, have based their policy-ŵakiŶg. IŶ the ϭϵϴϬ͛s ThatĐheƌisŵ ǁas 
characterised by law enforcement and individualism, the legacy of which remains prevalent 
within UK society.  
 
Gramsci (1971), a neo-Marxist, proposed that when ideas about the world come to be 
aĐĐepted as ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛, theǇ ďeĐoŵe hegeŵoŶiĐ aŶd, as suĐh, eŶaďle those ǁhose 
iŶteƌests the ideas seƌǀe to ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe poǁeƌful, as this ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ is uŶƋuestioŶed. 
The hegemony of the current age is one of a market-based system, value for money and the 
requirement to be self-sufficient without reliance on state for care or security (Symonds, 
1998). This acts to advance a capitalist society, in a post-industrial era of productivity and 
technological advancement. In essence this supports the Marxist idea that power is driven by 
economics. As such the assumptions and values, uncovered by analysis of the dominant 
discourses in this research, are pƌeseŶted to soĐietǇ as the ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ ǀieǁ, ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ 
the development of our society. Further, Smail (1999) suggests that the disciplines of 
psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychology have instilled political ideas of individualism within 
their constructions of mental health, resulting in the individual believing all pain and distress to 
be internally located.  
 
B.5.2.1  Blame discourse  
Blame was discursively constructed by: mental health services; individual responsibility; 
institutional responsibility; and malignant alienation. Most of the participants struggled with 
the dialeĐtiĐal dileŵŵa of ͚ďeiŶg to ďlaŵe͛ ǀeƌsus ͚ďeiŶg a ǀiĐtiŵ͛. This fiŶds theŵ uŶaďle to 
resolve whether they are to blame or whether something, or somebody, outside themselves is 
to blame for their psychological difficulties. Linehan (1993) suggests this is a common 
dilemma.  
 
Considering this ideologically, the underlying values of this dialectic appear to be those of 
individualism and responsibility, these are dominant amongst the most powerful groups within 
society; those charged with governing, organising and directing society. These values ordinarily 
call upon an individual to identify problems within themselves and to accept responsibility for 
these ďǇ assuŵiŶg a ͚siĐk ƌole͛ ǁith ŵoƌe poǁeƌful gƌoups then assuming responsibility as 
͚eǆpeƌts͛ foƌ theiƌ ͚ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ aŶd ͚Đuƌe͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁith BPD, iŶdiǀiduals aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed Ŷot 
to ƌespoŶd to ͚eǆpeƌt͛ atteŵpts at ͚ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ aŶd ͚Đuƌe͛, suďseƋueŶtlǇ the ͚siĐk ƌole͛ is 
seemingly revoked and blame for non-response placed back with the individual. This presents 
the ͚ƌesĐuiŶg͛ ŵeŶtal health seƌǀiĐes as oŶlǇ helpiŶg those ǁho ǁaŶt to ďe helped; iŶdiǀiduals 
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ǁho aƌe ͚good patieŶts͛ aŶd ƌespoŶd to Đaƌe giǀiŶg ǁith gƌatitude, ĐoŵpliaŶĐe and recovery;  
ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the poǁeƌful positioŶ of ͚healeƌ͛. This ĐoŶfusiŶg dialeĐtiĐ pƌeseŶts its dileŵŵa 
directly to the individual: Am I to blame or not? Such dialectical dilemmas are described by 
Fairclough (2001a) as evidence of ideological struggle; the dominant view not only suggests 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ ďut pƌeseŶts a ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ ǀieǁ ǁhiĐh is ďeiŶg ĐoŶtested.  
 
Blame, as identified by Alicke (2000) is an everyday discourse related to matters which are 
considered morally wrong or socially shameful. The process of determining whether somebody 
is blameworthy and, therefore, punishable, occurs through attributions of culpability and 
control within the realms of moral philosophy. As human agents we seek to locate blame for 
harmful events, and actions, such that social order can be maintained through punishment and 
act as a deterrent to others in the social group. Thus, our lack of understanding of the 
construct of BPD within scientific and medical discourse, results in misplaced moral 
attributions of blame, as individuals are viewed as in control and thus potentially culpable. 
Potter (2009) identifies three values of Western culture which she believes underlie blame 
discourse in BPD: autonomy and intolerance of neediness and dependence; the undesirable 
and value-laden moral emotion of disgust; gender, and in particular femininity, rules within 
society including respectful behaviour, nurturing and compliance. Each of these values is 
ĐhalleŶged ďǇ iŶdiǀiduals ǁith the ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ of BPD.  
 
Johnstone (2010) states that applying a diagnosis to socially and culturally constructed 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes ͚…is aŶ iŵŵeŶselǇ poǁeƌful aĐt ǁhiĐh has pƌofouŶdlǇ daŵagiŶg iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ a 
peƌsoŶ͛s ĐoŶfideŶĐe, ideŶtitǇ, ƌelatioŶships, plaĐe iŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, eŵployment, health and 
futuƌe͛ ;p.ϭϱͿ. JohŶstoŶe fuƌtheƌ aƌgues that the aĐt of pathologisiŶg soĐial pƌoďleŵs as 
medical ones locates them within the individual and prevents escape from the originating 
social situation and positioning. Furthermore, DSM IV-TR (APA, 2000) actually sites mental 
disoƌdeƌ as oĐĐuƌƌiŶg ͚iŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛; as KutĐhiŶs aŶd Kiƌk ;ϭϵϵϳͿ poiŶt out, the ŵaŶual ǀeƌǇ 
clearly positions psychological problems as occurring from within an individual, and not 
outside, as such the implicit assumption being that if a problem is located within you then, 
particularly with reference to PD diagnoses, blame can be equally located within the individual.  
 
In relation to the discursive constructions of blame through mental health services, identified 
in B.4.3.2.1, Linehan (1993) suggests mental health pƌofessioŶals͛ loss of patience and 
intolerance of the constant seesaw of behaviours, as a result of unrealistic expectations, 
recreates an invalidating environment in which individuals are expected to respond positively 
to ͚tƌeatŵeŶt͛. The pƌofessioŶal oďseƌǀes laĐk of ĐhaŶge, attƌiďutes this to the iŶdiǀidual͛s 
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desire not to want to change, consequently, blame occurs. Blaming and invalidation has to be 
prevented if treatment is ever to be successful. Maskowitz (2001) proposes that another 
reason for negative responses to individuals exhibiting the characteristics of the BPD diagnosis 
is the way that they challenge our own inadequacies, our inability to be effective impacting 
upon perceptions of the self-as-therapist.  
 
Paris (2008) identifies the attraction of mental health professionals to simplicity when faced 
with individuals in distress. They are attracted to linear explanations of cause and effect, as the 
Western human mind is generally. Attribution theory, as outlined by Potter (2009), identifies 
that in order to gain a sense of control over their environment individuals attribute causes to 
events. In relation to those considered to have BPD, research suggests that staff attribute the 
individual to have control over their behaviours and therefore, are less likely to feel empathy 
and more likely to feel anger (Feather & Johnstone, 2001). Similarly, Nehls (1999) identified 
hoǁ ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶals͛ Ŷegatiǀe ƌespoŶses to those ǁith BPD ǁeƌe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ 
theiƌ ǀieǁ of theŵ as ͚ŵaŶipulatiǀe͛; iŵplǇiŶg that ĐhoiĐe aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ lie ǁith the 
individual. This is based not only in moral philosophy, as identified by Potter (2009), but also in 
the reductionist approach and Aristotlean logic of positivism. Within the medical model there 
is a drive to reduce everything to its simplest form in order to understand it. However, this acts 
to exclude the complexity of human existence, and creates unsubstantiated interpretations of 
behaviours. For example, Nehls (1999) found that the meaning of self-harm was not explored 
but nonetheless viewed as manipulative and aggressive, evidenced in B.4.3.2.3. Hence, when 
unable to understand things with simple causal explanations we devalue them and attribute 
negative interpretations, resulting in blame which is then internalised (Haigh, 2002b).  
 
This ďlaŵe positioŶiŶg of iŶdiǀiduals has giǀeŶ ƌise to the ͚self-help͛ shift ǁithiŶ ŵeŶtal health 
seƌǀiĐes. “uĐh that if aŶ iŶdiǀidual does Ŷot ͚help theŵselǀes͛ theŶ theǇ ŵaǇ ďe ĐoŶsidered as 
making a choice not to control their behaviour and as such within moral philosophy are 
ĐoŶsideƌed ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛. This ǁas fuƌtheƌ ideŶtified ďǇ Nehls ;ϭϵϵϵͿ as the ĐoŵŵoŶ health 
pƌoŵotioŶ stƌategǇ of iŶdiǀidualisŵ, to ͚help Ǉouƌself͛, aŶd oŶe that appears to apply 
particularly to mental health professional attitudes to BPD. The internalisation of this self-help 
view in relation to control was particularly evident in B.4.3.2.2 Extract 12. Blame was further 
ĐoŶstƌuĐted thƌough ͚MaligŶaŶt AlieŶatioŶ͛. This was conceptualised by Gethin Morgan in 
ϭϵϳϵ as a pƌoĐess haǀiŶg ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ oĐĐuƌƌed pƌioƌ to suiĐide aŵoŶgst ͚patieŶts͛ ǁhoŵ ŵeŶtal 
health professionals found difficult to like. He describes how patient, staff, interactions 
between patient and staff, and the environment act together to result in damaging outcomes 
for all. Watts and Morgan (1994) identify how the individual, unable to communicate their 
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Ŷeeds does so iŶ ǁaǇs ǁhiĐh aĐt agaiŶst staff peƌĐeptioŶs of the ͚good patieŶt͛. This ƌesults iŶ a 
poor alliance between staff and the individual, the reactions of staff are viewed in an 
environment attributing interactional problems to the individual rather than providing the 
opportunity to reflect upon the relationship in order to understand the meaning of behaviours 
and how these are re-enacted by staff. This results in staff alienating the individual and them 
being considered as an inevitable suicide risk. This process was reflected within the 
constructions of my participants and is dialectically related to stigma and recovery discourses.  
 
Furthermore, this blame discourse is particularly relevant to the diagnosis of BPD as a result of 
potential parallel processes within staff groups, as identified by Rigby and Longford (2004). 
When mental health professionals are faced with being held accountability for an individuals 
self-harming behaviours, as part of institutional responsibility as highlighted by several of the 
participants in B.4.3.2.3; there is a human tendency to defend the self against attack, and this 
can often result in blame attributions. By setting up a position whereby the individual is 
considered within a discourse of blame a common sense view is created - that this event is not 
their responsibility, in essence there is a parallel process relating to the dilemma of blame. 
While this discourse could be considered in relation to many diagnoses, the risks to self and 
the lack of consensus regarding the diagnosis of BPD mean that blame discourse is potentially 
most readily drawn upon as a result of an unresolved and unspoken dialectic between staff 
and clients. The discourse can become powerful in enabling the staff to potentially retain a 
͚ďlaŵeless͛ positioŶ aŶd the ĐlieŶts a ͚ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ͛ positioŶ, pƌeseŶtiŶg the polar opposites of 
the dialectic while each experiences an ideological struggle. However, this is a discourse theory 
that would require further investigation in relation to staff discourse, as this is based upon 
assumption.   
 
In short, we take a group of individuals who do not behave in their social environment 
according to the established rules and norms for interpersonal interaction; we fail to 
understand why they do not behave according to those rules and norms; determine this is 
unfathomable, according to the hegemony present within that society, as the rules and norms 
aƌe legitiŵated, ĐoŶsideƌed ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛; aŶd heŶĐe, deĐide that as theiƌ pƌeseŶtatioŶ is 
not bizarre it must be something that they are choosing to do demonstrating the individualism 
iŶheƌeŶt iŶ todaǇ͛s Đultuƌe. Thus ǁe judge, ĐoŶdeŵŶ aŶd ďlaŵe the iŶdiǀidual foƌ a soĐial aŶd 
cultural rule violation because we are unable to attribute any other simple causal explanation 
and the context is ignored. This results in a reciprocating, and damaging, relationship between 
the individual and the interactor which perpetuates and reinforces the violations.  
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B.5.2.2  Stigma discourse  
“tigŵa ǁas disĐuƌsiǀelǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐted ďǇ: attitudes, ͚kŶoǁledge͛, soĐial eǆĐlusioŶ, shaŵe aŶd 
discrimination. Johnstone (2000) suggests that it is the medical model which brings with it 
stigma and marginalisation. The medical model places emphasis on naturalism, the view that 
all ͚disoƌdeƌs͛ ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified as oĐĐuƌƌiŶg as a Ŷatuƌal faĐt, its oƌigiŶs ǁithiŶ eǀolutionary 
theory (Bolton, 2010). Ben-Zeev, Young and Corrigan (2010) propose that this view acts to 
ŵaiŶtaiŶ puďliĐ peƌĐeptioŶs of ͚ŵeŶtal disoƌdeƌ͛ thƌough the pƌoĐess of ĐategoƌisatioŶ. 
Categories place individuals into groups, implying homogeneity and stability of the problem, 
this being part of the purpose for categorisation. However, this results in culturally constructed 
public stereotypes of mental health problems which elicit fear, negative judgements about 
competence, and blame. These stereotypes are further reinforced through media 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs; politiĐal iŶflueŶĐe, foƌ eǆaŵple pƌoposals foƌ the ĐoŶtƌol of ͚DaŶgeƌous 
People ǁith “eǀeƌe PeƌsoŶalitǇ Disoƌdeƌs͛ ;DOH aŶd Hoŵe OffiĐe, ϭϵϵϵͿ; the laĐk of ĐoŶseŶsus 
amongst academics and clinicians about the validity of the construct, its aetiology and 
prognosis; and, until recently, an academic and clinical view that personality disorders are 
͚uŶtƌeataďle͛.  
 
Diagnostic labelling, or classification systems more generally, give an experience a name which 
suggests it actually exists as an entity. It implies an assumption that more than one person has 
had this experience and creates an initial feeling of relief. Maskowtiz (2001) highlighted this as 
ƌelief: thƌough ďeiŶg pƌoǀided ǁith a ͚fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg theiƌ suffeƌiŶg͛; of 
experiencing something which was not unique but experienced by others. This was something 
that was similarly constructed in the discourse of my participants and was also identified by 
Crawford et al. (2008). However, stereotypes, negative attitudes, social exclusion and 
discrimination then act to reinforce the values of the society that unless you behave in certain 
ǁaǇs, ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith that soĐietǇ aŶd Đultuƌe, Ǉou ǁill ďe ĐoŶsideƌed aŶ ͚outsideƌ͛ to ďe 
avoided. Horn et al. (2007) also ideŶtified ƌejeĐtioŶ aŶd ͚Ŷot fittiŶg iŶ͛ as ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of the 
experience of being labelled with BPD.  
 
In the 18
th
 ĐeŶtuƌǇ ͚tƌuth͛ aďout ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ ǁas ĐoŶstƌuĐted thƌough ƌeligioŶ, the doŵiŶaŶt 
discourse of the time; this then gave way to science and medicine as the dominant discourses 
aŶd, heŶĐe, the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚tƌuth͛ ǁas ĐoŶstƌuĐted ;“ǇŵoŶds, ϭϵϵϴͿ. IŶ faĐt, this ͚tƌuth͛ 
aŶd ͚kŶoǁledge͛ appeaƌs to ďe deŵaŶded ďǇ ǁesteƌŶ soĐietǇ ǁith its foƌŵal logiĐ, aŶd theŶ 
ƌeiŶfoƌĐed thƌough the ͚suppoƌtiŶg eǀideŶĐe͛ pƌoǀided ďǇ sĐieŶĐe. WithiŶ this, all ŵeŶtal 
health pƌofessioŶals aƌe positioŶed thƌough the positiǀist aŶd esseŶtialist paƌadigŵs as ͚all-
kŶoǁiŶg͛. ͞CliŶiĐiaŶs pƌeseŶt theiƌ ǀeƌsioŶ of ƌealitǇ as ďeiŶg akiŶ to soŵe kiŶd of ultiŵate 
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truth͟ ;Daǀies & Bhugƌa, ϮϬϬϰ, p.ϭϯϰͿ. As a collective, they are seen to hold the answers, 
because this is what the society has been led, and one can argue wants to be led, to believe; 
we invest the power of responsibility for care to these individuals, and believe them to hold 
͚iŶdeteƌŵiŶate͛ kŶoǁledge; that is, all the aŶsǁeƌs foƌ thiŶgs ƌelated to huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs that ǁe 
do not understand (Kelly, 1998). When considering this in relation to the discussion of the 
dominance of the biomedical model in B.2.6.1 the role of the psychiatrist is one of expert. A 
positioning that is created by virtue of their expertise in biological understanding.  
 
Nehls (1999) found the most significant problem for individuals was not having the diagnosis 
but the stigma and attitudes attached to it by mental health professionals and services. Nehls 
(1999) quotes a participant who experienced their GP as wanting to get them out of the 
surgery as quickly as possible; an experience also described by one the participants in this 
research. Gallop, Lancee and Garfinkel (1989) also found that those with BPD do not meet the 
value-ladeŶ Đƌiteƌia of a ͚good patieŶt͛ - also discussed in B.4.3.4.1 - they are not considered 
compliant, grateful or cooperative; in fact, they are considered manipulative and, therefore, 
less deserving of empathetic treatment. Evidence of this was apparent within my research 
interviews.  
 
Davies (2004) identifies how mental health professionals are also members of the public, and 
as such are open to the same discourses around mental health stigma as any other member of 
society, and so can bring these into the treatment environment. Aviram et al. (2006) further 
identified the dialectical relationship between the public stigma internalised by mental health 
professionals and the negative responses of clients. Consequently, mental health professionals 
internalise stereotypes and prevailing ideologies, they then respond to individuals labelled as 
BPD in ways consistent with the stereotypes which then results in a reciprocating enactment of 
the behaviours expected of the individual. The Consultation and Advocacy Promotion Service 
(2010a; 2010b) highlighted both staff and services users identified the impact of negative 
attitudes on the treatment received. 
 
Raven (2009) suggests that BPD stigma discourse is created in an environment where clinicians 
feel powerless to help effectively. Flanagan, Miller and Davidson (2009) identified the stigma 
amongst mental health practitioners as primarily related to structural and systemic pressures 
upon services. This requires staff to emphasise symptoms, problems and compliance with 
treatment in the provision of services to the detriment of focus upon the individual and 
recovery. This provides further evidence of mental health services being driven by economic 
forces, rather than a concern with humanity.  
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Stigma acts to devalue an individual; as a result of being positioned within a stigmatised group, 
they are considered to have less value, resulting in social exclusion (Aviram et al., 2006). 
Stigma, and social exclusion in particular, is highlighted by Baker, Procter and Gibbons (2009) 
as resulting in profound social losses in relation to employment, housing and other 
opportunities. Earlier Miller (1994) found that all the individuals that she interviewed 
experienced estrangement and inadequacy at being unable to meet societal expectations. 
Aviram et al. (2006) identified that people have a tendency to distance themselves from the 
stigmatised within society. Attempts to address social exclusion have been made through 
various documents and campaigns: Time to Change campaign led by Mind and Rethink (2010); 
No longer a diagnosis of exclusion (DOH, 2003); Mental Health and Social Exclusion (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 2004); however, these attempts have been slow to permeate and impact upon 
discourses. Employers, housing providers, society and mental health services continue to hold 
negative attitudes, discriminate and stigmatise those with perceived mental health problems.  
 
Dialectically related to social exclusion is shame. Rusch et al. (2007) identify shame as 
prominent within individuals diagnosed with BPD. However, as identified by Crowe (2004), this 
is not considered within the criteria of the diagnosis. Linehan (1993) ideŶtifies that ͞shaŵe 
ƌeaĐtioŶ͟ ;p.ϰϮͿ oĐĐuƌs as a ƌesult of a soĐial leaƌŶiŶg eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt that positioŶs eŵotioŶal 
ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ as ͚shaŵeful͛. This liŶks ǁith Potteƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of the ǀalues 
underlying blame discourse discussed in B.5.2.1. Shame occurs as a result of difference which 
implies judgement and exclusion (Crowe, 2004). It is a moral emotion, characterised by 
experiences of worthlessness, and powerlessness, and concern about denigration by others. 
Shame is constructed through devaluation and fear of exposure (Rusch et al., 2007). Crowe 
(2004) identifies shame as positioning the self inferiorly to others based on what they perceive 
would be the others view. As a result Holm, Berg and Severinsson (2009) emphasised the 
importance of exploring meaning for those with a BPD diagnosis who have experienced 
traumatic childhoods, enabling individuals to overcome shame, guilt and feeling trapped by 
these emotions. Crowe (2004) alternatively proposes a new construction of BPD as a chronic 
shame response. Linehan (1993) describes shame as resulting from a dialectical dilemma: 
inability to integrate helplessness with competence, non-control and control, creating moral 
shame. Blum (2008) highlights the importance of identifying shame discourse within 
individuals as this can prevent recovery and is often hidden. Within this research the impact of 
shame was observed to impede constructions of recovery and effect subject positioning within 
the recovery discourse.  
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B.5.2.3  Recovery discourse 
The recovery discourse dominant within the interviews was identified through constructions 
referenced as: knowledge, understanding, treatment, dilemmas of permanence, disorder 
management and hope. It was apparent that the subject positions within the discourse were 
created differently according to the dialectical relationships between the constructions, which 
were further related to the individuals positioning in the dilemma contained within them. To 
elaborate, those individuals who: constructed the knowledge of BPD to ďe the ͚tƌuth͛; fouŶd 
treatment unhelpful; felt misunderstood; thought BPD to be permanent; considered disorder 
management  the only option and had limited construction of hope, or none at all constructed 
BPD as unrecoverable. Although partial hope constructions created more of a dilemma for 
theŵ ǁith ƌegaƌd to ƌeĐoǀeƌaďilitǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, those iŶdiǀiduals ǁho ƋuestioŶed the ͚tƌuth͛ of 
the knowledge, believed themselves to have been understood by some, thought treatment to 
have been helpful, questioned the permanence and requirement for disorder management 
and retained a construction of hope constructed BPD as recoverable; thus revealing the 
dialectical dimensionality of constructions within the recovery discourse.  
 
Paris (2008) highlights that one of the problems with diagnosis is that psychiatrists are 
required to ŵake a diagŶosis ďased oŶ sǇŵptoŵs aŶd theŶ ͚ŵake it go aǁaǇ͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, BPD is 
not something that responds to medication (NCCMH, 2009) and, therefore, does not fit this 
category. Nonetheless, medications that do not appear to be effective will be retried in case 
they work next time, unlike psychotherapy. Although, more recently CBT has been offered 
many times in the NHS in a similar way to medication as a result of empirically validated 
research evidence; the evidence suggests it is effective with certaiŶ ͚disoƌdeƌs͛ aŶd, theƌefoƌe, 
͚it ŵust ǁoƌk͛. OfteŶ theƌapists ĐaŶ ďe heaƌd to ďlaŵe the ĐlieŶt ǁheŶ it does Ŷot haǀe the 
desiƌed ƌesults, suggestiŶg ͚theǇ ǁeƌe Ŷot ƌeadǇ͛. Thus, ďillioŶs of pouŶds haǀe ďeeŶ speŶt oŶ 
these approaches. Further, we need only look at the Ŷaŵes of psǇĐhotheƌapeutiĐ dƌugs ͚aŶti-
depƌessaŶt͛, ͚aŶti-psǇĐhotiĐ͛, to ideŶtifǇ the ǀalue assuŵptioŶ that these states aƌe 
uŶdesiƌaďle, aŶd as suĐh ŵust ďe ƌesisted, ǁith phaƌŵaĐeutiĐal dƌugs ďeiŶg seeŶ as the ͚Đuƌe͛ 
(Johnstone, 2000).  
 
Millon (1996) identifies how pessimistic the current system of personality diagnosis is. He 
poiŶts out that, foƌ aŶ iŶdiǀidual, ƌeĐeiǀiŶg a diagŶosis of ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ oƌ ͚disease͛ is diffiĐult 
enough but then to suggest that this is pervasive, unchanging and inflexible, effecting every 
part of your being - such is the current understanding of personality- will doubtless bring with 
it hopelessness and helplessness. In concordance with this Haigh (2002b) found service users 
to construct mental health professionals as lacking in understanding and conveying messages 
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of ͚uŶtƌeataďilitǇ͛. OfteŶ the diagŶosis had ďeeŶ ǁithheld aŶd, oŶĐe it ǁas ideŶtified it 
remained permanent, resulting in service withdrawal; this was apparent in participant 
constructions in this research. Similarly, Horn et al. (2007) identified the permanency conveyed 
by the diagnosis. Despite recent research, for example, by Hopwood et al. (2009) investigating 
the stability of personality traits in BPD which suggest the historical conceptualisation of BPD 
as enduring, and unchangeable, may be incorrect. Therefore, it is not perhaps the diagnosis 
itself that is the primary problem but the implied assumption of permanence. Equally, there 
appears to be no formal process for the removal of a diagnosis. This inherently deems mental 
health problems to be permanent due to the lack of diagnostic de-categorising. This suggests 
that ǁe aĐtuallǇ ĐlassifǇ people ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚disoƌdeƌs͛.  
 
Flanagan and Davidson (2007) conducted an examination of the language used by researchers 
in their academic writings about diagnoses including BPD between 1975 and 2004, to 
determine whether the language that was used acted to classify people or disorders. They 
found that while the tendency to classify people through language such as ͚BoƌdeƌliŶe͛ oƌ ͚the 
BPD patieŶt͛ oƌ ͚the patieŶt is BPD͛ has deĐliŶed siŶĐe ϭϵϳϱ, iŶ ϱϬ% of aĐadeŵiĐ aƌtiĐles 
authors continued to infer the classification of people rather than disorders. Flanagan and 
Davidson identify a number of implications of this including the implicit assumption of 
permanence as the person is consequently identified as the disorder. They also highlight how 
this creates confusion within the general public as to whether disorders are in fact classifying 
people, or conditions that they may be affected by, and they further demonstrated this in a 
search of language use on the internet. Furthermore, they propose that the current 
classification system represents a folk taxonomy rather than a scientific one, as it is created 
not by confirmed evidence of naturalistic determinants but cultural values and perceptions. 
The use of language which implies people classification, thereby, results in the false 
assuŵptioŶ that these ͚disoƌdeƌs͛ eǆist iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ that a ďƌokeŶ leg oƌ a ǀiƌus eǆists 
tangibly. Consequently, it acts to maintain stigma and represents assumptions; we legitimise 
͚ŵeŶtal illŶess͛ thƌough psǇĐhiatƌǇ aŶd psǇĐhologǇ, positioŶiŶg ouƌselǀes as kŶoǁiŶg ŵoƌe 
about the concept than we actually do.  
 
Johnstone (2010) suggests that ŵediĐal laďels aĐt to ͚ƌesĐue͛ people eŶĐouƌagiŶg the seekiŶg 
of aŶ eǆteƌŶal ͚Đuƌe͛, oŶlǇ to ďlaŵe the iŶdiǀidual ǁheŶ the eǆteƌŶal ͚Đuƌe͛ does Ŷot ǁoƌk. 
Potteƌ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ iŶ heƌ ĐƌitiĐal aŶalǇsis of BPD defiŶes ouƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of a ͚healthǇ͛ 
identity iŶ the West as: ͞uŶified, staďle aŶd iŶdiǀiduated fƌoŵ otheƌs ǁhile ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg staďle 
aŶd healthǇ ƌelatioŶships ǁith otheƌs͟ ;pϭϴ.Ϳ; the WesteƌŶ idealised ǀieǁ of the self ďeiŶg 
highly compatible with scientific and capitalist hegemony dominant within clinical discourse 
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(Wright, Haigh &McKeown, 2007). Potter also concludes that being viewed as healthy involves 
self-awareness of this identity. However, the ability to do this requires the internalisation of 
representations of self, and others, and the boundaries between them. When contradictory 
ŵessages aƌe iŶteƌŶalised ďǇ the ͚patieŶts͛ suĐh that theǇ aƌe aďŶoƌŵal, to ďlaŵe, 
unrecoverable and stigmatised, in need of cure but incurable, not responsible but then 
responsible, makes this idealised self virtually unattainable. In short the mental health system 
could be described as paradoxical. It is designed to provide treatment to enable people to 
͚ƌeĐoǀeƌ͛ fƌoŵ ŵeŶtal ill-health and yet the stigma, blame and (non) recovery discourses 
within it, and the reluctance to re-diagnose or reclassify, suggests the impact of the system is 
opposite to that intended, certainly with regard to BPD.  
 
B.5.2.4  Enigma 
The lack of consensus about the diagnosis, the dilemma with regard to attributions of blame, 
the dilemma relating to the possibility of recovery, the stigma created by stereotyping are all 
apparent within my analysis and act together to construct an enigma. Crowe (2004) suggest 
the teƌŵ ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe͛ does ŶothiŶg to eŶhaŶĐe a ĐliŶiĐal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the sǇŵptoŵs it 
draws together, instead suggesting ambiguity creating an enigma. Bjorklund (2006) highlights 
that ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe͛ ƌefleĐts the laĐk of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg, the ĐoŶfusioŶ, the iŶaďilitǇ to defiŶe aŶd 
the paradoxical nature of the problems experienced on the part of both individual and mental 
health professional. In outlining the less than satisfactory way in which the original validity of 
BPD as a diagnosis was first determined and entered DSM, Kutchins and Kirk (1997) identify 
the circular argument that is used for defence of the construct. A therapist describes a client as 
being difficult, when asked why they are difficult, the therapist responds that it is because 
͚theǇ haǀe BPD͛, to ǁhiĐh theǇ aƌe asked ͚hoǁ do Ǉou kŶoǁ that͛ aŶd the ƌespoŶse is ͚ďeĐause 
they aƌe diffiĐult͛; this eǆplaiŶs ŶothiŶg it siŵplǇ aĐts to Đƌeate fuƌtheƌ ŵǇsteƌǇ. HoƌŶ et al. 
(2007) similarly identified the lack of understanding about what the diagnosis meant and what 
this implied about responsibility for the experience labelled as BPD, as I found in this research.  
 
The aim of the medical model is to reduce problems to simple causal explanations which 
identify symptoms, and indicate treatment, and yet the medical model has not provided this 
͚kŶoǁledge͛. IŶstead it has Đƌeated a ĐoŶstƌuĐt which suggests the existence of something but 
leaves a void where the information should be. This lack of answers is disguised in technical 
language and is apparent in the tendency to withhold information; information which is not 
actually known. Similarly to the discursive constructions identified within my research Horn et 
al. ;ϮϬϬϳͿ fouŶd that ͚kŶoǁledge͛ ǁas eǆpeƌieŶĐed as poǁeƌ, eitheƌ ƌesultiŶg fƌoŵ a seŶse of 
ĐoŶtƌol pƌoǀided ďǇ the diagŶosis oƌ as ƌesult of the laĐk of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌoǀided ďǇ ͚poǁeƌful͛ 
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otheƌs iŶ giǀiŶg the diagŶosis, heŶĐe a ǁithholdiŶg of ͚kŶoǁledge͛ ďǇ eǆpeƌts ďeiŶg ǀieǁed as 
unhelpful. Maskowitz (2001) comments on the withholding of the diagnosis and suggests this 
simply acts to increase misunderstanding and misalliance amongst individuals and those 
pƌoǀidiŶg ͚Đaƌe͛. LeƋuesŶe aŶd Heƌsh ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ideŶtified that ĐliŶiĐiaŶs ǁho did Ŷot disĐlose, oƌ 
were reluctant to disclose, a diagnosis of BPD to individuals identified a number of reasons 
why, including: concern related to stigma, similarly identified by Raven (2009); negative 
eǀaluatioŶ of the iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to uŶdeƌstaŶd the ŵeaŶiŶg of the diagŶosis; laĐk of 
certainty about the validity of the construct; the impact upon health and morale; in addition to 
fear about the reaction of the individual to receiving the diagnosis. They identify that not 
disclosing the diagnosis can prevent: the opportunity for individuals to gain understanding and 
͚kŶoǁledge͛; as ǁell as the oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ autoŶoŵǇ of the iŶdiǀidual; aĐĐess to tƌeatŵeŶt 
options; and self-discovery which, can result in constructions of the diagnosis being so bad that 
the services could not tell them. We may also consider that non-disclosure or limited 
disclosure creates further stigma.  
 
The absence of transparency about the construct and the reluctance of professionals to be 
seeŶ as ͚Ŷot-kŶoǁiŶg͛ ƌesults iŶ seƌǀiĐe useƌs, staff, aŶd soĐietǇ haǀiŶg to dƌaǁ theiƌ oǁŶ 
conclusions about the construct and hence further perpetuates the mystery. As a critical realist 
I find myself questioning not only the validity of the construct but also whether the problems 
experienced could be conceptualised in an alternative way. If we used a different criteria set or 
a different method of categorisation would we in fact end up with several different constructs. 
For example Morrison (2009) identifies that those with a BPD diagnosis and developmental 
history indicative of childhood trauma are likely to present differently to those without 
childhood trauma. This presents the possibility of an alternative conceptualisation. Hodges 
(2003) proposes the reformulation of the problems as post traumatic responses removing the 
temptation to invoke a blaming approach to treatment. However, it could be the case that we 
haǀe ďeĐoŵe so ǁedded to ͚pƌoǀiŶg͛ the existence of BPD that the political and bureaucratic 
ideas and paradigms prevent us re-conceptualising. Perhaps as a mental health community we 
feaƌ saǇiŶg ͚ǁe ŵaǇ haǀe got it ǁƌoŶg͛ oƌ ͚ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ͛ ďeĐause of the poteŶtial 
paradigmatic implications of this. I would also suggest that by attempting to provide certainty, 
aŶd deŶǇiŶg the possiďilitǇ of ͚Ŷot-kŶoǁiŶg͛, ǁe fuƌtheƌ the ŵǇsteƌǇ of the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ aŶd leaǀe 
space for formal logic to account for it. 
 
Modern medicine is controlled by political and economic pressures to produce maximum 
outcomes measured by targets for the minimum outlay (Allen, 2004); this is the product of 
political ideology, scientific paradigms and the demands of capitalism. As such, institutions 
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including the NHS are subject to national policy and complex internal structures, when the 
ideologies are in conflict with humanistic values these can impact upon the treatment received 
by individuals in their care (Davies, 2004). This can lead, and has led, to a loss of meaning and 
humanism (Flanagan, Miller & Davidson, 2009) from within mental health services as focus is 
placed upon symptom removal, public protection from harm, and a fear of accountability if an 
individual harms themselves as evidenced by the constructions of participants within this 
ƌeseaƌĐh ;see B.ϰ.ϯ.Ϯ.ϯͿ. The iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌsoŶal eǆpeƌieŶĐe ƌeŵaiŶs at the ďottoŵ of the 
hierarchy of pressures within practice as well as academic research. Therefore, while we 
continue to draw, perhaps unknowingly, upon blame, stigma and (non) recovery discourses in 
a system dominated by individualism we act to exclude the individual from their treatment 
(Roberts, 2000) and promote social inequality (Miller & McClelland, 2005).  
 
Crowe (2004) highlights that the criteria within the DSM for BPD represents the current 
ideology of goal directed and rational behaviour as well as displays of affect in keeping with 
professionalism; these underpin productivity and advancement within a western capitalist 
Đultuƌe. Baƌkeƌ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ states that ͞eŵotions involve cognitive and moral judgements and the 
ĐultuƌallǇ appƌoǀed ǁaǇ of aĐtiŶg theŵ out͟ ;p.ϭϯϭͿ. TheǇ aƌe ĐultuƌallǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐted; ideŶtified 
through cognitions, interpretations and rules, named and understood through discourse. In 
light of this, Crowe (2004) raises important questions about the BPD construct and how the 
difficulties experienced are conceptualised. He purports that beyond social and culturally 
accepted ways of behaving there is also an expectation of feeling and thinking in culturally 
accepted ways and that to err from this, to be emotional, dramatic or erratic is a violation of 
the social and cultural norm and as such worthy of judgement. Conversely, Western-style 
capitalism, as described by Weber (2001), requires individual qualities of conscientiousness, 
professionalism, investment and delayed pleasure and fulfilment.  
 
In the UK, we live in a Post-industrial age. Technological advancement and increased pace of 
life have resulted in the traditional social support mechanisms of times gone-by being no 
longer available; with increasing pressure to fit more in, get more for your money, and be 
more productive. An individual, who challenges the ideology of the time or this way of living, is 
considered non-conforming. As such, an individual who behaves in an impulsive, emotional or 
angry way, as pathologised by the diagnosis BPD, would be considered as not behaving in the 
interest of capitalism; in rejecting a common societal goal they are judged as rejecting 
͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛. TheǇ aƌe, theƌefoƌe, positioned in a number of ways through discourse. Firstly, 
that they are choosing not to conform (blame). Alicke (2000) suggests that in all social groups 
there is a concern to prevent and control harmful behaviour for the purposes of maintaining 
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social order. Those who commit ethical, moral or legal violations within their social groups 
must be held responsible for their violations; in essence punishment for violations implies 
blame for such actions.  The discourse is, thereby, considered necessary for social control and 
ultimately economic growth. Secondly, that they are different to everybody else, to our 
͚selǀes͛ aŶd heŶĐe, aƌe eǆĐluded ;stigŵaͿ. This idea of otheƌŶess, loĐatiŶg diffeƌeŶĐe fƌoŵ the 
self, as described by Wright et al. (2007) led to the traditional view of PD as a diagnosis of 
eǆĐlusioŶ. “ustaiŶiŶg this ǀieǁ of diffeƌeŶĐe fƌoŵ ouƌ ͚selǀes͛, thƌough disĐouƌse, ƌeŵoǀes feaƌ 
of thiŶgs ǁe do Ŷot ĐoŵpƌeheŶd. It pƌoǀides, ǁhat PadeskǇ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ desĐƌiďes as, ͚good ƌeasoŶs͛ 
for maintaining our views, to pƌeǀeŶt the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ouƌ ͚selǀes͛ ďeiŶg diffeƌeŶt aŶd soĐiallǇ 
excluded.  Finally, they are deemed to be in need of rapid assistance to conform and when this 
is not forthcoming they are positioned permanently outside social conformity (recovery). 
Therefore, blame, stigma and recovery discourses and the construction of enigma can be 
identified not only as a product of a capitalist, reductionist and positivist society, but also as 
ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the hegeŵoŶǇ. The ďelief that ͚ďlaŵe͛, ͚otheƌŶess͛ aŶd ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ aƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ 
and common sense discourses enables the ideological goals to remain hidden and 
unquestioned.   
 
B.5.3  Navigating the problem 
Our thus far limited understanding of BPD exists only in theory, there is no somatic referent; 
and neither is there conclusive evidence that childhood environments and development 
͚Đause͛ BPD ;Pilgƌiŵ, ϮϬϬϭͿ. Theƌe is Ŷo ĐoŶseŶsus, eaĐh pƌoposed ŵodel ĐoŶtaiŶs ǁithiŶ it 
ƌeseaƌĐh disĐƌepaŶĐies aŶd does Ŷot ǁhollǇ aĐĐouŶt foƌ the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛. This laĐk of ĐoŶseŶsus 
acts to enable policy-makers to treat BPD in a way which enables them to advance their 
political goals (Pilgrim, 2001). As counselling psychologists within the field we have the 
opportunity to either comply with the government directives relating to the ͚tƌeatŵeŶt͛ of 
BPD, and ideology, or to present a critical reflection upon the diagnosis; resisting attempts to 
consider the enigma of BPD simplistically, preserving humanist values, and presenting 
alternatives.  
 
We must be also be aware of a tendency towards disciplinary imperialism, as described by 
Sayer (2005), whereby the position of our own disciplinary endeavours is considered to hold 
the aŶsǁeƌs, pƌeseŶt the ͚tƌuth͛ aŶd the ƌeal ͚kŶoǁledge͛ aďout the eǆisteŶĐe of BPD. CoŶŶoƌ-
Greene (2006) states that no single academic discipline can fully account for the complexity of 
human problems, rather it requires interdisciplinary understanding and enquiry. Furthermore, 
Koenigsberg and Siever (2000) identified the importance of seeing a whole picture rather than 
just part of it through the lens of the discipline investigating; otherwise BPD will always remain 
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aŶ eŶigŵa. BoltoŶ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ also ideŶtifies the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of a ͚ǁhole͛ appƌoaĐh ǁhiĐh iŶtegƌates 
ostensibly competing paradigms. This furthers the case for a dialectical philosophy approach to 
underpin any conceptualisation of BPD. By considering only a part of an individual we 
invalidate, dehumanise, and devalue, them and their experience. BPD, if we assume 
momentarily that it does exist as a valid construct, is nonetheless only part of a person not the 
whole of them; it should not make them less valid or their experience any less meaningful.  
 
To suggest that the only way forward is through a social and cultural approach to mental 
health is in itself an essentialist and reductionist endeavour; suggesting that the only way to 
understand the psychological dilemmas that people experience is through their social and 
cultural context, when in fact they are irreducible to merely a social and cultural context. This 
is demonstrated by Sayer (2005) as an upwards reductionism. In an attempt to counter 
individualism, we suggest social determinism, both of which reduce human beings to simplistic 
understandings. We must identify a way in which we can leave room for individual and 
social/group understandings of responsibility within health and social care (Sayer, 2005). We 
can use the opportunity to construct models of distress which challenge the dominant ideas 
within a scientific and economic world which seek to pathologise distress (Miller & McClelland, 
2005). While Engel, in 1977, proposed the biopsychosocial model as an alternative to the 
biomedical one within psychiatry this has not necessarily been translated into the training of 
psychiatrists, or transferred consistently to psychiatric and mental health services.  
 
Strawbridge and Wolfe (2003) highlight the tensions prevalent within an employment context 
foƌ ĐouŶselliŶg psǇĐhologists to applǇ teĐhŶologiĐal eǆpeƌtise iŶ pƌioƌitǇ oǀeƌ ͚ďeiŶg-in-ƌelatioŶ͛ 
with clients. Roberts (2000) identified the tension between modernist mental health services 
with positivist ideas of rationalism, materialism and reductionism with post-modernist 
paƌadigŵs eŶĐouƌagiŶg a ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the idea that ͚tƌuth͛ is ǁaitiŶg to ďe disĐoǀeƌed. 
Roberts identifies the difficulty in rectifying the individual meaningful experience of 
therapeutic endeavours with those that are measurable and consequently, reproducible. The 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd ŵodeƌŶist deŵaŶds of the NH“ Đall upoŶ the ͚sĐieŶtist-pƌaĐtitioŶeƌ͛ to apply 
science to clinical practice. However, Strawbridge and Wolfe (2003) suggest the importance of 
retaining a view of the scientist-practitioner not simply to apply scientific and essentialist 
research, but to apply oneself to the individual from a phenomenological and existentialist 
position which emphasises humanism. Otherwise, as some have suggested, therapy becomes a 
way of maintaining the politically dominant ideology (Masson, 1988).  
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Johnstone (2010) proposes formulation as an alternative to psychiatric diagnosis and as a way 
of retaining meaning for an individual, increasing understanding, improving staff-patient 
interaction and providing an alternative means of communicating which does not rely upon 
the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛. While she identifies that this is not without its problems, and 
is therefore not a perfect solution it acts to remove the stigma, disempowerment, 
individualisation and social consequences created by diagnosis. It provides an opportunity for 
understanding the difficulties experienced by an individual within a historical, social and 
cultural context (Johnstone, 2005). However, Johnstone (2005), Summers (2006) and Dallos, 
Wright, Stedmon and Johnstone (2005) identify the need for reflexivity within this process. 
Miller (2004), Fonagy and Bateman (2004) and Miller and McClelland (2005) identify 
positioŶiŶg the iŶdiǀidual as ͚eǆpeƌt͛ aŶd takiŶg a ͚ŶoŶ-eǆpeƌt͛ positioŶ as theƌapist, ŵoǀiŶg 
aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ͚theŵ-and-us͛ thiŶkiŶg. AlteƌŶatiǀes ŵaǇ also iŶĐlude a soĐial iŶeƋualities approach 
to formulating client distress, as identified by Miller and McClelland (2005).  
 
The service user movement also campaigns for a new way of conceptualising mental health, 
without the medical model (Johnstone, 2010). They propose recovery to be defined not by the 
͚ĐuƌiŶg͛, oƌ ͚ƌeŵoǀal͛, of ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ ƌatheƌ as ƌestoƌiŶg the ageŶĐǇ of the iŶdiǀidual to ďƌiŶg 
about self-deteƌŵiŶatioŶ, hope foƌ the futuƌe, adjustŵeŶt to the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ 
and acceptance of the past (Roberts, 2000). Haigh (2002b) identified that services users felt 
treatment could be improved through acknowledgement of treatability. Wisdom, Bruce, Saedi, 
Wies and Green (2008) also identified the essential role of publicising narrative accounts of 
recovery which, highlight the importance of creating, maintaining and enhancing hope. Lack of 
hope is inversely related to recovery and, as such, is brought about through community beliefs 
and low expectations. In tandem with this the ability of therapists to instil positive attitudes 
towards recovery are important for therapeutic outcomes (Reisner, 2005).  
 
Wright et al. (2007) identify that clinical discourse is entwined with lay discourse characterised 
by value judgements and morality, and that this constructs individuals as undeserving of care 
aŶd ͚patieŶt͛ status. This highlights the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of supeƌǀisioŶ ;Aǀiƌaŵ et al., ϮϬϬϲ; Wƌight 
et al., 2007) and attention to stigma discourse within mental health professionals own practice 
and how this may influence the relationship. The need to ensure that, both explicitly and 
implicitly, BPD is conveyed as something that happens to and does not define a person 
(Flanagan & Davidson, 2007).  
 
Reisner (2005) states that therapists, within the current western psychotherapy paradigms, 
have developed within the scientific tradition; their credibility is dependent upon the power of 
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this tradition. Therefore, in order to compete with psychopharmacology and psychiatry we 
must establish this credibility, identifying those therapeutic approaches which are most 
effective with particular diagnoses in order to be accepted within the economic culture 
represented by an empirically validated model of treatment. Roberts (2000) identifies how the 
National Service Framework (NSF) (DOH, 1999) of the NHS clearly lays out a hierarchical 
system of the evidence based practice with randomised control trials and meta-analytic 
research at the top, and personal accounts and stories at the bottom. This places generalised 
͚kŶoǁledge͛ as ŵoƌe desiƌaďle thaŶ speĐifiĐ ͚kŶoǁledge͛, ƋuaŶtitatiǀe as pƌefeƌeŶtial to 
qualitative and objective as preferential to subjective.  An empirically validated model enables 
decisions about treatment to be made outside of the therapeutic relationship, determined by 
policy-makers, insurance companies and actuarial systems (Reisner, 2005). However, success 
in treatment then relies upon techniques and the ability to apply these to complex human 
beings outside of a controlled research environment, incorporating the complex interactions 
between individuals, social and cultural factors and biology.  
 
Over the years psychology has become more concerned with individualism to the detriment of 
understanding the importance of families and communities on preventing, creating and 
supporting psychological difficulties (Bankart, Koshikawa, Nedate & Haruki, 1992). Lieberman 
(1998) describes how therapists in general are currently encouraged and trained to effect 
ĐhaŶge iŶ the ͚heƌe aŶd Ŷoǁ͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ofteŶ pƌoďleŵs aƌe ƌeĐuƌƌiŶg aŶd people ďeĐoŵe 
stuck in history and repeating patterns as with BPD. Lieberman describes the importance of 
understanding the history of the system in which they live so that new narratives, new 
histories and new values can be created for the future evolution of the system in which they 
inhabit. Nehls (1999) also proposes the use of narratives as opposed to diagnostic 
classifications as a way to encourage mental health providers, academics, researchers to view 
clients as providers of knowledge rather than objects of knowledge. This involves taking the 
positioŶ of ͚Ŷot-kŶoǁiŶg͛ as opposed to the tƌaditioŶal ͚all-kŶoǁiŶg͛ positioŶ of esseŶtialist 
and positivist paradigms communicating an attitude of validation and curiosity.  
 
Narrative therapy, developed by Michael White and David Epston, aims to establish a 
therapeutic relationship based on respect and non-blaming, in an environment which is non-
pathologising. The approach presents an alternative to cause-and-effect models. Narrative 
therapy potentially provides an opportunity to regain meaning and reauthor lives, such that 
individuals can construct stories which enable them to be more adaptive to their social and 
cultural contexts (Roberts, 2000). Additionally, Laub and Hoffman (2002) propose integration 
of dialectical co-therapy and narrative therapy drawing on a model of dialectical polarity. Such 
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approaches have been developed in keeping with social constructionist ideas. Therefore, while 
continuing to explore the effectiveness of treatments such as DBT and MBT, we can also look 
to other areas of applied psychology globally.  
 
As identified within B.2.6.1 not all psychiatrists advocate a purely biomedical model, and as 
such they present an alternative ideology. Consequently, there is an alternative position to the 
͚all-kŶoǁiŶg͛ ƌole alƌeadǇ pƌeseŶt ǁithiŶ less ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ sĐhools of psǇĐhiatƌǇ. This ǁas 
originally advocated by Harry Stack Sullivan (Evans, 2005) in his proposition of interpersonal 
psychiatry, now more generally referred to as social psychiatry; he proposed the role of 
psychiatrist as participant observer, rather than the expert role taken by the biological 
psǇĐhiatƌist. “ulliǀaŶ desĐƌiďed a psǇĐhiatƌist͛s kŶoǁledge aŶd tƌaiŶiŶg ďeiŶg ďƌought togetheƌ 
with the clieŶt͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe to pƌoǀide a Đollaďoƌatiǀe uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of diagŶosis aŶd tƌeatŵeŶt. 
This is a role that is similarly proposed by those critical of traditional psychiatry and its reliance 
upon drugs to treat symptoms (Bracken & Thomas, 2010). Furthermore, this group of social or 
critical psychiatrists may be inclined to actively reject the overall role of paternalism that 
pƌeǀails ǁithiŶ psǇĐhiatƌǇ ;BaltƌušaitǇtė, ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶd suppoƌt the useƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ.  
 
The therapeutic community model identified in B.2.5 presents the possibility of integrating 
treatment paradigms, which do not necessarily need to be viewed in competition; and also 
avoids upwards reductionism. Theƌe aƌe a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ͚ŵiŶi theƌapeutiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶities͛ as 
described by Pearce and Haigh (2008) which have appeared over the last few decades. These 
offer the opportunity for developing the traditional values of social psychiatry upon which 
therapeutic communities are founded, respondent to a social constructionist epistemology, 
and considering the principles of an effective therapeutic environment within service 
development (Haigh, 2002c). By continuing to develop the quality assurance systems and 
continue to focus on demonstrating effectiveness, mini therapeutic communities may become 
more attractive politically with regards to economic savings (Pearce & Haigh, 2008). 
Furthermore, the therapeutic community principles described by Haigh (1999) of attachment, 
containment, communication, inclusion and agency can be drawn upon to facilitate a positive 
parallel process within community teams (Haigh, 2004).  
 
Future research far from relying almost entirely on essentialist and positivist approaches, and 
disciplinary imperialism, needs to draw on qualitative methodologies which enable a socially 
constructed diagnosis to be investigated in its social context (Pilgrim, 2001). In so doing we can 
draw together evidence-based practice, which is cross-disciplinary, and critically reflect upon 
aĐĐepted ͚tƌuths͛. CouŶselliŶg psǇĐhologǇ is fouŶded upoŶ huŵaŶistiĐ values, upon a belief in 
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well-being rather than illness and on the importance of personal meaning and context (Orlans, 
2009). It has already grappled with the difficulties of drawing together the philosophical 
underpinning of mainstream psychology with those of counselling and psychotherapy. The task 
of a counselling psychologist is to bring together the potentially competing paradigms of 
positivism and humanism; rationality and subjectivity; naturalism and phenomenology (Orlans, 
2009). Hence, it provides an opportune position from which to balance these competing 
demands to bring a new approach to understanding, reconceptualising whilst providing 
assistaŶĐe to those ǁith the ͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ of ͚BPD͛.  
 
My epistemological position within this research has been one of social constructionism, a way 
of considering post-structuralist and post-modernist ideas within Psychology (Harper & 
Spellman, 2005). The way that we talk, or otherwise communicate, constructs ways of 
perceiving the world and consequently constructs ways of being in the world. This research 
highlights the importance, for me, of considering the ideologies and dominant discourses 
pƌeseŶt ǁithiŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǁhiĐh seek to hide soĐial iŶeƋualitǇ ;Milleƌ & 
McClelland, 2005). By drawing on social constructionist approaches to the conceptualisation, 
understanding and consequences of human experience we potentially open up alternative 
subject positions, and discourses, empowering individuals to make choices within their social 
and cultural context.  
 
While it will always be difficult to resist, and challenge, the prevailing dominance and power 
within our work as therapists - to go against the accepted views and beliefs - it is vital for 
counselling psychology that we provide a critical reflectioŶ oŶ ͚tƌuth͛, ͚kŶoǁledge͛ aŶd ͚ƌealitǇ͛ 
claims with which we are presented, and identify how they came to be constructed such that 
we can bring a social and cultural consideration to an individuals experience; challenging our 
reliance on simple causal explanations. Ultimately the concern is to demystify enigma and 
offer an alternative subject position which provides the individual with an opportunity to 
recover meaning, and humanity, enabling them to adapt to the demands of the social and 
cultural environment in which they live. We must provide this with transparency and from a 
positioŶ of ͚Ŷot-kŶoǁiŶg͛, plaĐiŶg the iŶdiǀidual ǁith the ͚diagŶosis͛ as the eǆpeƌt; ǁhile 
balancing the political and economical demands of the UK health and social care system. 
Support must be sought from others attempting to do the same, for example user involvement 
groups who also face the difficulties of resisting a commonly held view (Miller & McClelland, 
2005).  
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In Chapter 4, I identified many questions raised by the discourses and their apparent 
ideological basis. These questions related to the underlying philosophy of the medical model 
approach to mental health and BPD in particular. Western philosophy is founded on Aristolean 
formal logic (Peng & Nesbit, 1999), and is apparent within my discussion of the dominant 
discourses. This provides the basis upon which the majority of our scientific paradigms are 
based and also underscores the folk wisdom of our culture, as identified by Peng and Nesbit 
(1999). Formal logic involves three principles, the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction 
and the law of the excluded middle. Essentially the law of identify states that regardless of 
context if something is true it will remain true; the law of non-contradiction states that 
regardless of context if something is true it cannot also be false; and the law of the excluded 
middle states that there is no middle ground, a truth can only be a truth it cannot be part 
truth. Applying this to the dominant discourses it can be seen, perhaps, why we have, as yet, 
been unable to move beyond the pejorative connotations of BPD as a diagnosis. If somebody 
has a ͚disoƌdeƌed peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ theǇ ĐaŶŶot also haǀe a ͚ŶoŶ-disoƌdeƌed peƌsoŶalitǇ͛; if 
soŵeďodǇ has a ͚disoƌdeƌed peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ this ǁill ďe the case regardless of situational context 
oƌ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt; if soŵeďodǇ has a ͚disoƌdeƌed peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ theǇ ĐaŶŶot also ďe ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛.  
 
As such when we try to eliminate contradiction within our culture by reducing our 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg to ͚tƌuths͛ aŶd ďǇ ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe ͚ƌight͛ aŶd ͚ǁƌoŶg͛, ǁe aĐt to ďƌeak the ƌules of 
dialectics. So in relation to the blame discourse the difficulty that participants have in resolving 
the dilemmas, and how they are positioned, we can understand in relation to formal logic. 
Both mental health professionals, and those for whom they provide a service, struggle in the 
absence of alternative theses to resist formal logic and accept that an individual can be 
͚disoƌdeƌed͛ iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐoŶteǆts aŶd Ŷot otheƌs, that ďoth ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶal and 
seƌǀiĐe useƌ Đould ďe ĐoƌƌeĐt aŶd ǁƌoŶg at the saŵe tiŵe; ďe ͚iŶ ĐoŶtƌol͛ aŶd ͚out of ĐoŶtƌol͛ at 
the same time. Similarly, in regard to stigma discourse we are unable to see an individual as 
both different and the same as everybody else; dangerous to themselves and not to anybody 
else. With regard to recovery discourse, we struggle to determine whether somebody has 
͚ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛ fƌoŵ a pƌoďleŵ Đƌeated ǁithiŶ a soĐial aŶd Đultuƌal ĐoŶteǆt, ǁheŶ poteŶtiallǇ 
being moved to a different social and cultural ĐoŶteǆt Đould ͚Đuƌe͛ theŵ oǀeƌŶight of the 
͚sǇŵptoŵs͛ of the disoƌdeƌ.  
 
B.5.4  Considering the research question  
IŶ B.Ϯ.Ϯ I ideŶtifǇ ŵǇ ĐuƌiositǇ as to ǁhǇ ͚tƌeatŵeŶt did Ŷot ǁoƌk͛, ǁhetheƌ this ǁas as a ƌesult 
of the way that individuals were constructed and positioned by mental health services, 
whether their positioning resulted in a reciprocal response in ways expected of them dictated 
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by the label construction of BPD; whether this label was in fact preventing them from 
experiencing and being in the world in alternative ways. I believe the answer to this is 
dialectical and thus not reducible to simple affirmation or disconfirmation. Discourse and 
subject positions are complex and multi-layered. However, by understanding how the BPD 
diagnosis is constructed by those who are diagnosed, and how they are positioned by it, can 
provide important information about their being in the world, informing interventions. When 
ǁe ĐoŶsideƌ that the ŵost effeĐtiǀe ͚tƌeatŵeŶts͛ of BPD haǀe ďeeŶ fouŶd to ďe those that 
employ dialectical principles, it would suggest that perhaps we could enable people to find an 
answer to the enigma of BPD not in reducing the problem but in thinking holistically about it 
and moving away from formal logic. The point remains that by attempting to reduce BPD to 
neuroscience, biology, genetics, developmental trauma, or psychology, we have been unable 
to account for it; this presents the prospect that it is perhaps not a reducible construct, if it 
exists as a construct at all.  
 
B.5.5   Evaluating the research for quality 
As identified in B.3.7, qualitative research requires different criteria for the consideration of 
quality to that of quantitative research employing positivist paradigms. As such Henwood and 
Pidgeon (1992) and Elliott, Fisher and Rennie (1999) have outlined frameworks for determining 
quality. Wodak and Meyer (2009) identify that CDA has not specifically addressed the issue of 
quality beyond that identified by other qualitative methodologies more generally, for which 
Silverman (1993) has proposed a framework. Taylor (2001) does, however, present suggested 
criteria for evaluation of research employing discourse analytic strategies. Therefore, my 
eǀaluatioŶ iŶĐoƌpoƌates aspeĐts fƌoŵ eaĐh of these authoƌs͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌks.  
 
The CDA appƌoaĐh iŶǀolǀes ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the ͚soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ǁithiŶ its soĐial, Đultuƌal, histoƌiĐal 
context with regard to other published work and research findings within different disciplines. 
I have attempted to consider my findings within the broader arena of social and psychological 
study, referring to social anthropology, philosophy, sociology, political theory, cultural theory, 
psychiatry, social psychiatry in addition to psychology and lay theories of personality and 
disorder. This meant considering the analysis from outside of the discipline of psychology. 
Reference to previously published work enabled me to identify any confirmation or 
disconfirmation of my findings. I also spent time discussing my analysis with my supervisor for 
the purposes of credibility of my suggestions. This led to further confirmation and 
disconfirmation throughout the process. Due to the complexity of the analysis I did not think 
that it would be appropriate to apply further triangulation by verifying my analysis with the 
participants after completion. However, as identified in the B.3.7 I checked my understanding 
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of their constructions by means of summary at the end of each interview, and the participants 
had the opportunity to correct any misunderstandings or misinterpretations.  
 
As identified by Fairclough (2003) reflexivity of the researcher within CDA is crucial. While it 
ƌeŵaiŶs the Đase that oŶe ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ ďe ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ as defiŶed ďǇ positiǀisŵ, ďeĐause the 
researcher will be influenced by their own ideologies and beliefs (Wodak & Meyer, 2009), it is 
possible to identify these so that the reader of analysis can determine credibility. Throughout 
the research I have made reference to my own positioning. I continue to believe that labelling 
when used ineffectively is unhelpful and unnecessary, acting as a mode of social order. 
However, I do also believe that when used in an effective way it can be beneficial and offer 
individuals the opportunity to move beyond the label. As a member of society and the mental 
health community I am also subject to the prevalent ideologies and beliefs of the dominant 
discourses. Therefore, in examining the problem of BPD I am positioned as an insider of those 
communities and as such in critiquing the common sense views and methods of operation I am 
also critiquing myself.  
 
I have tried to be explicit in documenting how I conducted my analysis and created a paper 
trail of analysis including extracts, which would enable others to clearly identify how I reached 
the conclusions that I did, as such they would be able to carry out further analysis on the data 
and identify any discrepancies. With regard to completeness, due to time restrictions and the 
degree of fine analysis required of CDA, I believe that had I continued to analyse the data I 
would have found more constructions and discourses potentially. However, the dominant 
discourses would remain with perhaps sub-dominant discourses being revealed. As such 
completeness has been achieved with regard to identifying the dominant discourses.  Within 
the analysis I looked for the deviant cases or the disconfirming evidence of discourses and 
have referred to these within the analysis. 
 
What remains is the fact that this is my interpretation of the data, my social construction of 
social constructions, as identified by Burr (2003) this is an inherent problem with any social 
constructionist account. However, I believe that while I do not propose to have provided the 
͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ ǁaǇ of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the disĐouƌse of iŶdiǀiduals of BPD, I do ďelieǀe that 
encouraging practitioners to consider different constructions and the impact of these on the 
individual will enhance the humanity within mental health communities. As such the 
information is transferable in suggesting ways in which we as mental health professionals act 
to position individuals through our language, ignorant perhaps of the ideologies we are 
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enacting, and consequently while best intentioned may inevitably act to maintain people in 
the roles and positions they are placed in as a result of a dialectical process.  
 
B.5.6  Limitations and future research 
The outcomes of this research identify the dominant discourses present within the talk of 8 
individuals with a diagnosis of BPD. A commonality of the 8 participants was the extra-
discursive experience of childhood trauma; two of the participants mentioned having received 
additional diagnoses of PTSD. As such it is possible that the dominant discourses could be 
dialectically related to the experience of trauma, with blame and recovery being common 
themes within research and practice related to these types of experiences. Therefore, further 
research investigating the influence of such extra-discursive events upon discourse and subject 
positions could usefully inform understandings of possible differences between those receiving 
the diagnosis with and without the experience of developmental trauma. While also an 
alternative research design or methodology may investigate the extent to which these 
dominant discourses are apparent within the talk of individuals diagnosed with other mental 
health problems, society more generally, and amongst mental health professionals.  
 
All the participants were aware of my professional role and as such I was positioned by them in 
ǀaƌǇiŶg ǁaǇs ƌelated to this ƌole. I ǁas peƌhaps positioŶed as ͚all-kŶoǁiŶg͛, ͚suppoƌteƌ͛, 
͚ŵeŶtal health pƌofessioŶal͛, ǁithiŶ theiƌ disĐuƌsiǀe ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs. This, considering my 
epistemological stance, would suggest that however I posed questions their positioning of me 
will have influenced their discourse. This genre is reminiscent of other genres which they may 
have experienced such as different types of mental health appointments, and as such can 
provide useful information. However, as individuals intentionally construct talk according to 
the social and cultural context and the purpose of the talk (Cheek, 2004); one might consider 
that if this interaction had occurred between two individuals with the diagnosis of BPD the 
discourse and positioning may have been different. Emancipatory research, as proposed by 
Ramon et al. (2000) and Castillo, Allen and Warner (2000), may usefully investigate this.   
 
B.5.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The foundation for this research was established from my experience of working within a 
residential therapeutic community. Within this setting individuals whose lives were disrupted 
to such an extent that they were prevented from functioning in accordance with soĐietǇ͛s ƌules 
and norms, were supported through a socially designed environment of attachment, 
containment, communication, inclusion and agency (Haigh, 1999). This enabled them to 
develop more adaptive functioning such that they could achieve social goals and gain a sense 
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of self. This represented a highly contrastive approach to that which I later experienced 
working in the community. Individuals with the same problems were here considered 
manipulative, attention-seeking, and treatment resistant. I set out to investigate why this was 
the case and to identify the potential impact.  
 
Within the introduction I identified the problems of the BPD diagnosis; the dilemmas regarding 
aetiology, theory, treatment and diagnostic validity, and the tendency to use the diagnosis 
pejoratively. A range of theories about BPD and its aetiology have been proposed, however, 
most authors prominent within the field generally agree that it will most likely involve a 
complex interaction of biological, psychological, social, cultural and historical factors. Further, 
the lack of agreement with regard to treatment resulted in the creation of NCCMH (2009) 
guidelines being produced. However, there remains a significant gap within the evidence-base 
for BPD, too many questions and too few answers continue to exist. Thereby, further research 
is required, irrespective of the ultimate fate of the diagnosis as a valid construct.   
 
The purpose of the research was to identify dominant discourses within the talk of individuals 
diagnosed with BPD, which may indicate the reasons for mental health services assuming them 
to be unresponsive to treatment and perceiving them negatively; furthermore, to identify 
possibilities for navigating a path around the problem. Upon completing my analysis I 
determined three dominant discourses to be present: blame, stigma and recovery; functioning 
dialectically to construct borderline personality disorder as an enigma. In-depth analysis 
revealed the underlying dominant ideological values of these discourses, and those upon 
which UK enterprise capitalism is founded, to be: individualism, responsibility, tradition and 
anti-welfare. These ideologies inherently impact upon the provision of mental health services. 
The identified values support a system concerned with economic growth and productivity, 
requiring individuals to be responsible and self-interested. The current dominant scientific 
paradigms of truth and knowledge, those of positivism, essentialism, naturalism, and 
reductionism, support enterprise capitalism by denying or omitting to consider the 
involvement of social factors in psychological functioning and well-being. Nonetheless, what 
we consider at the current time to be psychological problems are socially constructed. The 
problems are ĐoŶsideƌed to ͚eǆist͛ by systems designed to support the political ideology and 
economic goals and consequently, require a relentless search for tangible evidence of the 
causal factors of BPD necessarily located within the individual, in the absence of conclusive 
evidence it is an implied assumption indicating it has not yet been identified, these 
assumptions are founded in Aristolean laws of formal logic. As such a boundary is created 
ďetǁeeŶ the ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aŶd the ͚aďŶoƌŵal͛ as determined by society and culture and anchored 
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historically, such that these entities will inevitably change over time with new knowledge and 
cultural shifts.  As a consequence, the BPD diagnosis was originally constructed as a way of 
separating that which could not be understood within the traditional paradigms, individuals 
who appeared to act out against social norms and rules were considered in need of social 
control; this has remained as part of the dominant ideology.  
 
Enigma in this research was constructed through a number of dominant discourses: blame, 
stigma and recovery; these discourses and the discursive constructions contained within them 
identify struggles against the prevailing ideologies and provide information with regard to 
potential ways around the problem. Individuals with BPD diagnoses demonstrate dialectical 
dilemmas with regard to the positioning of: blame – individual or social; stigma – normal or 
abnormal; recovery – permanent or temporary. My findings identify each of these social 
constructions acts to position the individual such that hegemony is maintained. Many 
individuals are then unable to position themselves differently due to the perceived power of 
the dominant groups, and thereby, a perpetuating cycle of non-recovery is enacted with the 
individual considered manipulative, attention-seeking, and treatment resistant. Despite 
attempts by some including: service user groups and national organisations, guidance 
documents and local/national campaigns, the problems for individuals classified as BPD 
nonetheless at the current time remain the same.  
 
In order to navigate the problem and address some of these issues, while maintaining a 
realism about our ability to change societal norms and rules, I was able to identify a number of 
possibilities. These included: a move towards more systems-focused approaches to working 
with individuals including narrative therapy; use of comprehensive formulations rather than 
relying on diagnosis alone, or even at all; creation of more mini-therapeutic communities 
addressing problems both socially and individually to prevent upwards reductionism; the 
importance of continued research exploring qualitative approaches to understanding; 
alternative positioning of the role of the psychiatrist; the consideration of parallel processes 
amongst staff and the promotion of the same five therapeutic community principles as 
identified as important for clients within staff teams (Haigh, 2004). In addition the importance 
of mental health professionals presenting themselves as non-experts was identified and the 
ability and willingness to reflect on their own internal processes is essential (Rigby and 
Longford, 2004). Furthermore, the dominant discourses and the construction of BPD as an 
enigma, does impact significantly upon individuals creating uncertainty, dialectical dilemmas, 
and confusion. Unless we address and challenge these discourses; and unmask the enigma as 
aŶ aĐtual laĐk of ͚kŶoǁledge͛ aďout the ĐoŶstƌuĐt of BPD theŶ those diagŶosed as such will 
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continue to report being devalued and dehumanised, with personal meaning being dismissed. 
Counselling psychology with its foundations in humanistic principles and emphasis upon 
subjectivity and meaning; along with its integration of scientist-practitioner and reflectionist-
practitioner, provides a perfect backdrop against which to develop some of the suggested 
alternatives for navigating the problem of borderline personality disorder.   
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C: Professional Practice 
Working with trauma: the importance of the therapeutic alliance in both primary and 
secondary care contexts 
C.1  Introduction 
From primary care to secure setting, my doctoral studies have provided me with a spectrum of 
presenting problems within which to develop as a counselling psychologist. Throughout this 
experience the lifetime prevalence of trauma amongst the individuals I have encountered has 
been striking. Beyond the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as identified by 
Lindy and Wilson (2004), trauma has been manifest in ways as unique as the individual. 
Considering this within individual conceptualisations and formulations has been crucial to the 
outcome of interventions and essential to the therapeutic process, as identified by Pearlman 
(2004). Due to varying service constraints, including limited timeframes, resource parameters, 
appƌoaĐh aŶd iŶdiǀidual͛s preferences, I have had to work flexibly and collaboratively with 
each client to identify appropriate and realistic goals for treatment, while also considering the 
empirical research base for effective practice with trauma. The reason I have selected the 
following two cases for my doctoral portfolio is because I believe that they represent 
important aspects of my practice development in relation to this.  
 
The cases highlight several key learning points including the importance of the therapeutic 
relationship iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of seƌǀiĐe ĐoŶstƌaiŶts; the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚ďeiŶg-in-ƌelatioŶ͛ ƌatheƌ 
than simply applying technological expertise of empirically validated treatment models, as 
discussed by Strawbridge and Wolfe (2003); and the importance of meaning and 
understanding for the client, enabling them to reconnect with their humanity and establish a 
way of being in the world which perhaps involves more adaptive functioning in keeping with 
their social and cultural contexts. Beginning by identifying the contexts of the cases I will then 
move on to explore each separately. At the end of this section I will draw the cases together by 
examining how further they have influenced my practice. 
 
 
Pages 178 – 192 have been removed from this Thesis for the purposes of sensitivity of client 
information. The full copy is available to view in hard copy at City University Library.  
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D: Critical Review of Literature 
Sifting through the fragments of complex trauma: Reviewing the advancement of effective 
practice in working with adult survivors of childhood abuse 
D.1  Introduction  
Incidence of childhood abuse is believed to be a greater problem in the UK than is reported 
(National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [NSPCC], 2007) with statistics as 
high as 38% estimated to experience at least one incident (Cawson, 2002). The NSPCC (2007) 
identified that 32,000 children across the UK were known to be at risk of harm. While not all 
will go on to develop problems associated with these experiences, research suggests that 
multiple incidents and prolonged abuse places individuals at risk of experiencing  mental 
health symptoms in adulthood including, but not limited to, posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and extending beyond this to self-regulation problems in all realms of functioning 
(Cloitre et al., 2009). Adult survivors of childhood abuse typically experience betrayals of trust 
within core attachment relationships with devastating effects (Paivio & Pascual-Leone, 2010). 
Van der Kolk (2009a) states that while this type of complex trauma, within psychiatric 
classification, does not exist; it is perhaps one of the most common psychological problems 
presenting to clinicians within therapeutic practice.  
 
This often results in complex diagnostic co-morbidity and confusion with regard to treatment 
protocols and sequencing. There is no clear understanding of which of the co-morbid 
diagnoses is the primary problem (Kilpatrick, 2005a). Furthermore, the effects of childhood 
trauma are often ignored or misdiagnosed (van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005). This acts to 
compound a lifetime of unimaginable trauma for survivors and in many cases repeats the 
abusive cycle (Dalenberg, 2004).  The United Kingdom Trauma Group (UKTG, 2009) identify 
that literature review is urgently needed to better define complex trauma and identify best 
practices to guide practitioners in its assessment and treatment. Without this consensus there 
is a risk of implementing unhelpful or harmful treatments (van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005; 
Wagner, Rizvi & Harned, 2007).   
 
The third edition of the Handbook of counselling psychology devotes two chapters to trauma 
(Wolfe, Strawbridge, Douglas & Dryden, 2010). This not only signifies further the prominence 
of the topic within the therapeutic field, but also its relevance within the discipline of 
counselling psychology. Both Jordan (2010) and Heller (2010), supporting their conclusions 
with empirical research, focus upon attachment relationships in the context of interpersonal 
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trauma, the importance of the therapeutic relationship, as well as the establishment of safety 
for client and therapist in the processing of traumatic experiences. 
 
Counselling psychology as a discipline draws upon a humanistic value base rather than a 
medical model, focusing upon well-being rather than illness (Strawbridge & Wolfe, 2010).  It 
seeks to integrate mainstream scientific psychology with counselling and psychotherapy, and 
as such brings together the positions of scientist-practitioner and reflective practitioner; 
further this offers a broader definition of evidence-based practice than conceived by a medical 
model of illness and treatment (Wolfe et al., 2010). It is about individuals, how they function in 
the world and the process of human interactions, it emphasises self-development and growth 
beyond the correction of symptoms (BPS, 2007). Thereby, counselling psychology brings a 
philosophical base which may be important for the effective and ethical treatment of 
individuals experiencing complex trauma, it also presents an alternative perspective from 
which to conceptualise and formulate, that is worthy of exploration.  
 
As identified by Kilpatrick (2005), the research area of trauma is now broad and fragmented, 
lacking the requisite depth at this point. Consequently, this review necessarily narrows the 
field to focus upon adult survivors of childhood abuse specifically, and aims to provide a brief 
informative overview of the current state of the field of study and what this suggests with 
regard to recommendations for best practice. Different conceptualisations of complex trauma 
and some of the resulting problems and challenges that this presents will be identified. 
Following this there will be an overview of current treatment approaches. Further this critical 
literature review seeks to bring together best practice guidance and recommendations, while 
also identifying how far the field has progressed in addressing complex trauma and how 
counselling psychology may contribute.  
D.2  Defining and conceptualising complex trauma in current practice 
Prevalence of childhood trauma amongst individuals seeking psychotherapy is estimated to be 
as high as 90% (Pilkington & Kremer, 1995); this means that within clinical settings most 
practitioners will work with childhood abuse survivors. At the current time the diagnosis 
directly pertaining to traumatic experiences within Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fourth edition text revision (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2000) is PTSD, the appropriateness of this diagnosis for adult survivors of childhood abuse will 
be discussed later. The diagnosis of PTSD originated mainly from studies of Vietnam War 
veterans and was included in DSM III in 1980 despite much earlier discoveries of the impact of 
psychological trauma, as highlighted by Brewin (2003). Most recent estimates of the 
prevalence of PTSD are based mainly upon US statistics, they suggest a lifetime prevalence of 
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5-12% (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson, 1995; Lee & Young, 2001); while 93% of 
the population, according to a review by Lee and Young (2001) may have experienced a 
traumatic event during their lifetime.  
 
Courtois (2004), Ford and Courtois (2009a) and Paivio and Pascual-Leone (2010) identify that 
the intrusive re-experiencing; avoidance and numbing; and hyperarousal; characteristic of a 
PTSD diagnosis are not a defining feature of complex trauma.  US statistics suggest that 80% of 
clients with a PTSD diagnosis will also have another Axis I diagnosis, and many will also have 
Axis II diagnoses (Kessler et al., 1995). Major depression, substance use and anxiety appear to 
be the most commonly co-occurring Axis I diagnoses ;Cƌeaŵeƌ & O͛DoŶŶell, ϮϬϬϮͿ; ďut 
psychosis and bipolar affective disorder also occur (Mueser et al., 1998).  Self-harm, eating 
disorders and substance use also appear in those with child abuse histories particularly at an 
early age, indicative of self-regulation attempts (van der Kolk, 1996). Problems with affect 
regulation; dissociation; interpersonal relationships; unexplained physical problems (van der 
Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday & Spinazzola, 2005); reduced global functioning; and 
environmental problems are also evident (Bremner et al., 1995). In addition to these the DSM-
IV trials demonstrated that individuals may also experience problems with self-perception; 
hopelessness and inability to think about the future (van der Kolk et al., 2005).  This results in 
diagnostic difficulties and complexities in identifying effective treatment paths.  Consequently, 
Lasiuk and Hegadoren (2006) explore the concept of a trauma spectrum to conceptualise and 
understand the impacts of different types of traumatic experiences rather than single 
diagnostic categories.  
 
Most commonly survivors with the worst histories of childhood abuse have found themselves 
diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), Somatisation Disorder or Multiple 
Personality Disorder (this has been replaced in DSM-IV by Dissociative Identity Disorder) 
(Herman, 1992). These labels are often considered pejorative and notoriously create stigma. 
Herman (1992) suggested that the problems with identity, interpersonal relationships, 
psychosomatic representations and dissociation, prompting these diagnoses are in fact 
features of complex trauma. In BPD incidence of childhood trauma has been found to be as 
high as 75% (Wagner & Linehan, 2006; Zanarini et al., 1997).  Herman (2009) identifies that the 
similarities between complex trauma presentations and BPD presentations are becoming more 
and more apparent, having first been suggested several decades ago by Herman, Perry and van 
der Kolk (1989), as such there may exist similarities between effective treatment approaches.  
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Due to the extent of co-morbidity and diagnostic difficulties impacting upon the establishment 
of effective treatment, van der Kolk (2009a) argues for a separate diagnostic category for 
complex trauma in adults – Disorders of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified (DESNOS) or 
complex PTSD (Herman, 1992) – to enable a more focused effort on scientific and systematic 
study of the problem, enabling more rapid developments in understanding and treatment. 
DESNOS, developmental trauma disorder (children) and complicated grief disorder are all 
being considered by the APA (2010) as new trauma-related diagnoses for inclusion in DSM-5. 
DESNOS was originally considered in DSM-IV (APA, 1994) field trials but, despite what Herman 
(2009) describes as compelling evidence, the APA were uncertain whether the additional 
features were a more severe form of PTSD rather than a separate diagnosis (Roth, Newman, 
Pelcovitz, van der Kolk & Mandel, 1997). The APA also considered the findings could not be 
generalised to men as women were over-represented in the sample. Furthermore, Herman 
(2009) suggested that the classification grouping for the diagnosis could not be agreed, and 
heŶĐe ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed ͚Ŷot to fit͛. TheƌeďǇ, the deĐisioŶ ǁas takeŶ to iŶĐoƌpoƌate the 
additional features with the PTSD diagnosis. However, one may consider that the possibility of 
belonging to multi-classification groups indicates the fundamental and far-reaching impact of 
childhood abuse on development and adulthood. Since 1994 support for the diagnosis of 
DESNOS/Complex PTSD has grown (Courtois, 2004). Van der Kolk and Courtois (2005) identify 
approximately thirty studies providing evidence and a number of psychometric tests. However, 
Kilpatrick (2005a) disagrees suggesting that the construct and specificity of DESNOS has yet to 
be validated sufficiently to justify its inclusion as a separate diagnostic category.  
 
As such there are innumerable ways of classifying and conceptualising the problems 
experienced by adult survivors of childhood abuse. The holistic view taken by counselling 
psychology and the principle-driven philosophy focusing upon well-being, growth and 
development provide alternative conceptualisations in the absence of diagnosis, and require 
identification of strengths and adaptive functioning within malfunctioning contexts. As Ford 
and Courtois (2009a) suggest the core issues of complex psychological trauma arising from 
prolonged harm during crucial childhood development phases will remain the same 
irrespective of the specific diagnosis or conceptualisation. This will likely include addressing 
difficulties with emotional regulation, dissociative experiences, somatic difficulties, halted 
development of self, and problems in attachment relationships.  
D.3  Problems and challenges in the treatment of complex trauma 
As previously identified some of the major difficulties experienced by complex trauma 
sufferers include an inability to regulate emotions, to describe verbally what they feel or 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe, aŶd to ďe ͚soothed͛ ďǇ Đaƌe giǀiŶg figuƌes, due to aŶ iŶappƌopƌiate leǀel of Đare 
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during child development (van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005). Luxenberg, Spinazzola, Hidalgo, 
Hunt and van der Kolk (2001) identify additional issues of trust which disrupt relationships and 
arise from individuals fearing themselves to be beyond understanding and value; further they 
fear mistreatment and so create protective interpersonal barriers to prevent this. This results 
in difficulties establishing relationships with mental health providers leading to attrition from 
treatment services and revolving-door care, with mental health systems often being 
considered to re-enact the abusive experiences (Herman, 1992). 
 
In order to break this cycle, childhood trauma needs to be recognised and effective treatments 
offered which seek to change the experiencing of the individual (van der Kolk, 1996), as well as 
increasing understanding and changing perceptions of clients (Chaikin & Prout, 2004; Enns, et 
al., 1998). However, presentation to services with severe mental health symptoms may 
seriously obscure the presence of trauma and increase treatment resistance as a result 
(Chaikin & Prout, 2004). Treatment approach often also depends on whether trauma is 
accepted as the underlying problem (van der Kolk, 1996). In addition manifestations of 
complex trauma also occur which are below diagnostic thresholds (Ford & Courtois, 2009b), 
consequently excluding people from treatment when diagnostic systems are applied.  
 
There is also the risk of metaphorical blindness that can occur with serial treatment (Ford & 
Courtois, 2009b); failing to see the bigger picture and the interconnection of problems due to 
attending too closely to discrete categories of symptoms. For example suicidality is not a 
diagnosing feature of PTSD; however, it is often a significant problem in complex trauma. Foa, 
Keane and Friedman (2000) suggest clients should be hospitalised to manage risk. However, 
this has implications for survivors of childhood abuse that may fear locked environments. 
Kilpatrick (2005a) argues that attending to the trauma issues may in itself resolve the 
secondary co-morbid diagnoses, if posttraumatic stress is the central issue. As such the 
treatment of choice, according to Foa et al. (2000), should be one that addresses all problems, 
rather than serialisation (e.g. Shalev, Friedman, Foa & Keane, 2000). Furthermore 
indiscriminate application of CBT to survivors of childhood trauma may have detrimental 
effects if conducted without regard to safety or emotional regulation capabilities (Courtois, 
2004).    
 
A further problem within clinical practice is the interpretation of research findings due to 
definitions of childhood abuse; particularly in research emanating from the US and Canada 
childhood abuse is defined by the presence of sexual or physical acts, with maltreatment 
defining other types of abuse. Ford and Courtois (2009a) suggest that while emotional abuse 
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aŶd ŶegleĐt ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe ͚life-thƌeateŶiŶg͛ as defiŶed ďǇ the Đƌiteƌia of D“M-IV-TR (APA, 2000) it 
nonetheless has a far-reaching and devastating effect on the development of adaptive 
functioning and selfhood arising from subtlety of these experiences (Paivio & Pascual-Leone, 
2010). Furthermore, complex trauma is often a specific exclusion criterion within PTSD 
treatment studies (Gringrich, 2009). Thereby, when considering the empirical base it is 
important to consider these definitions and the potential implications of these for interpreting 
efficacy (e.g. Cloitre et al., 2009). 
 
Current drivers in the treatment of psychological problems are economic efficiency and 
increased productivity evident in such policies as Improving Access to Psychological Therapies 
(IAPT) (Strawbridge & Wolfe, 2010). Within a cost and target driven political climate it is 
obviously important that treatment is cost and resource effective. However, this does not 
necessarily mean treating the symptoms in the fastest time possible irrespective of outcome 
which appears to be how the policies have been interpreted locally; furthermore for this 
particular client group this is unlikely to be possible. As such the focus on rapid treatment and 
outcomes measured by employment figures places those with histories of severe and chronic 
childhood trauma at risk of being underserved by such policies, or being harmed further due to 
inappropriate treatment.   
D.4  Current position of treatment for traumatic experiences 
Globally a number of bodies have identified treatment recommendations for PTSD including 
the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS, Foa et al., 2000); the US 
department of Veteran Affairs (VA, 2004); Northern Ireland Health Service (CREST, 2003); the 
APA (2004); National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2005); and the 
Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health (ACPMH, 2007). Despite the inclusion of 
complex trauma under associated features of PTSD (APA, 2000) the empirical research base 
predominantly involves approaches to the treatment of PTSD not complex trauma. No formal 
guidelines on the treatment of complex trauma have been produced, although a number of 
suggested theories, books, chapters, articles pertain to treatment (Ford & Courtois, 2009a).  
 
As a result work has been undertaken to determine whether the recommended treatments for 
PTSD are appropriate for adult survivors of childhood abuse (van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005). 
Spinazzola, Blaustein and van der Kolk (2005) report that within the ISTSS practice guidelines 
(Foa et al., 2000) only 2 of the 34 studies reviewed focused on childhood sexual abuse and no 
studies focused on other types of sustained childhood trauma. Treatment approaches for 
survivors of childhood abuse appear, for the most part, to have been extrapolated from 
research conducted with rape survivors. However, Chard (2005) found rape survivors do not 
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demonstrate the same interpersonal relationship or social adjustment problems. Cloitre et al. 
(2009) have also identified significant differences in clinical profiles between survivors of 
childhood and adult trauma. Further, Moller (2002) found poorer treatment outcomes in cases 
with familial childhood abuse.  
 
D.4.1  PTSD treatment and complex trauma 
NICE (2005) and the ISTSS (Foa et al., 2000) recommend the use of trauma-focused cognitive 
behavioural therapy (TF-CBT) or trauma-focused eye movement desensitisation and 
reprocessing (EMDR), as the first-line interventions with PTSD. The NICE TF-CBT group of 
interventions included: prolonged exposure; image habituation training; imaginal flooding 
therapy; imaginal exposure and biofeedback-assisted desensitisation treatment; cognitive 
processing therapy; cognitive-behavioural treatment; cognitive therapy for PTSD; cognitive 
restructuring plus exposure; cognitive restructuring; cognitive trauma therapy and brief 
eclectic psychotherapy. Evidently there is significant variation in the techniques used; had the 
groups been split into specific techniques, some TF-CBT treatments may have been identified 
as less effective than others. For example stress management techniques, which are used 
frequently within CBT, were treated as a separate analysis group and were found to be less 
efficacious than other TF-CBT techniques.  
 
Within the review by NICE (2005) there were also few studies available for determining 
efficacy of non-TF-CBT interventions, and so are not indicated within the recommendations. 
Overall there appears also to have been limited attention to the reasons for non-completion of 
treatment; or the characteristics of the non-completers. Consequently, it is possible that these 
were individuals with more prolonged and repetitive trauma who were unable to tolerate the 
treatments (Bisson et al., 2007; Spinazzola et al., 2005). Furthermore, future research needs to 
be conducted regarding the application of the recommended treatments in clinical settings 
;NICE, ϮϬϬϱͿ. While ‘CT͛s ĐaŶ deŵoŶstƌate iŶteƌŶal ǀaliditǇ, theiƌ stƌiĐt paƌaŵeteƌs foƌ 
inclusion and exclusion can result in questionable external validity. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, further research has lent support to the effectiveness of trauma-focused 
interventions (Dorahy, 2006); with prolonged exposure and cognitive therapy having been 
shown to be the most effective (Bryant, Moulds, Guthrine, Dang & Nixon, 2003; Creamer & 
O͛DoŶŶell, ϮϬϬϮ; Kiŵďle, ‘iggs & KeaŶe, ϭϵϵϵ; TaǇloƌ et al., ϮϬϬϯͿ Hoǁeǀeƌ, the saŵples 
appear to be unrepresentative regarding socio-economic status and there is still limited 
consideration of attrition.  
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With regard to EMDR, the role of rapid eye movements has been questioned (Chemtob, Tolin, 
van der Kolk & Pitman, 2000; Hembree & Foa, 2003). Shapiro (2001), its founder, maintains 
that the eye movements in EMDR are an essential part of the treatment. However, there is 
suggestion that the other elements of EMDR are inherently similar to those of TF-CBT and that 
it is these that make the treatment efficacious (Davidson & Parker, 2001). There is also 
conflicting evidence for treatment efficacy of EMDR compared to TF-CBT. Some studies have 
found EMDR to be comparable to TF-CBT in reducing symptoms, while others have found TF-
CBT to be more efficacious (Zayfert & Becker, 2007). Devilly and Spence (1999) found that the 
treatment effects of EMDR were not long-lasting and had dropped at follow-up.  
 
As is apparent the majority of recommended empirically-based techniques for PTSD treatment 
focus on behavioural elements of anxiety and avoidance. This disregards the involvement of 
other precipitating and maintaining factors (Kimble, et al., 1999). For example: van der Kolk 
(1996) suggests the importance of secure attachment in modulating the effects of trauma. 
Children who have not developed a secure attachment due to abusive or neglectful parenting 
tend to lack abilities in self-regulation. This leads to problems with over arousal, attention 
difficulties and inability to attend to most appropriate stimuli (van der Kolk, 1996). Further, 
Ford and Kidd (1998) identify that PTSD treatment outcome in those who have difficulty with 
self-regulation is poor. Kilpatrick (2005) and van der Kolk (1996) identify that further research 
is needed to identify the relative use of self-regulation training in the treatment of complex 
trauma. Luxenberg et al. (2001) identify that we do not yet know whether exposure techniques 
will be empirically validated as important within the treatment of complex trauma, although 
high dropout rates and continued presence of symptoms following treatment, suggest that TF-
CBT alone may not be enough. Overall PTSD treatments adapted for use with complex trauma 
presentations lack empirical–validation (Ford & Courtois, 2009b), further research is necessary 
to identify the effectiveness, efficacy and economics of these adaptations.  
 
D.4.2  Specific complex trauma treatment approaches 
Cloitre, Koenen, Cohen and Han (2002) published the first childhood abuse treatment outcome 
RCT. They received criticism for this research, from Cahill, Zoellner, Feeny and Riggs (2004), on 
the basis of not providing evidence that actually tested their hypotheses. This study trialled a 
new sequential treatment approach employing skills training in affective and interpersonal 
regulation (STAIR) with Imaginal Exposure (IE)
9
 tested against waiting list controls to determine 
whether the treatment was effective for working with adult survivors of child abuse. They 
found it was effective in improving mood regulation, interpersonal skills and PTSD symptoms, 
although comparison with other treatments was not undertaken (Cloitre, Stovall-McClough & 
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Levitt, 2004a). As this group of clients are thought to fair less well with exposure therapies, as 
concurred by Cahill et al. (2004), the first stage was considered to improve outcomes through 
development of self-regulation skills. However, the study did not include those with BPD, 
current substance abuse issues, suicidal ideation or severe mental health problems.  
 
McDonagh et al. (2005) conducted an RCT comparing TF-CBT, with present centred therapy 
(PCT) a problem-solving therapy, and waiting list controls in adult female survivors of sexual 
abuse, both were found to be effective in reducing the severity of PTSD symptoms and anxiety, 
ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to ƌeseaƌĐheƌs͛ eǆpeĐtatioŶs. While the TF-CBT group appeared to demonstrate more 
change at follow-up, there was a much higher dropout rate, 41% compared to 9% for PCT; 
further those undergoing PCT maintained treatment improvements at 6 month follow-up. 
Analysis of the attrition statistics suggests that those with characteristics diagnosable as 
personality disorders were most likely to dropout of the TF-CBT treatment group compared to 
waiting list or PCT suggesting that PCT would be a better alternative for those at risk of drop-
out; however, this requires further study. In addition those who dropped out of the TF-CBT 
group had increased severity of other symptoms, suggesting treatment outcome co-morbidity 
effects and the importance of treatment formulations which consider the whole person. Also 
this study excluded those with severe and enduring mental health problems, substance use 
problems and medical problems, all of which are of high incidence in this clinical group. In 
addition the usefulness of the results is limited due to the lack of representation with regard to 
socio-economic status. The sample was composed mainly of well-educated, employed, middle-
class females who experienced multiple child traumas.  
  
Callahan (2004) conducted a review of empirically tested group-based interpersonal-
psychodynamic therapies with survivors of childhood sexual abuse indicating promising 
results. Similarly, in a review of 6 uncontrolled and 7 controlled group treatments for female 
adult survivors of sexual abuse, Kessler, White and Nelson (2003) found these treatments may 
be helpful in reducing PTSD symptoms. However, the results require replication to address 
methodological problems of the earlier studies included in the review.  
 
Previously it had been suggested that group work may be a useful social support structure for 
individual therapy (Enns et al., 1998). Consequently, Chard (2005) conducted the first 
combined individual and group cognitive processing therapy RCT with adult survivors of child 
sexual abuse. They hypothesised that the combination treatment would reduce the number of 
dropouts due to the availability of support, in group sessions, and individual processing time 
for exposure exercises. Exclusions from the study included current suicidal intent, current 
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trauma, current substance dependence and other pressing serious medical conditions. Over 
half the sample participants reported over 100 incidents of abuse in childhood. Treatment 
lasted for 17 weeks and included a 90 minute group each week and an individual 60 minute 
session each week with one of the group facilitators for the first 9 weeks and the 17th week. 
The findings of this study suggest that this adapted form of Cognitive Processing Therapy for 
child sexual abuse survivors may be an effective treatment. Of the clients completing 
treatment most demonstrated clinically important changes in severity of PTSD symptoms, 
depression and dissociation and no client experienced symptoms worsening. However, it is 
unclear how important the group itself was in producing the results as no comparison study 
has yet been completed. Internal validity was limited by participant numbers (N=71) and lack 
of ethnic diversity. Further, it is also unclear what role therapeutic alliance played in these 
results, the study also did not report the attrition rates, only stating that it was lower than for 
other studies.  
 
DBT has been proposed as a potential treatment given the empirical evidence for effectiveness 
with BPD and the high incidence of childhood trauma amongst those individuals receiving the 
diagnosis (Wagner & Linehan, 2006; Wagner et al., 2007). However, it has not been validated 
specifically with adult survivors of complex trauma. Earlier, Cornell and Olio (1991) presented a 
model involving working with deǀelopiŶg the suƌǀiǀoƌ͛s aďilitǇ to toleƌate affeĐt ǁithout deŶial 
or dissociation. The model provides a clear theory of how this process could work; however, it 
lacks the manualised approach that would lend itself to rigorous empirical testing. Paivio and 
Pascual-Leone (2010) suggest that Emotion-focused therapy for trauma (EFTT) at the time of 
writing was the only evidence-based treatment for males and females across all types of 
childhood abuse experiences. EFTT, as described by Paivio and Pascual-Leone (2010), is a four-
phase theory and research based treatment for those identified as suitable for short-term 
trauma interventions, for example where there is no evidential suicide or self-harm risks. The 
resolution of damaged attachment relationships is the primary focus of the therapy. EFTT is 
proposed to assist individuals with difficulties in linguistically identifying emotions, also 
referred to as alexythymia (Paivio & Pascual-Leone, 2010). However, its validity with 
individuals presenting as high risk or otherwise unsuitable for short-term therapy is unclear.  
 
The relevance of attachment theory to problems of emotion regulation and perception of 
social support has been empirically validated (e.g. Cloitre, Stovall-McClough, Zorbas & 
Charuvastra, 2008). By implication this suggests that targeting insecure attachment styles may 
assist in improving functioning in these realms. Other treatment approaches based in 
alternative views of problem aetiology, for example Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) 
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based in behavioural theory, rather than attachment theory have also been proposed 
(Kohlenberg, Tsai & Kohlenberg, 2006). Further, Lee (2005) suggests the use of Compassion 
focused CBT; addressing shame which is often subtle and hidden, and may play a significant 
part in the maintenance of trauma states. In addition in the last 10 years approaches have 
began to look at the importance of the mind-body connection; that working with physical 
experiences in the body is central to recovery (e.g Emerson, Sharma, Chaudry & Turner, 2009; 
Levine, 1997; Rothschild, 2000; van der Kolk, 2009b). Other manualised treatments have also 
been validated for some co-ŵoƌďidities iŶĐludiŶg Najaǀits͛ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ “eekiŶg “afetǇ foƌ PT“D aŶd 
substance use; and Mueser, Rosenberg and Rosenberg (2009) cognitive restructuring program 
for PTSD in special populations.  
 
Many scientist-practitioners, those who have identified progress in the treatment of complex 
trauma (e.g. Chaikin and Prout, 2004; Courtois, 2004; Dorahy, 2006; Ford, Courtois, Steele, van 
der Hart & Nijenhuis, 2005; Kimble et al., 1999; van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005) recommend the 
use of a phased approach to treatment, although this approach remains largely the basis of 
clinical experience. The three phases identified by Herman (1992) are: 1) development of 
working alliance, stabilising and establishing safety, including psychoeducation and skills 
building, 2) processing of traumatic memories, and 3) life integration and relapse prevention 
skills. Proponents of this tripartite model suggest it can be utilised across all approaches to 
complex trauma treatment. The main focus being the acquiring of skills needed to be able to 
self-regulate affect. Further, Ford et al (2005) identify several treatments that have been 
manualised and tested for use with self-dysregulation and shown promising results with this 
treatment population. However, they identify within this phased model problems occur when 
trying to determine if a client is ready to move into phase 2.  
 
Reviewing the research base Courtois (2004) identifies that a range of theoretical approaches 
have been identified to be helpful, suggesting a transtheoretical conceptual model employing 
multi-modal approaches encompassing biopsychosocial and spiritual considerations. 
Treatment proposed by Courtois, and Pearlman and Courtois (2005), employs a whole person 
approach to traumatic experience, regarding the traumatic experience as part of the whole 
person rather than the whole person. Thereby, it is individualised according to the particular 
strengths and difficulties of the person. The model is further founded on the tripartite model 
and places overall emphasis on posttraumatic growth and improved life-functioning, with the 
aim of preventing the characteristic ongoing decline often seen in complex trauma cases. 
Courtois (2004) identifies that some individuals may never move beyond the first phase of 
treatment by necessity or choice.  
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The most promising treatments seem to require an ability to recognise the traumatised 
patieŶt͛s teŶdeŶĐǇ to re-enact abusive interpersonal relationships. The first task of therapy: to 
establish interpersonal safety in the relationship so that an individual may experience secure 
attachment and learn to self-regulate (van der Kolk, 1996). However, Luxenberg et al. (2001) 
comment on the importance of not only addressing safety and security problems 
behaviourally, but also to inquire and understand the significance of this for the individual, 
exploring personal meaning.  
 
D.4.3  The therapeutic relationship and complex trauma treatment 
Kilpatrick (2005b) suggests that within the traumatic stress field there has been little empirical 
focus on the impact of the therapeutic relationship, beyond clinical observation. NICE (2005) 
makes only brief reference to the impoƌtaŶĐe of a theƌapeutiĐ ƌelatioŶship statiŶg ͚…a good 
theƌapeutiĐ ƌelatioŶship is at tiŵes ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ the speĐifiĐ tƌeatŵeŶts offeƌed͛ ;p.ϮͿ. 
However, Cornell and Olio (1991) clearly identify the importance of the therapeutic 
relationship in mediating positive treatment outcomes. Furthermore, Herman (1992) identifies 
empowerment as a fundamental principle in the therapeutic healing relationship, while 
aǀoidiŶg teŵptatioŶ to tƌǇ to ͚fiǆ thiŶgs͛, a ŵediĐal ŵodel teŶdeŶĐǇ. The ƌole of theƌapist is iŶ 
encouraging clients to take control of their own lives (Enns et al., 1998). Cloitre, Stovall-
McClough and Chemtob (2004b) and Ford et al. (2005) also found the establishment of an 
early strong therapeutic alliance to be correlated with improvement of PTSD symptoms.  
However, it remains unclear what exact role the therapeutic relationship plays and requires 
further exploration (Kilpatrick, 2005a); possibly the reason for only brief mention by NICE 
(2005). 
 
Pearlman and Courtois (2005) advocate that the therapeutic relationship is essential for 
providing the basis for which the self and attachment problems can be addressed. Without 
resolving these issues they believe that change for the individual will be unlikely to progress 
beyond the amelioration of psychiatric symptoms and skills deficits. They place emphasis on 
the importance of the attachment bond in child development in the prevention of 
dysregulation, interpersonal problems and somatic expressions. They implicate these 
processes in dissociation and place emphasis on resolution through the therapeutic 
relationship. The theory remains untested but is well-founded in attachment theory, which is 
now beginning to converge within trauma research. Heller (2010) identifies the importance of 
the maternal role within attachment theory to enable a developing child to accomplish skills in 
ŵeŶtalisatioŶ, pƌoǀidiŶg a seĐuƌe ďase, eŵpathiĐ ĐapaĐitǇ, ƌefleĐtiǀe eŶgageŵeŶt aŶd ͚theoƌǇ 
of ŵiŶd͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe theŶ ƌefleĐted ǁithiŶ the Đhild. IŶ ŵaŶǇ ǁaǇs the theƌapeutiĐ ƌelationship 
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can be considered another opportunity in which this can occur (e.g Winnicott, 1960; Fonagy, 
2001). 
 
Further, Chaikin and Prout (2004) identify the important of being aware of transference and 
countertransference issues. The therapist must resist the urge to parent the survivor, instead 
providing a model for parenting the self. The therapist role is to encourage growth and change 
(Bratton, 1999). Herman (1992) describes complex transference reactions in cases of complex 
trauma involving dominance and submission, hope and fear, suspicion and faith, and distrust 
and trust. Additionally, the survivor has expeĐtatioŶs of peƌfeĐtioŶ iŶ this ͚life-saǀeƌ͛. HeƌŵaŶ 
also cautions that survivors of prolonged sexual abuse may believe that their only value, in an 
unbalanced power relationship, is as a sexual object; or the only way to please an abuser; or 
demonstrate gratitude. Consequently, the therapeutic relationship may be filled with sexual 
transference. Dalenberg (2004) also highlights the importance of being aware of 
countertransference of anger. The therapist needs to model effective anger expression in 
order to assist the client with interpersonal relationship development. This was evidenced 
thƌough iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg ŵaŶǇ ĐlieŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts of theƌapǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐes.  
 
In addition clients report finding the blank slate therapist dissatisfying, this suggests a need to 
take a different approach with this client group (Dalenberg, 2004). Without this, it seems the 
therapist is in danger of re-enacting the role of the disinterested, neglectful parent. Olio and 
Cornell (1993) identify that the blank slate therapist is unhelpful and punishing to adult 
survivors of childhood abuse reminiscent of earlier experiences of care-givers. They support 
the need for a different kind of therapeutic relationship providing a safe environment in which 
to experience secure attachment and develop self integration with affect. The therapist must 
aim to sensitively pass the power of the relationship back to the client (Bratton, 1999). This is 
also supported by Cloitre et al. (2004b).  
 
Further, Chaikin and Prout (2004) suggest that many clinicians underestimate the effect of 
heaƌiŶg aŶotheƌ͛s tƌauŵatiĐ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ;ĐouŶteƌtƌaŶsfeƌeŶĐeͿ. The theƌapist͛s aďilitǇ to self-
care is crucial in the process of treatment. Bratton (1999) highlights the importance of self-
care for the therapist of trauma survivors. Therapists are urged to care for themselves in the 
same way they encourage their clients to. The risk of vicarious traumatisation is high, even for 
the therapist skilled at separating client and personal feelings. In addition, therapists may find 
themselves isolated in an environment where colleagues lack understanding of the effects of 
captivity upon development (Herman, 1992). It is imperative that systems are in place to 
buffer the effects of traumatic transference and countertransference including therapist 
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supervision and support, therapeutic boundaries and goal setting (Herman, 1992). 
Countertransference may result in therapist feelings of incompetency, helplessness and 
hopelessness (Kimble et al., 1999). This can lead to acts of rescuing and advocacy.  
 
Traditionally, Cognitive Therapy has been thought to placate the issue of transference and 
countertransference in the methods employed in the approach (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 
1979). When problems occur the therapist challenges the underlying dysfunctional thinking, 
ǁith the aiŵ of ƌeplaĐiŶg it ǁith ŵoƌe fuŶĐtioŶal thiŶkiŶg. IŶ faĐt iŶ )aǇfeƌt aŶd BeĐkeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ 
CBT for PTSD manual barely mention issues of transference or countertransference. It is 
unclear whether this is due to the belief that, even when working with complex trauma, 
cognitive therapists are not susceptible to these issues or if it is simply omission. However, it 
seems incredulous to suggest that a cognitive therapist by virtue of their approach would be 
unsusceptible to vicarious traumatisation (countertransference). In fact to the client this may 
even present the similar problems to that of the psychoanalytic approach of blank slate.  
 
Wolf (2001) in describing her own experiences of therapy and childhood trauma states the 
importance of therapist self-aǁaƌeŶess iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide effeĐtiǀe ͚adult paƌeŶtiŶg͛. IŶ heƌ 
experience it was this that finally made the difference between good and bad counselling 
experiences. Other branches of psychology are concerned with the reduction of symptoms as a 
main treatment goal. Counselling psychology is about the whole person, body and mind. It is 
concerned with process in preference to content. Counselling psychology promotes self-
awareness in addition to competency in applying understanding of interpersonal and personal 
communication systems and processes (BPS, 2007). Furthermore, Saakvitne, Gamble, 
Pearlman and Lev (2000) use the acronym RICH to identify the most important components of 
treatment for complex trauma: respect, information, connection and hope, signifying the level 
of significance of the therapeutic relationship. It is apparent that further research is necessary 
to establish the importance of empathic engagement with an individual with complex trauma 
experiences (van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005); and how this is moderated by therapeutic 
approach, caseload factors, training, supervision, personal factors including history, 
personality, emotional maturation and resilience, and other life stressors (Ford & Courtois, 
2009b).  
D.5  Conclusions  
A subgroup of the UKTG (2009) issued a position statement identifying that the brief trauma-
focused approach recommended by NICE (2005) relates to simple, not complex trauma; which 
requires a broader range of treatment approaches, this was also a position held earlier by 
Luxenberg et al. (2001). In the absence of consensus Kilpatrick (2005b) and Pearlman (2004) 
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highlight the importance of empirically-based theory in the development of therapeutic 
interventions. This enables an individualised approach to be employed, while drawing on the 
scientist-practitioners inquisitive and the reflective practitioners open mind, the essence of 
counselling psychology (Strawbridge & Wolfe, 2010).  
 
There exists general clinical consensus that treatment with survivors of child abuse is complex, 
lengthy, phased and multi-modal (Enns, et al., 1998). At the current time the tripartite model 
appears to have gained agreement across all approaches to complex trauma, including 
Courtois (2004), Ford & Courtois (2009a), Ford et al. (2005), Luxenberg et al. (2001), Shapiro 
(2001), UKTG (2009), van der Kolk (1996; 2009a). The establishment of safety and stabilisation 
indicated within phase 1 is the most commonly applied principle within all treatments 
demonstrating positive outcomes including: DBT (Wagner & Linehan, 2006; Wagner et al., 
2007), EFTT (Paivio & Pascuale-Leone, 2010), compassion focused CBT (Lee, 2005), 
constructivist self development theory (Courtois, 2004; Pearlman & Courtois, 2005), STAIR-NST 
(Cloitre et al., 2002; Cloitre et al., 2006), seeking safety (Najavits, 2002).  Further when time is 
limited it is generally agreed that focus should be upon the establishment of safety, support, 
psychoeducation, the development of key emotion regulation skills and case management as 
priorities (Ford & Courtois, 2009a). The development of support systems beyond the 
therapeutic environment should also be addressed and encouraged (Chaikin & Prout, 2004; 
Ford & Courtois, 2009a; Dalenberg, 2000). Furthermore, Kilpatrick (2005b) highlights the 
importance of integration across disciplines and continuity of care. 
 
Ford and Courtois (2009a) further identify a number of key points identified by empirical 
research to be addressed during therapy including: physical experiencing; the emotional 
regulation; internal working models of attachment; problem-solving ; risk behaviours; 
dissociative experiences; sense of self ; avoidance of trauma re-enactment and revictimisation; 
relationship difficulties related to betrayal trauma and disorganised attachment patterns; and 
restoration of meaning. Here counselling psychology offers prioritisation of subjectivity and 
personal meaning are prioritised beyond diagnosis and treatment increasing understanding 
through phenomenology (Lane & Corrie, 2006). Further, the therapeutic relationship appears 
to have identifiable importance (Olio and Cornell, 1993). While this remains to be tested more 
fully, it would seem to be linked to treatment outcome by the fostering of secure attachments 
and a safe place in which to integrate affect with the experiencing self and develop self-
regulation (van der Kolk, 1996).  
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It is doubtless that complex trauma is inherently difficult to research (Chard, 2005; McDonagh 
et al. 2005). Consequently much of the previous research has been methodologically flawed, 
and there are many unanswered questions beyond those of effective treatment. To progress 
further towards best practice guidance with regard to adult survivors of childhood abuse 
research needs to be integrated and collaborated upon across disciplines (Kilpatrick, 2005b). 
This will enable reassembly of the fragmentation that has occurred within the field.  
 
The research on treatment outcomes with this clinical group has predominantly involved 
females and childhood sexual abuse. Therefore, the efficacy requires further testing with 
regard to gender and other types of childhood abuse. There is little information on treatment 
outcome by gender, age or ethnicity or socioeconomic background (Foa, et al., 2000). In 
addition, majority of the ƌeseaƌĐh is Noƌth AŵeƌiĐaŶ ;Cƌeaŵeƌ & O͛DoŶŶell, ϮϬϬϮͿ, aŶd Đƌoss-
cultural applicability is unknown. Further, there is a general consensus amongst RCT research 
critics regarding the limited ecological validity in treatment trials; research tends to be 
unrepresentative of the clinical population (Dorahy, 2006; Spinazzola et al. 2005); and 
inclusion and exclusion criteria often completely preclude certain groups and methods 
(Dorahy, 2006).  
 
This review has identified additional methodological gaps within the research including the 
exploration of attrition and unfavourable treatment outcomes (Bisson et al., 2007). Further to 
enhance treatment development there needs to be investigation of the differences between 
and within group differences which render some interventions, such as prolonged exposure, 
intolerable (Ford et al., 2005).  Bradley, Heim and Westen (2005) suggest interplay between 
different personality patterns amongst childhood sexual abuse survivors alone. This finding 
needs to be considered further to understand possible modulating effects of different types of 
experiences. This will also provide an opportunity to empirically test theories regarding 
different lengths of treatment (Courtois, 2004; Dorahy, 2006), as optimal treatment length is 
arbitrary. However, this is connected to funding restrictions and the lengthy follow-up times 
necessary to measure changes.  
 
Self-regulation skills have been identified as important within complex trauma treatment (e.g. 
Courtois, 2004; Ford & Kidd, 1998). However, further research may identify the mechanism for 
this and assist with understanding how it may moderate development and maintenance of 
symptoms (van der Kolk, 2009a), or whether other moderators, such as social support, are as 
important (Kilpatrick, 2005a). Similarly, clinically relevant treatment outcomes require 
comparison studies (Chaikin & Prout, 2004; Dorahy, 2006; Ford et al., 2005; Kimble et al., 1999; 
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van der Kolk & Courtois, 2005). For example comparing STAIR-NST (Cloitre et al., 2006), with 
Cognitive Processing Therapy, perhaps using the individual and group model proposed by 
Chard (2005), and with a waiting list control group. In addition, exploratory research 
identifying how non-manualised therapies could be rigorously tested is also required to 
provide further comparison opportunities.  
 
The philosophical values and practice of counselling psychology are apparent within the best 
practice summary by Ford and Courtois (2009a) identify important therapist attributes for 
working with complex trauma. They highlight the importance of recognising the individuality 
and uniqueness of each person, and a focus upon identifying resilience and adaptive 
functioning, such that empowerment can be fostered. Further, it requires therapist emotional 
maturity, in addition to suitable qualifications and competence that can manage effectively the 
constellation of problems, challenges and difficulties that occur in the material presented and 
the therapeutic relationship. Thereby, counselling psychology presents a philosophical 
foundation that already emphasises the converging constants within the field of complex 
trauma.  
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Appendices 
Appendix B1 – Research Adverts 
 
Research Study 
 
Do you have a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder? 
What is it like for you having this diagnosis? 
 
I am looking for individuals to take part in my research study. If you 
are over the age of 18, are English speaking, diagnosed in the UK 
and not currently receiving therapy or counselling, and would be 
willing to talk about your experiences of being diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, then please read on: 
 
My name is Lisa Wilson, I am a Counselling Psychology Doctoral 
student at City University, London. I would really like to give a voice 
to people who have received a diagnosis of Borderline Personality 
Disorder, and I am interested in hearing what effects this may have 
had on you.  
 
The research aims to find out what impact this diagnosis has on 
people by looking at how they talk about their experience of it. The 
study is confidential and anonymous, and will take place on an 
individual basis with me, I will provide a safe and non-judgemental 
space for you to talk about your experience.  
 
My intention is to provide those diagnosing and treating Borderline 
Personality Disorder with an opportunity for increased understanding 
of the effect this may have on the way that people see themselves.  
 
If you are interested in taking part, and would like further 
information, please contact me on lisa.research@btinternet.com or 
abbw193@city.ac.uk or by phone on 07702-416632 
 
This research is being supervised by Fiona Bailey at City University 
and she can be contacted by email at Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk or 
phone on: 020 7040 4557 
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Would you like the chance to talk about what it is like for 
you to have a Borderline Personality Disorder diagnosis? 
 
I am researching the effects of having a borderline personality disorder 
diagnosis on how you talk about your experiences. 
 
If this is something you would like to take part in, I will arrange for us to 
meet at a safe and convenient place and talk about what it is like for you 
 
This is a chance for you to say what you really think in 
confidence! 
 
Further information on the disorder and resources will be available for you to take away with 
you. 
 
If you think you might like to do this and you can answer yes to all the following 
questions then please contact me for more information: 
 
Lisa Wilson 
Tel No: 07702-416632  Email address:lisa.research@btinternet.com 
 
Are you over 18?     Yes   No  
 
Are you English speaking?   Yes   No  
 
Were you diagnosed in the UK?   Yes   No  
 
If the answer is yes to all of these, and you are not currently 
receiving therapy or counselling, then I would really like to hear from 
you. 
This research is being supervised by City University London 
Research Supervisor: Fiona Bailey Tel No: 020 7040 4557 for further 
information: Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk 
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www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.co.uk also included the 
following:  
 
About Me and the research  
My name is Lisa Wilson, I am a Counselling Psychology Doctoral student at City 
University, London. I would really like to give a voice to people who have 
received a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD), I am interested in hearing about what effects this 
has on individuals. 
 
My research aim is to find out what impact this diagnosis has 
on people by looking at how they talk about their experience 
of it. The study is confidential and anonymous, and will take 
place on an individual basis with me, I will provide a safe and 
non-judgemental space for people to talk about their 
experience.  
 
My intention is to provide those diagnosing and treating 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) with an opportunity for increased 
understanding of the effect of this on the way that people see themselves.  
If you would like to take part please contact me, I will provide further information 
about the research and also information and resources relating to the diagnosis.  
Contact Us  
If you are interested in taking part, and would like further information, please 
contact me on:  
lisa@borderlinepersonalitydisorder.co.uk  
or lisa.research@btinternet.com  
I am more than happy to answer any questions and there is absolutely no 
commitment to participate if you contact me.  
 
This research is being supervised by Fiona Bailey at City University, 
London and she can be contacted by email at Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk  
Counselling Psychology, School of Social Sciences, City University, 
Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB 
 
 Click here to Tell a friend about this research  
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Appendix B2 – Participant Information Sheet 
 
Dear_________________ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to think about talking to me as part of my research study. 
 
I am Doctoral Psychology Student at City University London. I am looking at the effects 
that being diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder has on the way that people 
express themselves, in the way they talk. This is important because it will help 
Psychologists and other mental health professionals to better understand and think 
about the impact that giving somebody a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder 
has on people. I will be talking to up to 15 people about their experiences. 
 
It is important that you think about whether you really want to take part in this study and 
are aware of what this means: 
  Your personal details will not be part of the research, that means that nothing 
that can identify you will appear in the final write up of this study. What may 
appear is parts of what you say to me, this gives real examples of what is 
important for everybody to understand. 
  You have the right to stop being part of the study at any time, if you change 
your mind about being involved. 
  You will be taking part completely voluntarily, nobody should be making you 
feel like you have to take part. 
  What you say, the audio recording that I take, the notes and transcription, that 
I keep will all be kept securely and nobody else will have access to these 
except for my research supervisor. This is covered by the Data Protection Act.  
  After the research process is complete, all records will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen if you decide to take part: 
 
We will meet and I will ask you a few questions about your experience and thoughts 
about having a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder. The interview itself will last 
for approximately 1 hour. You only say what you want to, there will be no intentionally 
difficult questions and you do not have to share anything that you do not want to.  
 
At the end of our meeting, you will have the chance to ask me any questions that you 
have and to say how you found talking about your experience. I will spend as much 
time as you need talking about this and ensuring that you leave the interview feeling 
safe. This could mean that the time taken will be longer than 1 hour.  
 
That is it! A few days after we meet I will contact you to make sure that you have no 
further questions and that you have not been upset by meeting with me. After this if you 
have any further questions or concerns you can contact either myself or my research 
supervisor up until July 2009, when I expect to finish the study.  
 
If you would like you will have the chance to find out at the end of the study what I have 
discovered. 
 
What should you do now? 
Discuss with somebody, whose opinion that you trust, that you would like to take part, 
and ask them what they think. If you are able to answer all the following questions on 
the next page with yes, contact me then we will arrange to meet at City University, 
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London at a convenient time. If needed I will refund your travelling expenses. If you 
would like any further information you contact either myself or my research supervisor 
as indicated below.  
 
It is very important that you are not currently experiencing any mental 
health problems that are not being effectively treated and stable; this is 
for your own well-being. This means any problems that you may 
experience that are not directly resulting from your diagnosis of 
Borderline Personality Disorder. I will go through this with you before we 
agree to meet.   
 
While I am a Counselling Psychologist-in-training I will not be providing 
you with treatment, just the opportunity to talk about your experience. I 
will enable you to leave the interview safely by using specific 
interventions if necessary. However, should you require further specialist 
support following the interview; I will provide you with details of a 
qualified therapist with expertise in working with those diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder. They will see you within 72 hours. This 
individual will be aware of the research and will provide a one-off session 
paid for by me. 
 
Researcher: Lisa Wilson 07702-416632 lisa.research@btinternet.com 
Research Supervisor: Fiona Bailey 020-7040-4557 Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk 
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Appendix B3 – Informed Consent Form 
What effects does the label of Borderline Personality Disorder have on the 
way people talk about themselves? 
 
I agree to take part in the above City University research project. I have had the 
project explained to me, and I have read the Participant Information Sheet, 
which I may keep. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I have 
answered yes to the following statements: 
 
Please tick the boxes if you are able to answer yes to the following: ฀ I am over 18 ฀ I am English speaking ฀ I was diagnosed by a Psychiatrist in the UK with Borderline Personality 
Disorder ฀ I am not currently receiving therapy/counselling or inpatient treatment ฀ I do not have any other untreated mental health problems ฀ I am able to give my consent to take part in this study. ฀ I understand that I will be interviewed by the researcher and that this 
interview will be audiotaped, (and later written out in full), and take about 
1 hour. ฀ I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, 
including during the interview, and that if I do all records will be 
destroyed. ฀ I am agreeing to take part voluntarily in this study, nobody is making me 
feel that I have to take part. ฀ I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no 
information that could lead to the identification of any individual will be 
disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party. No 
identifiable personal data will be published. The identifiable data will not 
be shared with any other organisation. The only time that this agreement 
will be broken is if I disclose being a serious risk to myself or to another 
including a child.  ฀ I understand that this research will be written up and may be published. ฀ I am aware that I do not have to talk about anything with the researcher 
that I do not feel happy or safe talking about. ฀ I have asked any questions that I had about the research and have 
understood the answers. 
 
Name:___________________________________ 
Signature_____________________________________Date:______________ 
 
I, the researcher, agree to comply with the above statements and sign on behalf 
of all the professionals who may be involved with this research. 
 
Researchers name:___________________________ 
Signature:____________________________________Date:_______________ 
 
Research Supervisor: Fiona Bailey    020-7040-4557    
Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk 
Counselling Psychology Department, City University, Northampton Square, 
London 
230 
 
Appendix B4 – Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1) What is your experience of being diagnosed with Borderline Personality  
Disorder? 
- how did you come to be diagnosed  
- what were the effects, positive or negative, for you 
- what differences are there in your experience between being first 
diagnosed and now 
- what are your thoughts about other people knowing you have the diagnosis 
BPD? 
 
2) What is your perspective of the effect of being diagnosed with Borderline  
    Personality Disorder? 
- How helpful/unhelpful have you found the diagnosis  
- how have other people responded to your diagnosis 
- what differences are there in how things were when you were first 
diagnosed and now 
 
3) What is your perspective of treatment now that you have a diagnosis of  
     Borderline Personality Disorder? 
-  If you have not received treatment what are the reasons for this? 
- What has been helpful/unhelpful about the treatment you have received 
- how have treatment providers responded to you 
 
4) Do you think you can recover from BPD?  
 
5) Imagine you met somebody who had no knowledge or experience of BPD,  
they lived in a place where the diagnosis does not exist. What would you 
tell them about it? How would you assist them to understand the 
problems that you have experienced? What would be important to you 
for them to know? 
 
6) If this was the perfect interview what question would you expect me to ask  
  that I haven’t already 
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Appendix B5 – Participant Resource Pack  
Useful Contacts and Support Agencies 
 
Your current mental health professional may be your first choice for support 
The following organisations may provide you with further support, particularly 
out of hours: 
 
Samaritans: 08457 90 90 90 www.samaritans.org jo@samaritans.org 
Chris, PO Box 9090 Stirling FK8 2SA – will offer emotional support 24/7 
 
Mind (National Association for Mental Health): 0845 766 0163, email 
contact@mind.org.uk, www.mind.org.uk – they will put you in touch with your local 
branch of mind who may be able to offer you support. 
 
SANEline: 0845 767 8000 SANEmail: sanemail@sane.org.uk 
  www.sane.org.uk – they can provide you will telephone or email support if you are 
finding it difficult to cope 
 
NHS Direct – 0845 4647 www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk – can advise you about what to do if 
your feeling low, or who to contact in your local area; also can offer health advice 
following self-harm 
 
Cruse Bereavement Care – personal and confidential advice to anybody who is 
bereaved 0870 167 1677 
 
Relate – assistance for people experiencing relationship problems (they are not mental 
health experts) www.relate.org.uk – to find your nearest branch – fees vary 
 
BPDWorld – is the first registered charity for Border Personality Disorder 
sufferers they offer on-line, email and telephone support 0870 005 3273 
(national rate) www.bpdworld.org  
 
Borderline UK – national user led network offering the opportunity to talk with others 
about BPD 
www.borderlineuk.co.uk 
 
SupportLine Telephone Helpline: 020 8554 9004 - Provides emotional support to male 
and female survivors of abuse and associated issues. Also keeps details of counsellors 
and survivor support groups, helplines, and details of counsellors listed with the 
National Register of Male Sexual Assault Counsellors throughout the UK. Also provides 
email support info@supportline.org.uk and postal support SupportLine, PO Box 1596, 
Ilford, Essex IG1 3FW 
Bristol Crisis Service for Women: 0117 925 1119, PO Box 654, Bristol BS99 
1XH, email bcsw@btconnect.com, www.users.zetnet.co.uk/bcsw - National helpline 
for women in distress, especially those who self injure and run and support self help 
groups. 
Childwatch: 01482 325 552, email info@Childwatch.org.uk, 
www.Childwatch.org.uk - Free and confidential counselling for young people and 
adults who have suffered abuse, physical, mental, emotional, sexual. 
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NAPAC (National Association for People Abused in Childhood): 0800 085 
3330, 42 Curtain Road, London EC2A 3NH, www.napac.org.uk - Provides referrals 
and free extracts from the DABS Resource Packs to survivors. 
Rape & Sexual Abuse Support Centre: Helpline 08451 221331, Counselling 020 
8683 3311, email info@rasasc.org.uk, www.rasasc.org.uk - Helpline support and 
information for all survivors of rape or childhood sexual abuse. 
The Roofie Foundation: 0800 783 2980, www.roofie.com - Advice information and 
support on drug assisted rape. 
SAFE: 01722 410889 - SAFE provides a telephone helpline for survivors of ritual 
abuse and their supporters. 
Survivors Poetry:  020 7281 4654, email info@survivorspoetry.org.uk, 
www.survivorspoetry.com - National organisation promoting poetry of survivors of 
mental distress through workshops, meetings and publications. Phone for details of 
nearest group. 
www.dissociation.co.uk - Details of therapists with experience of dissociation and 
useful links 
www.havoca.org – website offering support and advice for survivors of abuse 
www.nshn.co.uk – national self harm network offer support and advice to those who 
self-harm to cope with emotional distress 
Useful reading: These books give accounts of two individuals diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder 
No one knows: Borderline Personality Disorder. The story of a secret survivor by 
Joshua Cole (2008) 
Get me out of here: My recovery from Borderline Personality Disorder by Rachel 
Reiland (2004) 
Please note: If you feel that you are at risk of seriously harming yourself 
then you should call 999 or get to your nearest A&E department. While 
you may be reluctant to do this it may be the quickest way to staying safe.  
http://www.mind.org.uk/Information/Booklets/How+to/How+to+cope+with+
suicidal+feelings.htm – this is a link to a useful booklet produced by mind on 
Coping with suicidal feelings and also provides other emergency numbers and 
organisations who may be able to help 
Other items in this resource pack: 
Borderline UK Ltd  - ‘An introduction to BPD leaflet’ is provided as part of the 
resource pack 
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BPDWorld – ‘Crisis: What to do when life gets too much’ is provided as part of 
the resource pack; Borderline Personality Disorder; Dialectical Behaviour 
Therapy 
Mind Leaflets – Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder; Understanding 
Talking Treatments; Understanding Dissociative Disorders; How to cope with 
loneliness; How to cope with suicidal feelings  
 
Therapist contact details 
 
Dr Imogen Sturgeon-Clegg 
Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Cornerstone Psychological Services 
32 Kings Road 
Brentwood 
Essex 
CM14 4DW 
07773 312468 
 
Jonny Brough CPsychol 
Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Finding Space 
Counselling Psychology Practice 
info@findingspace.co.uk 
Tel: 020 8365 3545 
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Treatments for Borderline Personality Disorder 
(information from: www.personalitydisorder.org.uk) 
Please note: Not all of these may be available from you local NHS provider 
Dynamic psychotherapy 
 This is based on a developmental model of 
personality   Treatment is generally long term   The aim of therapy is to understand the way in 
which the past influences the present   Treatment focuses on: the relationship between 
client and therapist; the individual’s emotional 
life; and their use of defences   Therapy uses the relationship between client 
and therapist as a way to understand how the 
internal world of the individual affects 
relationships  
Cognitive Analytical Therapy 
 This therapy assumes that a set of partially 
dissociated 'self-states' account for the clinical 
features of borderline personality disorder   Rapid switching between these self-states leads 
to lack of control of emotions including intense 
expression of them and virtual absence 
(depersonalisation or a feeling of not being 
there)   Therapy aims for the therapist and client to 
address these processes, examining them as 
they occur in treatment as well as in life 
experiences  
Cognitive Therapy 
 This is similar to cognitive behaviour therapy, it 
is goal directed and focused more on altering 
underlying belief structures rather than reduction 
of symptoms   It is likely to take up to 30 sessions of treatment, 
of which the early sessions help to identify the 
areas of intervention required by uncovering 
what are the fundamental structures of past, 
present and future experiences   The therapist and client maintain a collaborative 
relationship throughout treatment, the approach 
includes homework and testing of core beliefs 
and structures  
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Dialectic Behaviour Therapy (DBT) 
 This is a special adaptation of cognitive therapy, 
originally used for the treatment of women with 
borderline personality disorder who self-harmed   DBT is a manualised therapy which includes 
looking at  behaviour, skills training and support 
(empathy, validation of feelings, management of 
trauma)   Directed at reducing self-harm through increase 
self-regulation of emotions and behaviour 
Therapeutic Community Treatments 
 Therapeutic communities provide intensive 
psychosocial treatment which may include a 
variety of therapies but where the therapeutic 
environment itself is seen as the primary agent 
of change. This is normal residential.   They include democratic and concept types, the 
former including members of the community as 
decision makers   External control is kept to a minimum: members 
of the community take a significant role in 
decision making and the everyday running of the 
unit  
 
The National Personality Disorder Website – contains further up to date 
information and developments in the general area of personality disorder. The 
following link is to a webpage providing downloadable leaflets on coping with 
bereavement, stress and anxiety, anger, traumatic events and other important 
and potentially relevant topics - 
http://personalitydisorder.org.uk/index2.php?page_id=19 
The site also identifies where in the country new treatment pilots are being 
conducted. 
Researcher: Lisa Wilson 07702-416632 lisa.research@btinternet.com 
Research Supervisor: Fiona Bailey    020-7040-4557     
Fiona.Bailey.1@city.ac.uk Counselling Psychology Department, City University, 
Northampton Square, London 
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Appendix B6 – Debriefing and Interview Closure Procedure 
 
Throughout the interview I will ensure that I listen empathically, without exerting 
undue influence on the qualitative research process. I will ensure that I 
communicate clearly throughout. My interviewing style will be calm and 
accepting. These principles are identified by Beck, Freeman and Davis (2004), 
Livesley (2003) and Padesky (2005) as being important when working with 
individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. 
 
At the end of the interview, I will: 
  briefly summarise the main points the participant has said during the 
interview. I will take care to ensure that this provides the opportunity to 
validate their feelings;  ask the participant if my understanding and summary is correct;  ask how they feel after the interview; assuming that they are feeling in as 
good a state as when they entered the interview then:  ask if they have any questions and answer these 
appropriately  where they are feeling unduly effected by the interview, I will spend time with 
them using a variety of functional interventions to address this: 
o If the participant is feeling dissociated I will use ‘here and now’ 
grounding techniques to re-orientate them to the present time; 
o If the participant is feeling a mood affect then I will take time to 
validate their feelings and try to identify an action plan with them 
that will assist in ensuring their safety upon leaving the interview. 
This may include identifying ways in which the client may keep 
themselves safe and ideas for coping with moods; 
o If the participant expresses a wish for relaxation then simple and 
brief breathing and imagery relaxation will be used; 
o If after exploring each of these there is no change it may be 
necessary to contact the emergency number from their contact 
sheet, or to seek advice from a colleague or member of 
psychology staff. This will be done with the knowledge of the 
participant.   The resource pack will be provided and extra information offered in the form 
of leaflets and further reading for them to take away with them. The resource 
pack will be explained and the support agencies listed will be identified to 
ensure that the participant knows who they can contact if they need to.   The participant will be reminded that if they have any questions or comments 
that they would like to add after the interview they can contact either myself 
or my research supervisor up until the research has been written up. 
 
In the event that a participant becomes markedly distressed during the 
interview, I will seek to ensure safety and containment and not continue with the 
interview process. This will involve: 
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 Increased empathic listening   Validating of the emotional reaction  Focus on understanding the participants point of view through providing 
summaries  Using the participants own words and not paraphrasing  Communicating clearly in short sentences, so that the participant is aware of 
my communication and I can check their reception of my statements  Help the client to draw on former positive experiences or strengths  If after an appropriate amount of time has passed and this has not assisted 
in containing the situation or assisting the participant to feel safe then it will 
be necessary to either stop the interview or seek support from staff, a 
colleague or security if there is any physical danger. It may also be 
appropriate in the situation to make contact with the participants identified 
emergency contact. Alternatively, the participant may wish to be seen for a 
therapeutic session. Details will be provided in the resource pack (Appendix 
5) who they contact and be seen by within 72 hours, and the participant’s 
attention will be drawn to this.  
 
The above procedure is a safety measure taking into account some of the 
diagnosing features of borderline personality disorder. It is possible that the 
participant has difficulties with self-regulation, emotional, cognitive and/or 
behavioural. These techniques as identified by Padesky (2005) and Beck et al 
(2004) are generally effective in providing safety and containment and reducing 
emotional arousal. The most important factor will be to prevent escalation of the 
response. Should this situation arise the interview will not be continued for 
research purposes, only to ensure the participants safety and containment.  
 
The researcher has identified that the interview will take 1 hour, however, with 
debriefing this will possibly be longer. This has been identified on the participant 
information sheet (Appendix 3) and will be explained to the participant upon 
initial contact; when arranging the interview and prior to commencement of the 
interview. The length of time will depend on the amount of debriefing that is 
required. 
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Appendix B7 – Checklist 
Name:  
Contact Details: 
 
 
DOB:  Gender:  First Language:  
 Yes No 
Over 18? 
  
Diagnosis of BPD by UK Psychiatrist? 
Date diagnosed: 
  
Currently receiving therapy/counselling?  
Date last received therapy counselling: 
  
Untreated co-existing Axis I disorders: Substance-Related 
Disorder 
Psychosis or Schizophrenia 
Depression or Bipolar Disorder 
Anxiety Disorder (PTSD; OCD; generalised; panic; phobia) 
Dissociative Disorder 
Eating Disorder 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Capacity to consent? 
  
Consent form discussed and signed, including right to withdraw: 
At initial contact? 
                            At start of interview? 
  
Participant information discussed and provided:   
                At initial contact? 
                At start of interview? 
  
Procedure explained?   
Opportunity for questions?   
Emergency Contact form explained and completed?   
Contingency Plan explained, including therapist contacts?   
Resource Pack provided?   
Interview date; directions provided; room booked; colleague 
identified: 
 
Details of debriefing 
provided: 
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Appendix B8 – Ethics Form 
Ethics Release Form for Psychology Research Projects 
 
All students planning to undertake any research activity in the Department of Psychology are required to 
complete this Ethics Release Form and to submit it to their Research Supervisor, together with their 
research proposal, prior to commencing their research work. If you are proposing multiple studies within 
your research project, you are required to submit a separate ethical release form for each study. 
 
This form should be completed in the context of the following information: 
  An understanding of ethical considerations is central to planning and conducting research.  Approval to carry out research by the Department of Psychology does not exempt you from Ethics 
Committee approval from institutions within which you may be planning to conduct the research, e.g.: 
Hospitals, NHS Trusts, HM Prisons Service, etc.  The published ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society (2004) Guidelines for minimum 
standards of ethical approval in psychological research (BPS:  Leicester) should be referred to when 
planning your research.  Students are not permitted to begin their research work until approval has been received and this 
form has been signed by 2 members of Department of Psychology staff. 
 
Section A: To be completed by the student 
 
Please indicate the degree that the proposed research project pertains to: 
 
BSc           MPhil             MSc             PhD           DPsych   √          n/a    
Please answer all of the following questions, circling yes or no where appropriate: 
 
1. Title of project 
What effects does the label of Borderline Personality Disorder have, as demonstrated through 
discourse? 
 
2. Name of student researcher (please include contact address and telephone number) 
Lisa Wilson, 36 Riviera Drive, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, SS1 2QT, 07702-416632 
 
3. Name of research supervisor 
Fiona Bailey, Counselling Psychology Department, City University, Northampton Square, London, 
EC1V 0HB, 020 7040 4557 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
4. Is a research proposal appended to this ethics release form?          Yes   No 
 
5. Does the research involve the use of human subjects/participants? Yes  No 
 
If yes, a.  Approximately how many are planned to be involved?  Between 8 -15  
 
b. How will you recruit them? Recruitment flyer/advertisement requesting volunteers 
  
c. What are your recruitment criteria? Over 18 yrs; English speaking; diagnosed with Borderline 
Personality Disorder by a Psychiatrist in the UK; has no untreated co-existing Axis I disorders; has 
the capacity to consent to participation in research; is not currently an inpatient; not 
currently receiving therapy or counselling. (Please append your recruitment 
material/advertisement/flyer) 
 
d. Will the research involve the participation of minors (under 16 years of age) or those unable to give 
informed consent?     Yes  No 
 
e. If   yes, will signed parental/carer consent be obtained? Yes  No 
 
6. What will be required of each subject/participant (e.g. time commitment, task/activity)? (If psychometric 
instruments are to be employed, please state who will be supervising their use and their relevant 
qualification). 
Each participant will take part in a semi-structured interview for approximately 1 hour with the 
researcher. They will be asked open-ended questions relating to their experience and perspectives 
of their diagnosis. (See Appendix 6) 
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7. Is there any risk of physical or psychological harm to the subjects/participants? 
 
         Yes  No 
 
If  yes,  a.  Please detail the possible harm? As with any research involving human participants there 
is the possibility of negative effects, when discussing past experience, this is not considered to be 
undue harm. 
  
   b.  How can this be justified? There is no expected harm outside of what a participant may 
experience in their usual environment as a result of their free-will. The potential for risk will be 
monitored and a list of resources for support provided.  
 
8. Will all subjects/participants and/or their parents/carers receive an information sheet describing the 
aims, procedure and possible risks of the research, as well as providing researcher and supervisor contact 
details? 
         Yes  No 
 
 (Please append the information sheet which should be written in terms which are accessible to your 
subjects/participants and/or their parents/carers) 
 
9. Will any person’s treatment/care be in any way compromised if they choose not to participate in the 
research?         
         Yes  No 
 
10. Will all subjects/participants be required to sign a consent form, stating that they fully understand the 
purpose, procedure and possible risks of the research? 
         Yes  No 
 
 (Please append the informed consent form which should be written in terms which are accessible to your 
subjects/participants and/or their parents/carers) 
 
11. What records will you be keeping of your subjects/participants? (e.g. research notes, computer 
records, tape/video recordings)? 
Research notes; computer typed and stored transcripts; digital audio recordings 
 
12. What provision will there be for the safe-keeping of these records? All written and printed notes will 
be kept in locked storage at researcher’s home address. All computer files will be password 
protected. 
 
13.  What will happen to the records at the end of the project? The records will be stored until 
successful submission, completion and examination of the research has occurred and no further 
raw data is required, they will then be destroyed securely. 
14. How will you protect the anonymity of the subjects/participants? The participants will not be 
identified by name in the research and their information will not be stored under their names, only 
a number to identify between the participants. No identifying details will be stored outside of the 
required demographic data of age, gender and ethnicity. Only fragments of their interview 
transcripts will be recorded in the final submission and will not contain any identifying details. 
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Appendix B9 – Research Costs  
 
Website and advertising  £116.33 
Including purchase of domain name, Google ads, website hosting 
 
Meeting Rooms   £209.30 
Including room hire and refreshments 
 
Travel and Accommodation £261.18 
Including train travel, petrol, parking and overnight accommodation 
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Appendix B10 – Leaflets provided as part of resource pack  
 
Borderline UK Ltd. (2007). An introduction to BPD. Retrieved from 
http://www.emergenceplus.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layo
ut=blog&id=46&Itemid=64 
BPDWorld. (2007). Borderline personality disorder: Self-harm. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpdworld.org/leaflets-a-downloads 
BPDWorld. (2007). Crisis: What to do when life gets too much. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpdworld.org/leaflets-a-downloads 
BPDWorld. (2007). Dialectical behavioural therapy. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpdworld.org/leaflets-a-downloads 
BPDWorld. (2007). What is borderline personality disorder? Retrieved from 
http://www.bpdworld.org/leaflets-a-downloads 
Flory, L. (2007). Understanding borderline personality disorder. (Rev. ed.). London: 
Mind Publications.   
Livingstone, K. (with First Person Plural). (2009). Understanding dissociative disorders. 
(Rev. ed.). London: Mind Publications.  
Meakins, E., & Gorman, J. (2007). How to cope with loneliness. (Rev. ed.). London: 
Mind Publications.  
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. (2009, January 27). Press 
Release: New NICE guidelines set to improve treatment and management of people 
with borderline personality disorder. Retrieved from http://www.nice.org.uk 
Perry, K. (2008). How to cope with suicidal feelings. London: Mind Publications.   
Read, J. (2009). Understanding talking treatments. (Rev, ed.). London: Mind 
Publications.  
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Appendix B11 – Examples of feedback received from participants  
 
Received by email on 27/3/09 
Hi Lisa  
Thank you for the list of books, it's really helpful and I will check them out.  It was good 
to have a chance to talk openly about my BPD experience and I wish you well with your 
research.  It's good to know that these areas are being re-considered for the sake of 
both the sufferers and therapists of the future and I certainly benefitted from the 
interview.  I was a little drained afterwards but it was well worth it and I appreciate the 
work that you are doing and was amazed really that you took the time and effort to 
travel so far! 
Very best wishes for all that you do and I look forward to reading your findings when 
they are complete. 
Take Care 
Received by email on 3/3/09 
Dear Lisa, 
 thank you very much for your email and informative attachments.  It was very nice to 
meet you and I felt very relaxed during the interview despite talking about a distressing 
subject and felt you dealt with me in a very understanding manner. 
can't thank you enough for your help,….You have made a difference in m agonizing life 
and given me hope for a better future with this newfound knowledge.  If there is ever 
anything I can do to help you in any way in terms of follow research about DBT in bpd 
cases in the UK please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Best wishes, 
(N.B. Individual went on to access treatment which they did not realise was available 
until after our interview) 
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Received by email 26/2/09 
Dear Lisa 
I wonder if it is possible for me to forward your contact details to xxxxx?  I attend a 
meeting in London and was talking about your work and interest was noted. 
Once again thank you 
 
Examples of verbal feedback received after the interviews: 
“Yeah it feels pretty cool.” – March 09 
“Oh it’s great really I’m ((laughingly)) I’m sort of yeah I just feel I don’t know maybe I 
buried it all I haven’t really talked about it ever so knowing that there’s all this I don’t I 
don’t perhaps I don’t feel so lonely or abandoned….I would like to follow some of it up 
erm yeah you know erm yeah I think I would like to write about it because it is so 
subjective isn’t it. Yeah it’s great so I didn’t really expect to get so much back so thank 
you” - April 09
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Appendix B12 – Approximate Transcribing Times 
             Interview length Hours of transcribing 
Anne     67 mins 1 sec    70 
 
Beatrice    77 mins 53 secs   80 
 
Clemence    104 mins    100 
 
Dorothy    63 mins 50 secs   65 
 
Ellen     49 mins 43 secs   55 
 
Francis    58 mins    50 
 
Grace     86 mins 30 secs   78 
 
Helen     86 mins 24 secs   75 
 
 
Total Transcribing Time       573 
 
Transcribing time includes time taken to audio-type a first hearing including attention to 
pauses, intonation, emphasis. Followed by checking print out for errors and omissions, 
and making corrections. 
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Appendix B13 – Brief Contextual Information for Participants 
 
Anne  
Anne has had a diagnosis of BPD for over 10 years; she is married with 2 adolescent children. 
She works part-time campaigning for better rights and services for families effected by mental 
health issues and to improve services for mental health service users. Her interview clearly 
evidences her search for an answer; while demonstrating an underlying fear that she will never 
ƌeĐoǀeƌ. Heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of BPD is ďeiŶg ĐoŶtƌolled ďǇ soŵethiŶg eǆteƌŶal to heƌself. AŶŶe͛s 
motivation to participate in the research came from her role as campaigner, and a wish to be 
heard as an individual, she relies on explanations of collective experience to express herself. 
Anne identifies her children as her reason for survival. She is searching for meaning and hope. 
Anne appears to be caught in a dialectical dilemma between the desire for personal control 
and the desire for others to take responsibility for her.  Her life is dominated by mental health 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs: heƌ oǁŶ, heƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s, heƌ sisteƌs, heƌ paƌeŶts aŶd heƌ fƌieŶds.        
 
Beatrice  
Beatrice received her diagnosis 8 years prior to the interview fairly late on in her life, she lives 
alone and describes an experience of overwhelming isolation and loneliness. She had no 
contact with mental health services at the time we met.  Beatrice is searching for an answer to 
her problems; at the time we met she was preoccupied with the possibility of an additional 
diagnosis of Aspergers Syndrome. Beatrice feels let down by the mental health system and the 
people she believed were supposed to have helped her.  Her motivation to participate in the 
research came from a desire to express her frustration with the mental health system and to 
disclose her anger at being let down by it. However, in addition to this it was the opportunity 
to make contact with somebody who could provide an answer, and potentially alter the course 
of her life. Beatrice describes her experience in terms of having being abused a second time by 
the services who were intended to help her.  
 
Clemence  
Clemence was informed of her diagnosis 8 years prior to the interview. She lives with her 
partner and is a practising psychologist. This was the first time that she had spoken about her 
experience since completing long-teƌŵ theƌapǇ Ǉeaƌs pƌeǀiouslǇ. CleŵeŶĐe͛s ŵotiǀatioŶ to 
participate in the research came from her desire to challenge the prejudice and stigma that 
eǆisted ǁithiŶ the pƌofessioŶ, to staŶd up aŶd saǇ ͚I did it, I ƌeĐoǀeƌed͛; ŵakiŶg it Đleaƌ to the 
profession that the current understanding of BPD and its prognosis was incorrect. However, 
she experienced a dilemma, could you actually recover from a disordered personality. 
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CleŵeŶĐe͛s ďelief ďeiŶg that BPD ǁas iŶ faĐt a ƌeaĐtioŶ to eǆtƌeŵe tƌauŵa. CleŵeŶĐe͛s 
interview was punctuated by analogies, metaphors and use of verbal processes, directly 
quoting what others had said, or might have said. Her analogies are real and vivid bringing her 
experience to life.   
    
Dorothy  
Dorothy was formally diagnosed 3 years prior to interview; she has a daughter who stays with 
her several nights a week. She spent most of her own childhood in care. Her support networks 
are mainly friends whom she had been through residential treatment with and friends from 
AlĐoholiĐs AŶoŶǇŵous. DoƌothǇ͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ suggested to ŵe that she ďelieǀed she would 
always have BPD, there were no answers but she hoped that each time she experienced a bad 
time she would learn a little bit more about how to manage her symptoms. She describes her 
experience of the problems and treatment associated with her symptoms as punishing. Her 
motivation for participating in the research appeared to be related to her poor experience of 
community mental health treatment. She wanted to know what else might be available and to 
make me, as a mental health professional, aware that she had been let down, perhaps 
wondering what I might be able to offer.  
 
Ellen  
Ellen lives with her husband and had only recently been formally diagnosed with BPD. She had 
been left trying to understand what it meant and whether she was to blame, it was important 
to heƌ that people uŶdeƌstood that heƌ ͚diagŶosis͛ ǁas a ƌesult of ŶeuƌologiĐal diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ 
the brain. Ellen was confused, she was not sure what the diagnosis meant for her or her future, 
but wanted to participate in the hope I would be able to provide some sense of meaning, 
understanding and information that would enable her to understand and to give her hope for 
the future, as well as benefiting others in her situation. Her interview was punctuated with 
unfinished sentences, almost as if fearful about what would happen if she voiced her fears.   
 
Francis  
Francis lives with his wife and was diagnosed 7 years prior to the interview. He is employed 
full-time and is a martial arts instructor. Shortly after his diagnosis he was discharged from 
mental health services, which he describes as having been his choice, as he did not feel there 
was anything more they could do. Francis describes the diagnosis as having given him an 
answer, a reason for his problems and something he could work hard to overcome. However, 
he did Ŷot thiŶk that it ǁas possiďle to ƌeĐoǀeƌ fƌoŵ it ďeĐause theƌe ǁas soŵethiŶg ͚ǁƌoŶg͛ 
with his personality. His motivation to talk to me, although not explicit, appeared to be a 
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reaching out to me as a psychologist to see if there was anything else; if I would offer him 
something he had previously been unable to find, possibly the opportunity to be dependant 
upon somebody else. Francis viewed his problems very much in light of his past traumatic 
experiences; his interview is filled with examples of him having coped alone, independently, 
with the minimum of support.   
 
Grace  
Grace was diagnosed with BPD four years prior to interview; she is a mental health 
pƌofessioŶal. GƌaĐe͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁas the oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ heƌ to ŵake seŶse of heƌ experience 
and to have a voice against the stereotyping and stigma present amongst mental health 
professionals towards those with BPD. Her interview clearly demonstrates a dilemma relating 
to the holding of two positions as professional and ex-service user. Grace seeks an answer, to 
understand what the diagnosis means for her now in her role as a professional. This is a 
dilemma which during the course of the interview she uncovered and voiced. Her struggle with 
the shame she experiences in relation to her past behaviour, is further impacted by the 
prejudice of other professionals around her towards service users with the diagnosis.  
 
Helen  
Helen received her BPD diagnosis 6 years prior to interview. Her motivation to participate in 
the research influenced by a fear that her problems were beginning to resurface as a result of 
a new romantic relationship, she wanted to find out what might be available to support her 
and reduce the impact of this. Her interview is punctuated with metaphors and analogies 
demonstrating her skill at voicing her experiences in a language which others, namely mental 
health professionals, could understand. Helen seeks answers and increased understanding. 
She perceives the diagnosis as something that she is able to hold on to for safety when things 
ďeĐoŵe diffiĐult iŶ heƌ life. Hoǁeǀeƌ, she also diƌeĐtlǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐts BPD as ͚aŶ eŶigŵa͛, aŶd the 
ŵeŶtal health sǇsteŵ as a ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ǁhiĐh is diffiĐult to ͚esĐape͛ fƌoŵ oŶĐe Ǉou aƌe paƌt of it.  
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Predisposing 
factors 
 
 
Acute Phase 
 
Maintenance Phase 
 
High Negative 
Affectivity/ 
Trait Anxiety/ 
Neuroticism 
(resulting from 
early 
childhood 
experience) 
Biological 
Predisposition 
to 
somatisation 
of anxiety 
Increase in 
Anxiety/ 
Arousal Level 
Somatisation 
of Anxiety as 
Gastro-
intestinal 
symptoms 
Failure to 
Habituate or 
Gather 
Disconfirming 
Evidence 
Interpretation of 
interoceptive cues 
(or similar cues in 
others) as indication 
of imminent vomiting 
(butterflies, watery 
mouth; child 
coughing) 
 
Hypersensitivity/ 
Attentional Bias to 
Interoceptive Cues or 
similar cues in others  
Worry or 
Concern about 
Future Vomiting 
Avoidance 
of real or 
imagined 
nauseants 
(hospitals, 
food, words) 
 
Trigger 
Sensations; thoughts; situations 
(Butterflies in stomach, watery mouth; ‘If I go into the 
hospital I might catch something and be sick and that 
would be unbearable’; children appearing unwell e.g. 
coughing) 
Appendix C1 -  Cognitive Behavioural Formulation for Alison  
                            ďased oŶ BosĐheŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ Model of Eŵetophoďia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
